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THE MYRIAD REASONS TO HIT “RESET” ON 
PATENT-ELIGIBILITY JURISPRUDENCE 
Alan J. Heinrich & Christopher T. Abernethy∗ 
This Article explores the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. in the 
historical context of the Court’s jurisprudence regarding the scope of 
patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, including the 
broad, judicially created “exceptions” to the statute which exclude 
“laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas” from patent 
eligibility. The authors posit that the Myriad decision was a significant 
departure from the Court’s prior jurisprudence regarding patent-
eligible subject matter. The authors welcome this departure and 
contend that Myriad more accurately adhered to the letter and the spirit 
of § 101 than did many of the Court’s prior rulings. The authors further 
propose that Myriad’s bright-line test for patent eligibility can provide 
a foundation for a clear and workable framework, grounded firmly in 
statute, that would at last bring order and consistency to an area of 
patent law that has long been riddled with confusion and uncertainty.
 
 ∗ Alan J. Heinrich and Christopher T. Abernethy are litigators at Irell & Manella LLP. The 
views expressed in this Article are solely those of the authors and do not reflect the views of Irell 
& Manella LLP or its clients. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On June 13, 2013, the Supreme Court decided Association for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,1 its latest decision on 
the scope of patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. In 
Myriad, the Court considered the patent eligibility of claims directed 
to human DNA sequences. The patentee had discovered the sequence 
and precise location on chromosomes 13 and 17 of two genes 
(BRCA1 and BRCA2) that, when mutated, are associated with a 
substantial increase in an individual’s risk of developing breast and 
ovarian cancer.2 The Court decided the case by applying a bright-line 
rule. The Court held that naturally occurring DNA sequences are not 
patent eligible, but that non-naturally occurring DNA sequences 
(known as complementary DNA, or “cDNA”), which are synthesized 
using well-known laboratory techniques, are patent eligible.3 
The thesis of this Article is twofold. First, we posit that 
Myriad’s bright-line rule on patent eligibility sharply conflicts with 
much of the Court’s modern § 101 jurisprudence—including, in 
particular, with the Supreme Court’s immediately preceding foray 
into patent eligibility in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus 
Laboratories, Inc.4 Second, we posit that Myriad was “correctly 
decided”—that is, decided in accordance with the letter and spirit of 
§ 101 itself. 
In ruling that cDNA is patent eligible, the Myriad Court 
abandoned two primary judicial glosses on § 101 from prior Supreme 
Court case law—the “inventive concept” and “preemption” analyses. 
The Myriad Court did not ask whether the patentee’s claims to 
cDNA included an “inventive concept” beyond the discovery of the 
patent-ineligible isolated genes and the use of conventional 
laboratory techniques to synthesize cDNA from those genes. Nor did 
the Myriad Court consider whether, and to what extent, allowing 
claims directed to cDNA would “preempt” further exploitation and 
 
 1. 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
 2. Id. at 2112–13. 
 3. Id. at 2111 (“[W]e hold that a naturally occurring DNA segment is a product of nature 
and not patent eligible merely because it has been isolated, but that cDNA is patent eligible 
because it is not naturally occurring.”); id. at 2116–19. 
 4. 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
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investigation of the patentee’s discovery of the patent-ineligible 
isolated genes. This Article proposes that Myriad’s abandonment of 
those judicial glosses presents an opportunity for the Supreme Court 
to hit “reset” on its § 101 jurisprudence in future cases. 
It is hardly a matter of controversy to observe that § 101 case 
law has become a morass, as lower courts have struggled mightily to 
apply the Supreme Court’s various judicial glosses on, and 
exceptions to, patent eligibility. The result has been inconsistency, 
uncertainty, and disagreement between and among district and 
appellate judges—and, indeed, conflicts between and within 
Supreme Court cases themselves. One need look no further than the 
Federal Circuit’s recent case of CLS Bank International v. Alice 
Corp. Pty. Ltd.5, in which an “irreconcilably fractured”6 en banc 
court failed to articulate any approach to the § 101 analysis that 
could garner majority support among the judges. As Chief Judge 
Rader remarked, “though much is published today discussing the 
proper approach to the patent eligibility inquiry, nothing said today 
beyond our judgment has the weight of precedent.”7 In the midst of 
such a morass, Myriad’s straightforward analysis is a welcome 
change. 
At the same time, we recognize that the Supreme Court’s 
juridical glosses on, and exceptions to, § 101 have been motivated by 
legitimate—and, indeed, weighty—policy concerns. These concerns 
include striking the proper balance between spurring innovation 
through the grant of a patent monopoly and ensuring that the patent 
system does not hamper innovation by restricting the exploitation 
and investigation of matters that properly belong in the public 
domain. However, in our view, the patent laws provide other tools in 
addition to § 101 for striking this balance, and in many cases those 
other tools provide a more logical and predictable analysis. Under 
the approach to § 101 that we advance in this Article—an approach 
that takes its cues from Myriad and the statute itself—most of the 
§ 101 cases that we survey may well have turned out the same way, 
albeit by a different legal route. 
 
 5. 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc). 
 6. Id. at 1314 (Moore, J., dissenting) (lamenting the fact that the Federal Circuit “is 
irreconcilably fractured over these system claims [when] there are many similar cases pending 
before our court and the district courts”). 
 7. Id. at 1292 n.1 (Rader, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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This Article begins with an analysis of § 101, including its 
constitutional basis and its statutory predecessors. We then survey 
the history of the Supreme Court’s case law on patent eligibility, 
focusing on the development of the Court’s “judicial exceptions” to 
§ 101 and the inconsistencies from case to case in the Court’s 
application of those judicial exceptions. We proceed with a 
discussion of why, in our view, the Court’s patent-eligibility case law 
has diverged too far from the statutory scope of § 101, and we show 
how the Court’s frameworks have proven to be unmanageable for 
lower courts to apply. We end by considering how future application 
and interpretation of Myriad may provide a pivotal opportunity for 
the Court to hit “reset” on its § 101 jurisprudence and to bring much-
needed certainty and predictability to this troubled area of the law. 
Finally, we note the obvious: the thesis we present here is not 
intended to be a descriptive summary on the state of the law today. 
Myriad has not, of course, overruled prior Supreme Court cases sub 
silentio. It is up to the Supreme Court alone to decide whether, and to 
what extent, it will change course in its § 101 jurisprudence. Until 
then, lower courts and litigators must apply Supreme Court precedent 
as it currently stands, including the judicial glosses and exceptions 
that continue in full force under prevailing Supreme Court precedent. 
II.  PATENT ELIGIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY BASES 
Section 101 of the Patent Act defines the categories of subject 
matter that are patent eligible. It reads, in its entirety, as follows: 
“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the 
conditions and requirements of this title.”8 
On its face, § 101 states that “any” new and useful “process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter” constitutes patent-
eligible subject matter.9 However, despite this plain language, the 
Supreme Court has recognized “three specific exceptions to § 101’s 
broad patent eligibility principles: ‘laws of nature, physical 
phenomena, and abstract ideas’” are not patent eligible.10 
 
 8. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (emphasis added) (quoting Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)). 
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The task of defining and consistently applying these vague, 
judicially created “exceptions” to § 101—which are “not required by 
the statutory text”11—has confounded courts, commentators, and 
practitioners for more than 150 years. In an attempt to lend a 
modicum of clarity to more than a century of confusion, Parts II and 
III walk through and analyze the history of patent-eligible subject 
matter, starting with the U.S. Constitutional Convention, and ending 
with the Supreme Court’s June 13, 2013, decision in Myriad.12 
A.  Intellectual Property Clause 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, known as 
the “Intellectual Property Clause,” bestows upon Congress the 
power: “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”13 
While a plain reading clearly indicates that the Intellectual 
Property Clause is expansive in scope, an analysis of the Clause’s 
origins is instructive. We begin with the Constitutional Convention 
of 1787, wherein James Madison of Virginia and Charles Pinckney 
of South Carolina each proposed multiple separate provisions 
relating to federal power over intellectual property rights.14 The 
Convention Journal for August 18, 1787, listed twenty “powers 
proposed to be vested in the Legislature of the United States,” among 
which were the following provisions relating to intellectual property: 
To secure to literary authors their copy rights for a limited 
time 
. . . . 
To encourage, by proper premiums and provisions, the 
advancement of useful knowledge and discoveries 
. . . . 
To grant patents for useful inventions 
To secure to authors exclusive rights for a certain time 
 
 11. Id. 
 12. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2107 (2013). 
 13.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 14. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 321–25 (Max Farrand 
ed., 1937); see also S. REP. NO. 1979, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), reprinted in 1952 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2396 (describing the history of the Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution when enacting the Patent Act of 1952). 
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To establish public institutions, rewards and immunities for 
the promotion of agriculture, commerce, trades, and 
manufactures.15 
Although the Convention Journal does not state who proposed 
each of these powers, James Madison’s journal entry for August 18, 
1787, indicates that Madison offered the first two proposed powers, 
while Pinckney offered the latter three.16 On September 5, 1787, the 
Committee of Eleven—which included Madison—merged the 
foregoing proposals into a single provision that would become the 
Intellectual Property Clause: “To promote the progress of science 
and useful arts by securing for limited times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and 
discoveries.”17 
The Committee unanimously approved the Intellectual Property 
Clause without recorded debate,18 and the Clause later became 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution (with only 
minor changes in capitalization and punctuation).19 
Describing the Intellectual Property Clause in the Federalist 
papers, Madison stated that “[t]he utility of this power will scarcely 
be questioned,” as the “public good fully coincides in both cases [of 
copyrights and patents] with the claims of individuals.”20 Madison’s 
reference to the “public good” can best be understood as invoking 
the policy goal of incentivizing innovation, which is reflected in the 
Intellectual Property Clause’s grant of power to “promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts” by securing to authors and 
inventors “the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”21 This language reflects Madison’s broad proposal 
“[t]o encourage, by proper premiums and provisions, the 
advancement of useful knowledge and discoveries.”22 
 
 15. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 14, at 321–22. 
 16. Id. at 324–25. 
 17. Id. at 505–09. 
 18. Id. at 505–09, 547. 
 19. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”). 
 20. James Madison, THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 309 (1788). 
 21. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (same). 
 22. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 14, at 321–22; 324–
25. 
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Indeed, the Intellectual Property Clause reflects many of the 
broader provisions proposed by Madison and Pinckney, while 
eschewing many of the narrow ones. For example, Pinckney 
narrowly proposed to “grant patents for useful inventions,” while 
Madison broadly proposed protections for “useful knowledge and 
discoveries.”23 The Committee of Eleven apparently merged these 
two proposals into the Intellectual Property Clause, omitting the 
narrow term “patents” and broadly including both the terms 
“Inventors” and “Discoveries.”24 Further, the phrase “To promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts” in the Intellectual Property 
Clause reflects Madison’s broad proposal “To encourage . . . the 
advancement of useful knowledge.”25 As Congress and 
commentators have noted, in the late eighteenth century, the word 
“Science” in this context was generally understood to mean 
“knowledge in general.”26 
Similarly, on the copyright front, Madison narrowly proposed to 
secure “literary authors their copy rights,” while Pinckney broadly 
proposed to secure “authors [their] exclusive rights.”27 The 
Intellectual Property Clause again incorporates language akin to the 
broader proposal, authorizing Congress to secure to “Authors . . . the 
exclusive Right to their . . . Writings.”28 The narrower term 
“copyrights”—like the terms “patents” and “inventions”—does not 
appear in the Intellectual Property Clause.29 
Finally, Pinckney’s narrowest proposal—”To establish public 
institutions, rewards and immunities for the promotion of agriculture, 
 
 23. Id. (compare Pinckney’s first proposal and Madison’s second proposal) (emphasis 
added). 
 24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 25. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 14, at 321–22; 324–
25 (Madison’s second proposal). 
 26. S. REP. NO. 1979, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 
2396 (Committee Report accompanying the Patent Act of 1952, commenting on the history of the 
Intellectual Property Clause); see also Giles S. Rich, The Principles of Patentability, 42 J. PAT. 
OFF SOC’Y 75, 79–80 (1960) (addressing the meaning of “science” in 1787); Arthur H. Seidel, 
The Constitution and a Standard of Patentability, 48 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 5, 11–12 n.14 (1966) 
(same); Edward C. Walterscheid, Conforming the General Welfare Clause and the Intellectual 
Property Clause, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 87, 93, n.21 (1999) (noting that Samuel Johnson’s A 
Dictionary of the English Language, an authoritative dictionary at the time, lists “knowledge” as 
the first definition of “science”). 
 27. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 14, at 321, 325 
(emphasis added) (compare Madison’s first proposal with Pinckney’s second proposal). 
 28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 29. Id. 
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commerce, trades, and manufactures”30—is not reflected in the 
Intellectual Property Clause in any way.31 
Overall, the broad language of the Intellectual Property Clause, 
coupled with the fact that multiple narrower proposals by Madison 
and Pinckney were considered and rejected, suggests that the 
Framers intended the Intellectual Property Clause to be expansive in 
scope. 
B.  Legislative History of Section 101 
Pursuant to the legislative power granted by the Intellectual 
Property Clause, Congress enacted the first patent statute in 1790.32 
Congress titled the law “An Act to promote the progress of useful 
Arts,” mirroring the language of the Intellectual Property Clause 
itself.33 Section 1 of the 1790 Act included the first statutory 
provision defining the categories of patent-eligible subject matter, 
stating that a patent may be sought by anyone who has invented or 
discovered “any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, 
or any improvement therein not before known or used.”34 
Patent applications under the 1790 Act were to be submitted to a 
Patent Board consisting of the secretary of state, the secretary of war, 
and the attorney general, which was entitled to grant a patent if it 
“deem[ed] the invention or discovery sufficiently useful and 
important.”35 Pursuant to section 2 of the 1790 Act, applicants who 
were approved for patent grants were thereafter required to file with 
the secretary of state a “specification in writing, containing a 
description . . . of the invention or discovery” in sufficient detail “to 
enable a workman or other person skilled in the art or 
manufacture . . . to make, construct, or use the same, to the end that 
the public may have the full benefit thereof, after the expiration of 
the patent term.”36 During the brief pendency of the 1790 Act, the 
Secretary of State and leader of the Patent Board was “Thomas 
 
 30. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 14, at 325 
(Pinckney’s third proposal). 
 31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 32.  Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109 (1790) (repealed 1793). 
 33. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of . . . useful 
Arts . . . .”). 
 34. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109 (1790) (repealed 1793). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. ch. 7, § 2. The foregoing provision in section 2 of the 1790 act was clearly the 
beginning of the modern written description and enablement requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112. 
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Jefferson, who was personally deeply interested in the subject matter 
of patent law.”37 
The administrative requirements of the 1790 Act proved too 
time consuming for the small Patent Board to handle, particularly 
considering the numerous other demands placed on the offices of the 
secretary of state, the secretary of war, and the attorney general.38 
Accordingly, the 1790 Act was replaced after only three years by the 
Patent Act of 1793, authored by Thomas Jefferson.39 The 1793 Act 
created a registration system whereby patents were granted to anyone 
who fulfilled the formal filing requirements and provided an “oath or 
affirmation” of the applicant’s belief “that he is the true inventor or 
discoverer.”40 The 1793 Act also modified the categories of patent-
eligible subject matter to include “any new and useful art, machine, 
manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement [thereof], not known or used before.”41 
The broad patent-eligibility language in the 1793 Act “embodied 
Jefferson’s philosophy that ‘ingenuity should receive a liberal 
encouragement.’”42 Moreover, the patent-eligibility provision of the 
1793 Act included several notable changes from that of the 1790 Act. 
First, the 1793 Act eliminated the “engine” and “device” 
categories from the definition of patent-eligible subject matter, while 
simultaneously adding a new category for “composition[s] of 
matter.”43 This change can best be viewed as broadening the scope of 
patent-eligible subject matter, as the eliminated “engine” and 
“device” categories were substantially duplicative of the “machine” 
category, whereas the broad new “composition of matter” category 
was not clearly duplicative of any previously included category. 
 
 37. S. REP. NO. 1979, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 
2396 (Committee Report accompanying the Patent Act of 1952). 
 38. Id. at 2397. 
 39. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318 (1793); see also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 
447 U.S. 303, 308–09 (1980) (referencing Thomas Jefferson as the author of the 1793 Act). 
 40. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1 Stat. 321 (1793); see also S. REP. NO. 1979, 82nd 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2397 (Committee Report 
accompanying the Patent Act of 1952, discussing the history of the 1793 Act). 
 41. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 319 (1793) (emphasis added). 
 42.  Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308–09 (quoting 5 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 75–76 
(Washington ed. 1871)). 
 43. Compare Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 110 (1790) (repealed 1793) (categories of 
patent-eligible subject matter including “art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device”), with 
Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 319 (1793) (categories of patent-eligible subject matter 
including “art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter”). 
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Second, the 1793 Act added the word “new” to the definition of 
patent-eligible subject matter—i.e., “any new and useful art, 
machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and 
useful improvement” thereof.44 This is notable because, at the time, 
the foregoing provision already included a statement in the same 
sentence that the invention or discovery must be “not before known 
or used” (1790 Act),45 or “not known or used before the application” 
(1793 Act).46 This suggests that Congress (and Jefferson) intended 
the word “new” to have a different meaning in the context of patent-
eligible subject matter, unlinked to the concept of novelty then 
reflected in the “known or used” language.47 Otherwise, the addition 
of the word “new” would have been redundant. We posit that the 
term “new” was added to the definition of patent-eligible subject 
matter to convey that something must be “new” to the world to be 
patent eligible, even if it was “not known or used” prior to its 
discovery. Indeed, as we will discuss in Part V.F and elsewhere 
throughout this Article, we believe that the word “new” offers 
perhaps the only concrete statutory support for any part of the 
Supreme Court’s judicial “exceptions” to § 101.48 
Another notable feature of the 1793 Act was its express 
recognition that a patent might sometimes dominate later patents that 
claim improvements to the originally patented invention, potentially 
blocking downstream inventors from practicing their patented 
improvements. Specifically, section 2 of the 1793 Act states: 
Provided always, and be it further enacted, That any 
person, who shall have discovered an improvement in the 
principle of any machine, or in the process of any 
composition of matter, which shall have been patented, and 
shall have obtained a patent for such improvement, he shall 
not be at liberty to make, use or vend the original discovery, 
nor shall the first inventor be at liberty to use the 
improvement.49 
 
 44. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 319 (1793) (emphasis added). 
 45. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 110 (1790) (repealed 1793). 
 46. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 319 (1793). 
 47. Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 102 (providing the modern novelty requirement). 
 48. See infra Part III. 
 49. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 2, 1 Stat. 318 (1793). 
 
128 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:117 
This is significant, as it shows that the patent laws were by design 
intended to allow inventors to exclude others from practicing their 
patented inventions, even if doing so might preempt later inventors 
from practicing their own innovations that build upon or make use of 
the earlier patented invention.50 
The 1793 Act remained in force until 1836, whereupon it was 
replaced in response to dissatisfaction with the granting of patents for 
inventions without any formal examination as to novelty or the other 
requirements of patentability.51 The 1836 Act established a Patent 
Office tasked with examining applications for patentability and given 
the power to reject applications if required.52 Despite this change, the 
substantive language pertaining to patent-eligible subject matter 
remained substantially unchanged in the 1836 Act, as well as in 
subsequent revisions to the statute made in 1870 and 1874.53 
In 1952, when Congress re-codified the patent laws, it replaced 
the word “art” with “process” in the definition of patent-eligible 
subject matter, creating the modern embodiment of § 101: “Whoever 
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the 
conditions and requirements of this title.”54 
The Committee Report to the 1952 Act indicates that this minor 
change was merely intended to clarify—not modify—the scope of 
patent-eligible subject matter, because the term “art” as used in the 
statute had always been interpreted to mean “process or method.”55 
 
 50. See, e.g., Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(“A ‘blocking patent’ is an earlier patent that must be licensed in order to practice a later 
patent.”). 
 51. See S. DOC. NO. 338, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. (1836) (report of Senate committee appointed 
to study the patent system and propose necessary changes, finding that “[a] considerable portion 
of the patents granted are worthless and void, as conflicting and infringing upon one another, or 
upon public rights not subject to patent privileges”); see also S. REP. NO. 1979, 82nd Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, at 2397 (Committee Report accompanying 
the Patent Act of 1952, discussing the history of the 1836 Act). 
 52. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 1, 5 Stat. 117 (1836). 
 53. Id.; see also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (“Subsequent patent 
statutes in 1836, 1870, and 1874 employed the same broad language.”). 
 54. Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 101, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 101) 
(emphasis added). 
 55. See S. REP. NO. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 17 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2394, 2398–99 (“‘Art’ in this place in the present statute has a different meaning than the words 
‘useful art’ in the Constitution, and a different meaning than the use of the word ‘art’ in other 
places in the statutes, and it is interpreted by the courts to be practically synonymous with process 
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Further, section 100(b) of the 1952 Act expressly and broadly 
defined the term “process,” stating: “The term ‘process’ means 
process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known process, 
machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material.”56 The 
Committee Report further states that the foregoing broad definition 
was added specifically to quell any remaining doubts as to the 
expansive scope of patent-eligible processes.57 
Another notable change in the 1952 Act was that, for the first 
time, Congress clearly separated the definition of patent-eligible 
subject matter from the novelty requirement, codifying these distinct 
requirements in sections 101 and 102, respectively.58 The 1952 Act 
also included an express non-obviousness requirement for the first 
time (section 103),59 and it included a separate section dedicated to 
the disclosure requirements (section 112).60 Within section 101’s 
definition of patent-eligible subject matter, the novelty-related 
language included in prior versions of the statute (e.g., “not known or 
used”)61 was deleted and replaced with a statement that the listed 
categories of subject matter are patentable “subject to the conditions 
and requirements of this title,”62 referring to the additional necessity 
of satisfying the separate patentability requirements defined in 
sections 102, 103, and 112. Notably, however, Congress retained the 
word “new” in section 101’s definition of patent-eligible subject 
matter despite moving the novelty requirement to section 102, 
indicating that the word “new” in section 101 must mean something 
other than mere novelty.63 
 
or method. The word ‘process’ has been used to avoid the necessity of explanation that the word 
‘art’ as used in this place means ‘process or method,’ and that it does not mean the same thing as 
the word ‘art’ in other places.”). 
 56.  Patent Act of 1952, Pub L. No 82-593, § 100(b), 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified at 35 
U.S.C. § 100(b)). 
 57. See S. REP. NO. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2394, 2399 (“The definition of ‘process’ has been added in section 100 to make it clear that 
‘process or method’ is meant, and also to clarify the present law as to the patentability of certain 
types of processes or methods as to which some insubstantial doubts have been expressed.”). 
 58. See Patent Act of 1952, Pub L. No 82-593, §§ 100(b) & 101, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) 
(codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 100(b) & 101). 
 59. Id. § 103 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 103). 
 60. Id. § 112 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 112). 
 61. See, e.g., Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109 (1790); Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 
§ 1, 1 Stat. 318 (1793); Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117 (1836). 
 62.  Patent Act of 1952, Pub L. No 82-593, § 101, 66 Stat. 792 (1952). 
 63. See infra Part V.F. 
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Finally, the 1952 Act is notable for the fact that the 
accompanying Committee Report interpreted the scope of patent-
eligible subject matter under section 101 to broadly include 
“anything under the sun that is made by man.”64 This statement has 
been often cited and hotly debated. Some judges and commentators 
have suggested that the statement has been taken out of context, as it 
was immediately followed by the statement: “but it is not necessarily 
patentable under section 101 unless the conditions of the title are 
fulfilled.”65 We disagree. To the contrary, proponents of the out-of-
context argument have themselves taken the relevant statement out 
of its context, choosing to analyze only the single sentence: “A 
person may have ‘invented’ a machine or a manufacture, which may 
include anything under the sun that is made by man, but it is not 
necessarily patentable under section 101 unless the conditions of the 
title are fulfilled.”66 However, viewing the foregoing statement in its 
full context throws cold water on the out-of-context argument, as the 
Committee Report to the 1952 Act states: 
Section 101 sets forth the subject matter that can be 
patented, “subject to the conditions and requirements of this 
title.” The conditions under which a patent may be obtained 
follow, and section 102 covers the conditions relating to 
novelty. 
A person may have ‘invented’ a machine or a manufacture, 
which may include anything under the sun that is made by 
man, but it is not necessarily patentable under section 101 
unless the conditions of the title are fulfilled. 
 
 64. S. REP. NO. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 
2399 (emphasis added). 
 65. See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303–
04 (2012) (emphasizing the language “but it is not necessarily patentable under section 101”); In 
re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1000 (2008) (Mayer, J., dissenting) (“This statement does not support the 
contention that Congress intended ‘anything under the sun’ to be patentable. To the contrary, the 
language supports the opposite view: a person may have ‘invented’ anything under the sun, but it 
is ‘not necessarily patentable’ unless the statutory requirements for patentability have been 
satisfied. Thus, the legislative history oft-cited to support business method patents undercuts, 
rather than supports, the notion that Congress intended to extend the scope of section 101 to 
encompass such methods.”); Robin Feldman, A Conversation on Judicial Decision-Making, 5 
HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 1, 8 (2013). 
 66. S. REP. NO. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 
2399. 
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Section 102 in paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) repeats the 
conditions in the existing law relating to novelty.67 
Considered in its full context, we believe that the meaning of the 
foregoing passage is quite clear: “Section 101 sets forth the subject 
matter that can be patented,” which “may include anything under the 
sun that is made by man.”68 However, even if a particular invention 
or discovery constitutes patent-eligible subject matter under section 
101, it is only patentable “subject to the conditions of and 
requirements of this title.”69 “The conditions under which a patent 
may be obtained follow [section 101],” in provisions such as “section 
102,” which “covers the conditions relating to novelty.”70 
Accordingly, we posit that the foregoing passage from the 
Committee Report to the 1952 Act does indeed evidence a 
congressional intent to broadly define the categories of patent-
eligible subject matter listed in section 101—i.e., to “include 
anything under the sun that is made by man.”71 The statement that 
such an invention or discovery will still not be patentable “unless the 
conditions of the title are fulfilled” merely conveyed the 
unremarkable proposition that the requirements of sections 102, 103, 
and 112 must also be satisfied in order to obtain a patent.72 
III.  A HISTORY OF THE “JUDICIAL EXCEPTIONS” TO SECTION 101 
The Supreme Court has recognized “three specific exceptions to 
§ 101’s broad patent eligibility principles: ‘laws of nature, physical 
phenomena, and abstract ideas’” are not patent eligible.73 In this 
part, we analyze relevant Supreme Court cases over the past two 
centuries in an effort to determine the bases for and scope of these 
judicial exceptions to patent eligibility. 
A.  The Early Cases 
The earliest Supreme Court decision typically cited as relevant 
to patent-eligible subject matter is the 1852 case of Le Roy v. 
 
 67. Id. (emphasis added). 
 68. Id. (emphasis added). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, 112. 
 73. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (emphasis added) (quoting Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)). 
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Tatham.74 The patent at issue in Le Roy described and claimed an 
improved machine for manufacturing metal pipes.75 The claimed 
machine was designed to exploit the patentees’ discovery “that lead, 
when recently become set, and while under heat and extreme 
pressure in a close vessel, would reunite perfectly, after a separation 
of its parts,” allowing pipes of any length to be crafted without 
casting in a mold.76 
The primary issue on appeal in Le Roy was the propriety of a 
jury instruction pertaining to novelty.77 The trial court had instructed 
the jury “that the originality of the invention did not consist in the 
novelty of the machinery, but in bringing a newly discovered 
principle into practical application.”78 However, the Supreme Court 
construed the patent as claiming a “combination of . . . machinery” 
for manufacturing pipes, not a method of manufacturing pipes.79 
As such, the Court held that it was error to instruct the jury that “the 
novelty of the combination of the machinery, specifically claimed by 
the patentees as their invention, was not a material fact.”80 
It was not disputed in Le Roy that the claimed machine for 
manufacturing pipes constituted patent-eligible subject matter. 
Moreover, the Court specifically noted that “[t]he question whether 
the newly developed property of lead, used in the formulation of 
pipes, might have been patented, if claimed as developed, without 
the invention of machinery, was not in the case.”81 Nonetheless, for 
whatever reason, the Court chose to opine at length on the subject. 
Writing for the Court, Justice McLean offered the following: 
It is admitted, that a principle is not patentable. A principle, 
in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a 
motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in 
either of them an exclusive right. Nor can an exclusive right 
exist to a new power, should one be discovered in addition 
to those already known. Through the agency of machinery a 
new steam power may be said to have been generated. But 
 
 74. 55 U.S. 156 (1852). 
 75. Id. at 171. 
 76. Id. at 173. 
 77. Id. at 176–77. 
 78. Id. at 176–77. 
 79. Id. at 176. 
 80. Id. at 177. 
 81. Id. 
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no one can appropriate this power exclusively to himself, 
under the patent laws. The same may be said of electricity, 
and of any other power in nature, which is alike open to all, 
and may be applied to useful purposes by the use of 
machinery. 
In all such cases, the processes used to extract, modify, and 
concentrate natural agencies, constitute the invention. The 
elements of the power exist; the invention is not in 
discovering them, but in applying them to useful objects.82 
The Court did not cite the Patent Act or its legislative history in 
support of the above sweeping dicta. Rather, the Court offered a pure 
policy rationale, expressing concern as to the potential preemptive 
effects broad patents might have on downstream innovation: 
A patent is not good for an effect, or the result of a certain 
process, as that would prohibit all other persons from 
making the same thing by any means whatsoever. This, by 
creating monopolies, would discourage arts and 
manufacturers, against the avowed policy of the patent 
laws.83 
And thus, with a stroke of the pen—without any statutory 
interpretation, and in a case that did not raise patent-eligibility 
concerns—the Court set in motion a snowball that would grow to 
define more than 160 years of patent-eligibility jurisprudence. 
A year later, in the 1853 case of O’Reilly v. Morse,84 the 
Supreme Court considered a patent directed to Samuel Morse’s 
famed invention, the electromagnetic telegraph. The Court found that 
Morse was the first and true inventor of the telegraph,85 and it 
discerned no flaws in the first seven claims of Morse’s patent, all of 
which were directed to the telegraph device and its use.86 However, 
the Court took exception to Claim Eight, which read as follows: 
Eighth. I do not propose to limit myself to the specific 
machinery or parts of machinery described in the foregoing 
specification and claims; the essence of my invention being 
the use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic 
 
 82. Id. at 174–75. 
 83. Id. at 175. 
 84. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853). 
 85. Id. at 109. 
 86. Id. at 112. 
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current, which I call electro-magnetism, however developed 
for making or printing intelligible characters, signs, or 
letters, at any distances, being a new application of that 
power of which I claim to be the first inventor or 
discoverer.87 
The Court found that Claim Eight’s broad scope captured more 
than Morse was entitled to claim as his invention.88 Although Morse 
invented the telegraph, he had “not discovered, that the electric or 
galvanic current will always print at a distance, no matter what may 
be the form of machinery or mechanical contrivances through which 
it passes.”89 The Court expressed concern that Claim Eight could 
capture advancements by future inventors who, “in the onward 
march of science, may discover a mode of writing or printing at a 
distance by means of the electric or galvanic current, without using 
any part of the process or combination set forth in the plaintiff’s 
specification.”90 
The Court found that the disclosure in Morse’s specification 
(describing the telegraph and its use) was not commensurate with the 
broader scope of Claim Eight (reciting the use of electromagnetism, 
by any means, to print characters at a distance). Referring to the 
disclosure requirements set forth in sections 5 and 6 of the Patent Act 
of 1836,91 the Court stated: 
The act of Congress above recited, requires that the 
invention shall be so described, that a person skilled in the 
science to which it appertains, or with which it is most 
 
 87. Id. (emphasis added). 
 88. Id. at 112–13 (“He claims the exclusive right to every improvement where the motive 
power is the electric or galvanic current, and the result is the marking or printing intelligible 
characters, signs, or letters at a distance . . . [H]e claims an exclusive right to use a manner and 
process which he has not described and indeed had not invented, and therefore could not describe 
when he obtained his patent. The court is of the opinion that the claim is too broad, and not 
warranted by law.”). 
 89.  Id. at 117. 
 90.  Id. at 113 (emphasis added). 
 91. Id. at 118 (citing Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, §§ 5 & 6, 5 Stat. 117 (1836)); see also 
Patent Act of 1836 § 5 (requiring a patent to include claims “specifying what the patentee claims 
as his invention or discovery,” while “referring to the specifications for the particulars thereof”); 
id. § 6 (requiring “a written description of [the] invention or discovery, and of the manner and 
process of making, constructing, using, and compounding the same, in such full, clear, and exact 
terms, avoiding unnecessary prolixity, as to enable any person skilled in the art or science to 
which it appertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make, construct, compound, and 
use the same”). 
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nearly connected, shall be able to construct the 
improvement from the description by the inventor. 
Now, in this case, there is no description but one, of a 
process by which signs or letters may be printed at a 
distance. And yet he claims the exclusive right to any other 
mode and any other process, although not described by him, 
by which the end can be accomplished, if electro-
magnetism is used as the motive power. That is to say—he 
claims a patent, for an effect produced by the use of electro-
magnetism distinct from the process or machinery 
necessary to produce it. The words of the acts of Congress 
above quoted show that no patent can lawfully issue upon 
such a claim. For he claims what he has not described in 
the manner required by law.92 
It thus appears that the Supreme Court rested its holding in 
Morse on enablement grounds,93 not on any finding regarding patent-
eligible subject matter.94 We view Morse as an early application of 
 
 92. O’Reilly, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 120 (emphasis added). 
 93. Today, the enablement requirement is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 112, which states: 
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner 
and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to 
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly 
connected, to make and use the same . . . . 
35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012). In reaching its holding in Morse, the Court analyzed section 6 of the 
Patent Act of 1836, which stated the enablement requirement in similar terms to the present-day 
statute: 
But before any inventor shall receive a patent for any such new invention or discovery, 
he shall deliver a written description of his invention or discovery, and of the manner 
and process of making, constructing, using, and compounding the same, in such full, 
clear, and exact terms, avoiding unnecessary prolixity, as to enable any person skilled 
in the art or science to which it appertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to 
make, construct, compound, and use the same . . . . 
Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117 (1836). 
 94. We join a number of commentators in making the straightforward yet important 
observation that Morse was decided on enablement grounds. See, e.g., CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE 
LAW OF PATENTS 61–62 (2008) (“The majority in Morse held claim eight invalid because the 
breadth of the claim was not commensurate with the specification. . . . The Court employed the 
enablement requirement to constrain claim scope, limiting Morse to his first seven claims.”); 
Benjamin Hattenbach, On Illuminating Black Holes in Patent Disclosures: Toward a Structured 
Approach to Identifying Omitted Elements Under the Written Description Requirement of Patent 
Law, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1195, 1200 n.21 (2001) (“In evaluating enablement, the question is not 
whether something within the scope of the claim is enabled, but whether everything is enabled. 
For example, in the infamous telegraph case, [Morse], the Court decided that Morse’s 
specification describing the telegraph might have supported claims to the telegraph, but did not 
enable claims to all means of using electro-magnetism to communicate at a distance.” (citations 
omitted)); A. Samuel Oddi, Regeneration in American Patent Law: Statutory Subject Matter, 46 
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the principle that, “[t]o be enabling, the specification of a patent must 
teach those skilled in the art how to make and use the full scope of 
the claimed invention without ‘undue experimentation.’”95 The 
“full scope” enablement doctrine requires a patent’s disclosure to be 
“commensurate with the scope of the claims,” thereby preventing 
“overbroad claiming that might otherwise attempt to cover more than 
was actually invented.”96 In Morse, although the patent specification 
enabled a species of invention (i.e., the telegraph), it failed to enable 
the full scope of a claim that recited a genus (i.e., the use of 
electromagnetism, by any means, to print characters at a distance).97 
As the Court explained, Morse’s disclosure of the telegraph “confers 
on him the exclusive right to use the means he specifies to produce 
the result or effect he describes, and nothing more.”98 
Despite the fact that O’Reilly v. Morse is best viewed as a 
landmark decision regarding enablement, it would somehow grow to 
become synonymous with patent-eligibility jurisprudence over the 
coming 160 years, with the Supreme Court and lower courts citing 
Morse as support for the maxim that a patent claim may not be so 
broad as to wholly “preempt” the use of a fundamental principle.99 
 
IDEA 491, 514 (2006) (“In modern theory, the issue [in Morse] would better be categorized as 
one of enablement rather than undue breadth and certainly not one of patentable subject matter.”); 
Aaron J. Zakem, Rethinking Patentable Subject Matter: Are Statutory Categories Useful?, 30 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2983, 2992 (2009) (“The majority’s concern with the broad coverage of 
Morse’s claim would seem to indicate that its primary concern is enablement . . . .”). 
 95. MagSil Corp. v. Hitachi Global Storage Techs., Inc., 687 F.3d 1377, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 
2012) (emphasis added) (quoting Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1365 
(Fed. Cir. 1997)); see also Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Labs, 720 F.3d 1380, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 
2013) (“Claims are not enabled when, at the effective filing date of the patent, one of ordinary 
skill in the art could not practice their full scope without undue experimentation.”). 
 96. MagSil, 687 F.3d at 1380–81 (quoting Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 999 
(Fed. Cir. 2008)). 
 97. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 120 (1853). 
 98. Id. at 119 (emphasis added); see also id. at 119–20 (“Indeed, if the eighth claim of the 
patentee can be maintained, there was no necessity for any specification, further than to say that 
he had discovered that, by using the motive power of electro-magnetism, he could print 
intelligible characters at any distance. We presume it will be admitted on all hands, that no patent 
could have issued on such a specification. Yet this claim can derive no aid from the specification 
filed. It is outside of it, and the patentee claims beyond it.” (emphasis added)). 
 99. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3253 (2010) (citing Morse, 56 U.S. (15 
How.) at 113) (describing Morse as “explaining that Morse’s patent on electromagnetism for 
writing would preempt a wide swath of technological developments”). 
To the contrary, Morse actually suggested precisely the opposite—i.e., that one can patent a 
broadly-claimed invention if the scope of the claim is fully enabled. See Morse, 56 U.S. (15 
How.) at 119 (“Whoever discovers that a certain useful result will be produced, in any art, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, by the use of certain means, is entitled to a 
patent for it; provided he specifies the means he uses in a manner so full and exact, that any one 
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In the 1874 case of Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard,100 the 
Supreme Court considered a patent directed to “a new and useful 
rubber head for lead-pencils.”101 The claimed invention comprised a 
piece of rubber (i.e., an eraser) containing a socket “so made as to fit 
upon a lead-pencil at or near the end thereof.”102 In analyzing this 
patent, the Court began by noting that rubber erasers “had long been 
known” in the art.103 The Court then noted that “[e]verybody knew, 
when the patent was applied for, that if a solid substance was 
inserted into a cavity in a piece of rubber smaller than itself, the 
rubber would cling to it.”104 The Court then found the patent invalid, 
offering the following reasoning: 
What, therefore, is left for this patentee but the idea that if a 
pencil is inserted into a cavity in a piece of rubber smaller 
than itself the rubber will attach itself to the pencil, and 
when so attached become convenient for use as an eraser? 
An idea of itself is not patentable, but a new device by 
which it may be made practically useful is. The idea of this 
patentee was a good one, but his device to give it effect, 
though useful, was not new. Consequently he took nothing 
by his patent.105 
The Court’s holding in Rubber-Tip Pencil was rather 
ambiguous. The Court’s analysis of the facts—finding that rubber 
erasers and rubber sockets were well-known in the art—appeared to 
raise concerns regarding obviousness.106 Indeed, only a few years 
later, the Supreme Court repeatedly characterized Rubber-Tip Pencil 
as having been decided on obviousness grounds.107 
 
skilled in the science to which it pertains, can, by using the means he specifies, without any 
addition to, or subtraction from them, produce precisely the result he describes.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 100.  87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498 (1874). 
 101.  Id. at 505. 
 102.  Id. at 502. 
 103.  Id. at 505. 
 104.  Id. at 507. 
 105.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 106.  In 1874, at the time of the Rubber-Tip Pencil decision, the Patent Act did not yet include 
an express non-obviousness requirement. See Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 566, 571–72 
(1870). 
 107.  See, e.g., Wilson Packing Co. v. Chicago Packing & Provision Co., 105 U.S. 566, 571 
(1881) (citing Rubber-Tip Pencil for the proposition that a claimed invention “must involve 
something more than what is obvious to persons skilled in the art”); Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 
U.S. 347, 356–57 (1875) (citing Rubber-Tip Pencil for the proposition that the mere application 
of “mechanical skill” is not “invention”). 
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However, the rhetoric at the end of Rubber-Tip Pencil—i.e., that 
“[a]n idea of itself is not patentable”—can arguably be read as 
addressing the issue of patent eligibility.108 In our view, this vague 
and unsupported statement thrown out at the end of the opinion was 
largely divorced from the facts of the case. The patent at issue did 
not claim an “idea” in the ether; rather, it disclosed and claimed a 
specific “rubber head for lead-pencils,” which the Court expressly 
found was a “new article of manufacture” (albeit one that required 
little ingenuity to create).109 Indeed, it is difficult to fathom how a 
specific, new, and useful physical device, which was created by man, 
can lack patent eligibility. Perhaps it is for this reason that the facts 
and reasoning of Rubber-Tip Pencil have largely been swept into the 
dustbin of history. However, the broad statement that “[a]n idea of 
itself is not patentable” has lived on, resurrected by the Supreme 
Court a century later as support for the maxim that “abstract ideas” 
are not patent eligible.110 
In 1876, in Cochrane v. Deener,111 the Supreme Court expressly 
opined on the patent eligibility of a “process [of] manufacturing 
flour.”112 The claimed process included several steps of using cloth 
filters to remove impurities from flour while blasting it with air, 
leaving behind only “superfine” flour.113 The patent claims at issue 
were “not limited to any special arrangement of machinery,” but 
rather recited only the steps needed to perform the process.114 In a 
cursory analysis without citations, the Court waived off any concerns 
as to patent eligibility, holding that “the process may be patentable, 
irrespective of the particular form of the instrumentalities used.”115 
The Court reasoned that a process “is just as patentable as is a piece 
of machinery,” because “[i]n the language of the patent law, [a 
process] is an art”116—presumably referring to the subject-matter 
 
 108.  Rubber-Tip Pencil, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 507. 
 109.  Id. at 505. 
 110.  See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (“An idea of itself is not 
patentable.” (quoting Rubber-Tip Pencil, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 507)); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 
U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (noting “the longstanding rule that ‘[a]n idea of itself is not patentable.’” 
(quoting Rubber-Tip Pencil, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 507)). 
 111.  94 U.S. 780 (1876). 
 112.  Id. at 784. 
 113.  Id. at 785. 
 114.  Id. 
 115. Id. at 787. 
 116.  Id. at 788. 
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categories of “art” and “machine” listed in the Patent Act of 1870.117 
Then, for whatever reason, the Court decided to go further, casually 
endeavoring to define the term “process” in the following dictum: “A 
process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given 
result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-
matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing.”118 
This seemingly innocuous statement—made in dicta, and without 
explanation or citation to authority—was the genesis of what would 
later become the “machine-or-transformation test,” discussed 
infra.119 
The Supreme Court’s next important patent-eligibility decision 
came in 1881 with the case of Tilghman v. Proctor.120 Tilghman had 
discovered that fat can be separated into its component parts (fat 
acids and glycerine) through “the single and simple process of 
subjecting the neutral fat, whilst in intimate mixture with water, to a 
high degree of heat under sufficient pressure to prevent the water 
from being converted into steam.”121 Tilghman’s patent recited a 
single claim directed to the foregoing process, irrespective of the 
form of machinery used to carry it out.122 The Court held that this 
claim was directed to patent-eligible subject matter, stating: 
That a patent can be granted for a process, there can be no 
doubt. The patent law is not confined to new machines and 
new compositions of matter, but extends to any new and 
useful art or manufacture. A manufacturing process is 
clearly an art, within the meaning of the law.123 
Had the Court stopped there, Tilghman would have been a fairly 
unremarkable case. However, the Court instead went on to 
distinguish O’Reilly v. Morse—the enablement case decided 28 years 
prior—by interpreting the holding of Morse in a broad (and we 
believe incorrect) manner: 
 
 117.  See Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 24, 16 Stat. 198, 201 (1870) (“Sec. 24. And be it 
further enacted, That any person who has invented or discovered any new and useful art, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, . . . 
may . . . obtain a patent therefor.” (emphasis altered)). 
 118. Cochrane, 94 U.S. at 788. 
 119.  Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3221 (2010). 
 120.  Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1880). 
 121.  Id. at 712. 
 122.  Id. at 709–10, 715. 
 123.  Id. at 722. 
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The eighth claim of Morse’s patent was held to be invalid, 
because it was regarded by the court as being not for a 
process, but for a mere principle. It amounted to this, 
namely, a claim of the exclusive right to the use of electro-
magnetism as a motive power for making intelligible marks 
at a distance; that is, a claim to the exclusive use of one of 
the powers of nature for a particular purpose.124 
In contrast, the Court explained, Tilghman claimed a “process of 
‘manufacturing fat acids and glycerine from fatty bodies by the 
action of water at a high temperature and pressure.’”125 This was a 
claim for a patent-eligible “process” and “not for a mere principle,” 
the Court reasoned, because it “does not claim every mode of 
accomplishing [the] result” of separating fat into its component 
parts.126 
The foregoing holding was a key turning point in the history of 
patent-eligibility jurisprudence. We view the core error of Tilghman 
to be the Court’s interpretation of Morse as having invalidated a 
claim due to the type of subject matter claimed, as opposed to 
invalidating a claim because its breadth was unsupported by a 
sufficiently enabling disclosure.127 This led the Tilghman Court to 
draw a vague and unsteady distinction between claiming an 
unpatentable “principle” and claiming a patent-eligible “process.”128 
To be sure, the Tilghman Court could have instead distinguished 
Morse on enablement grounds. The Court analyzed the specification 
of Tilghman’s patent at length and concluded that it provided a 
sufficiently enabling disclosure to support Tilghman’s process 
claim.129 Although the process claim was not limited to the use of 
any particular machinery, the Court found that the particular 
apparatus used “was not material” to the disclosed invention, as the 
specification disclosed that the process could be implemented using 
means of heating water under pressure that were already well known 
in the art.130 This is in stark contrast to Morse, where the patent 
 
 124.  Id. at 726 (emphasis added) (citing O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 62 (1853)). 
 125.  Id. at 721. 
 126.  Id. at 729. 
 127.  See supra notes 93–98 and accompanying text. 
 128.  Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 721, 726–27, 729. 
 129.  Id. at 718–722. 
 130.  Id. at 718 (“The specification then goes on to describe, by the aid of the drawing referred 
to, the particular device mentioned. But it is evident, and indeed is expressly announced, that the 
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disclosed a new apparatus (the electromagnetic telegraph), yet 
attempted to claim any means of using electromagnetism to print 
characters at a distance.131 Morse had “not discovered, that the 
electric or galvanic current will always print [characters] at a 
distance.”132 Tilghman, on the other hand, had discovered—and 
disclosed in his patent—that fat will always separate into its 
component parts when one “subject[s] the neutral fat, whilst in 
intimate mixture with water, to a high degree of heat under sufficient 
pressure to prevent the water from being converted into steam.”133 
Thus, unlike the claim at issue in Morse, the “full scope” of 
Tilghman’s process claim was enabled by the patent’s 
specification.134 Nonetheless, rather than focusing on these core 
differences in disclosure and claim scope, the Tilghman Court chose 
to distinguish Morse by attributing to that case a sweeping, vaguely 
defined, per se patent-eligibility exclusion of any claim directed to a 
“mere principle.”135 
The Supreme Court appeared to back away from the foregoing 
interpretation of Morse only a few years later. In 1888, the Court 
decided Dolbear v. American Bell Telephone Co.,136 which 
concerned a patent relating to Alexander Graham Bell’s invention of 
the telephone. Bell was the first to discover that voices or other 
sounds could be transmitted over wires by “creating changes of 
intensity in a continuous current of electricity, exactly corresponding 
to the changes of density in the air caused by the vibrations which 
accompany vocal or other sounds.”137 The Court characterized this as 
 
process claimed does not have reference to this particular device, for the apparatus described was 
well known, being similar to that used for producing the hot-blast and for heating water for the 
purpose of warming houses.”); id. at 722 (“The apparatus for performing the process was not 
patented, and was not material.”); id. (“One may discover a new and useful improvement in [a] 
process . . . , irrespective of any particular form of machinery or mechanical device.”); id. at 729 
(“The mixing of certain substances together, or the heating of a substance to a certain 
temperature, is a process. If the mode of doing [the claimed process], or the apparatus in or by 
which it may be done, is sufficiently obvious to suggest itself to a person skilled in the particular 
art, it is enough, in the patent, to point out the process to be performed, without giving 
supererogatory directions as to the apparatus or method to be employed.”). 
 131.  O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112 (1853). 
 132.  Id. at 117 (emphasis added). 
 133.  Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 712. 
 134.  See supra notes 95–98 and accompanying text. 
 135.  Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 726–27. 
 136.  126 U.S. 1 (1888). 
 137.  Id. at 533–34. 
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a “discovery [which] astonished the scientific world.”138 Claim Five 
of Bell’s patent recited his invention as follows: “The method of and 
apparatus for transmitting vocal or other sounds telegraphically, as 
herein described, by causing electrical undulations, similar in form to 
the vibrations of air accompanying the said vocal or other sounds, 
substantially as set forth.”139 
At first glance, Claim Five of Bell’s patent may appear to bear 
similarities to invalidated Claim Eight of Morse’s patent, which 
recited “the use of . . . electro-magnetism, however developed for 
marking or printing intelligible characters . . . at any distances.”140 
The Court, however, expressly distinguished Morse, stating that 
Claim Eight of Morse’s patent had been found invalid because it 
recited “the use of [electro]magnetism as a motive power, without 
regard to the particular process with which it was connected in the 
patent.”141 The Court viewed Bell’s claim differently, as it stated: 
In the present case the claim is not for the use of a current 
of electricity in its natural state as it comes from the battery, 
but for putting a continuous current, in a closed circuit, into 
a certain specified condition, suited to the transmission of 
vocal and other sounds, and using it in that condition for 
that purpose. . . . We see nothing in Morse’s case to defeat 
Bell’s claim; on the contrary, it is in all respects sustained 
by that authority. It may be that electricity cannot be used at 
all for the transmission of speech, except in the way Bell 
has discovered, and that therefore, practically, his patent 
gives him its exclusive use for that purpose; but that does 
not make his claim one for the use of electricity distinct 
from the particular process with which it is connected in his 
patent. It will, if true, show more clearly the great 
importance of his discovery, but it will not invalidate his 
patent.142 
The foregoing statements indicate that the Dolbear Court was 
focused on comparing the claim’s scope to the scope of the patent’s 
disclosure—i.e., “the particular process with which [the claim] is 
 
 138.  Id. at 539. 
 139.  Id. at 531. 
 140.  O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112 (1853). 
 141.  Dolbear, 126 U.S. at 534 (emphasis added). 
 142.  Id. at 534–55 (emphasis added). 
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connected in [the] patent.”143 Claim Eight of Morse’s patent was 
invalid because it improperly attempted to claim all processes that 
use electromagnetism to print characters at a distance, including even 
processes not disclosed in the patent.144 In contrast, Claim Five of 
Bell’s patent was valid because it claimed the use of electricity to 
transmit voices only according to the particular process disclosed in 
the patent—i.e., “causing electrical undulations, similar in form to 
the vibrations of air accompanying the said vocal or other sounds.”145 
Notably absent from the Dolbear Court’s analysis, however, was 
any mention of Morse standing for the proposition that claims 
directed to “mere principles” are per se excluded from patent 
eligibility.146 Indeed, such an approach might have invalidated Bell’s 
patent, as Claim Five could have easily been characterized as reciting 
the mere principle of using electricity, varied in intensity according 
to sound vibrations, to transmit sounds at a distance. 
The Supreme Court’s next important decision with implications 
for patent eligibility came over 50 years later, in the 1939 case of 
Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of America.147 The 
patent at issue was directed to an antenna configuration for the 
directional transmission of radio waves.148 At the time of the 
invention, it had been well-known in the art that a mathematical 
equation (Abraham’s formula) could predict the angle of radio 
transmission off of a single charged wire, calculated as a function of 
wire length and radio frequency.149 The patentee designed an antenna 
comprising multiple wires in a “V” configuration, with the angle of 
the V chosen according to Abraham’s formula to ensure that all of 
the wires transmit along the axis intersecting the V’s apex.150 The 
Court quickly dismissed any patent-eligibility concerns regarding the 
claimed antenna, but in doing so, the Court stated the following: 
While a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of 
it, is not [a] patentable invention, a novel and useful 
structure created with the aid of knowledge of [the] 
 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. at 534. 
 145.  Id. at 531, 535. 
 146.  Contra Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 726–27 (1880). 
 147.  306 U.S. 86 (1939). 
 148.  Id. at 88–90. 
 149.  Id. at 93–94. 
 150.  Id. at 90, 93–94. 
 
144 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:117 
scientific truth may be. . . . We assume, without deciding 
the point, that [the claimed] advance was invention even 
though it was achieved by the logical application of a 
known scientific law to a familiar type of antenna.151 
This statement—made in dicta and without analysis or citation to 
authority—would later come to be repeatedly cited by the Supreme 
Court as support for the vague proposition that “laws of nature,” 
“abstract ideas,” and “mathematical algorithms” are not patent 
eligible, whereas applications of such principles may be.152 
With the foregoing decisions—from Le Roy in 1852 to Mackay 
Radio in 1939—the Supreme Court had amassed a body of shaky 
judicial proclamations that would in time snowball to become the 
judicial “exceptions” that govern patent eligibility today.153 We note 
two important observations regarding the foregoing body of case 
law. 
First, by as late as 1939, the Court had conducted very little 
statutory interpretation or analysis relevant to the patent-eligibility 
inquiry. The Court rarely even cited to the language of the Patent Act 
regarding patent eligibility, much less delved into the Act’s 
legislative history. 
Second, in each of the key decisions above, the Court did not 
clearly find any patent claim invalid on patent-eligibility grounds.154 
 
 151.  Id. at 94 (emphasis added). 
 152.  See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 
(2012) (citing Mackay Radio, 306 U.S. at 94); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981) 
(same); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591–92 (1978) (same); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 
67 (1972) (same); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (same). 
 153.  See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (“The Court’s precedents 
provide three specific exceptions to § 101’s broad patent eligibility principles: ‘laws of nature, 
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.’” (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 
(1980))). 
 154.  One outlier was the case of American Fruit Growers v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1 (1931), 
in which the Court invalidated a product claim directed to a “[f]resh citrus fruit of which the rind 
or skin carries borax in [an] amount that is very small but sufficient to render the fruit resistant to 
blue mold decay.” Id. at 6. The Court narrowly held that an orange treated with borax was not a 
“manufacture” within the meaning of the Patent Act, because the “[a]ddition of borax to the rind 
of natural fruit does not produce from the raw material an article for use which possesses a new or 
distinctive form, quality, or property.” Id. at 11. “There is no change in the name, appearance, or 
general character of the fruit,” the Court reasoned, adding that “[i]t remains a fresh orange, fit 
only for the same beneficial uses as theretofore.” Id. at 12. The Court offered no explanation for 
why such factors were relevant to patent eligibility. Further, the Court’s holding was factually 
flawed, as the Court itself recognized that the orange treated with borax did have a new quality 
and beneficial use—namely, increased mold resistance and a resulting longer shelf life. See id. at 
8, 11–12. Perhaps for these reasons, American Fruit Growers is generally viewed today as an 
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In the cases of Le Roy, Cochrane, Tilghman, Dolbear, and Mackay 
Radio, the Court found the claimed inventions patentable, while 
offering unsupported and vague dicta that could be construed as 
narrowing patent eligibility.155 The Court found the claims in Morse 
and Rubber-Tip Pencil invalid, but these holdings arguably rested on 
enablement and obviousness grounds, respectively.156 
Thus, as of 1939, the jurisprudence of patent eligibility was rife 
with unclear rhetoric, yet almost entirely devoid of substance. 
B.  The Competing Biotechs: Funk Bros. and Chakrabarty 
We view the modern era of jurisprudence—and confusion—
regarding patent-eligible subject matter as beginning in 1948 with 
the case of Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.157 
At the time the patent in Funk Bros. was filed, it was well-
known in the art that root-nodule bacteria (Rhizobium) could be used 
to inoculate the seeds of leguminous plants, creating a symbiotic 
relationship that assists the resulting plants in gathering nitrogen 
from the air.158 Multiple strains of root-nodule bacteria existed, but 
no individual strain could inoculate all species of legumes.159 
Further, it was believed that the different strains of bacteria could not 
be combined in a mixture, as they would mutually inhibit each 
other’s effects.160 Farmers were thus often required to buy multiple 
packages of inoculants containing different strains of bacteria for use 
with their different crops.161 
However, the patentee in Funk Bros. discovered that certain 
strains of root-nodule bacteria would not mutually inhibit each other 
and could be used together in mixed cultures, thus allowing a single 
 
outlier with little or no precedential value, as its holding and reasoning have not been relied upon 
by the Supreme Court in any subsequent case, and it has generally been distinguished by lower 
courts. See, e.g., DONALD S. CHISUM, 1 CHISUM ON PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT § 1.02[3][a] (2013) (“[T]he American Fruit 
Growers treatment of the meaning of ‘manufacture’ is of little or no precedential value. . . . 
Lower court and administrative decisions since American Fruit Growers distinguish its 
holding.”). 
 155.  See supra notes 74–83, 112–152 and accompanying text. 
 156.  See supra notes 84–110 and accompanying text. 
 157.  333 U.S. 127 (1948). 
 158.  Id. at 128–29. 
 159.  Id. at 129. 
 160.  Id. at 129–30. 
 161.  Id. at 131. 
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mixture to inoculate many different plant species.162 The resulting 
patent recited a series of claims directed to the new mixture of non-
inhibitive bacteria, including Claim Four, which read as follows: 
An inoculant for leguminous plants comprising a plurality 
of selected mutually non-inhibitive strains of different 
species of bacteria of the genus Rhizobium, said strains 
being unaffected by each other in respect to their ability to 
fix nitrogen in the leguminous plant for which they are 
specific.163 
The Supreme Court held that the patentee’s claims were invalid 
for failing to recite patent-eligible subject matter.164 The Court began 
by expressly announcing that “phenomena of nature” and “laws of 
nature” are per se excluded from patent eligibility: 
[P]atents cannot issue for the discovery of phenomena of 
nature. The [non-inhibitive] qualities of these bacteria, like 
the heat of the sun, electricity, or the qualities of metals, are 
part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men. They are 
manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and 
reserved exclusively to none. He who discovers a hitherto 
unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a 
monopoly of it which the law recognizes.165 
In support of this sweeping decree, the Court merely cited—without 
any explanation or analysis—the dicta from its prior cases such as Le 
Roy, Dolbear, and Mackay Radio.166 The Court did not address the 
relevant language of the Patent Act or the Act’s legislative history.167 
In applying the announced per se exclusion to the claims at 
issue, the Funk Bros. Court appeared to follow a two-step analysis. 
First, the Court identified what it viewed as the “phenomena of 
nature” or “law of nature” underlying the patent claims at issue. For 
this, the Court pointed to the discovery “that certain strains of each 
species of these bacteria can be mixed without harmful effect to the 
properties of either”—i.e., “their qualities of non-inhibition.”168 The 
Court held that the patentee’s observation of these effects was “no 
 
 162.  Id. at 130. 
 163.  Id. at 128 n.1. 
 164.  Id. at 132. 
 165.  Id. at 130 (citations omitted). 
 166.  Id. 
 167. See id. at 128–32. 
 168.  Id. at 131. 
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more than the discovery of some of the handiwork of nature and 
hence [was] not patentable.”169 
Second, the Court proceeded to consider whether the claims at 
issue recited some “invention” beyond the natural principle itself.170 
The Court acknowledged that the claimed “aggregation of select 
strains of [bacteria] into one product is an application of [the] newly-
discovered natural principle.”171 However, the Court found that this 
application “fell short of invention.”172 No matter “how[] ingenious 
the discovery of that natural principle,” the Court reasoned that, 
“once nature’s secret of the non-inhibitive quality of certain strains 
of the [bacteria] was discovered, the state of the art made the 
production of a mixed inoculant a simple step.”173 In other words, the 
Court apparently treated the natural principle as if it had been well-
known, then found that the claimed application was too “simple” to 
be considered an “invention” in view of the known natural 
principle.174 As we discuss at length throughout this Article, the 
foregoing two-step analysis applied in Funk Bros. was the genesis of 
what later became the “inventive concept” test for patent 
eligibility.175 
In holding that the claimed mixture of bacteria did not include 
an inventive concept, the Court emphasized that each individual 
strain of bacteria in the mixture was unchanged from its natural state: 
Each of the species of root-nodule bacteria contained in the 
package infects the same group of leguminous plants which 
it always infected. No species acquires a different use. The 
combination of species produces no new bacteria, no 
change in the six species of bacteria, and no enlargement of 
the range of their utility. Each species has the same effect it 
always had. The bacteria perform in their natural way. Their 
combination does not improve in any way their natural 
functioning. They serve the ends nature originally provided 
and act quite independently of any effort of the patentee.176 
 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Id. at 132. 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  See infra Parts III.D–G. 
 176.  Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 131. 
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It is unclear why the Court chose to focus on individual components 
(i.e., each strain of bacteria) as opposed to the claimed invention as a 
whole (i.e., the mixture of multiple non-inhibitive bacteria strains). 
Indeed, the Court itself acknowledged that the claimed mixture was 
“new and useful,” as it allowed a farmer to “buy one package and use 
it for any or all of his crops of leguminous plants.”177 
Concurring in the Funk Bros. judgment, Justice Frankfurter 
raised concerns regarding the workability of the majority’s approach 
to the patent-eligibility inquiry. With respect to the new per se 
exclusion from patent eligibility, Justice Frankfurter stated the 
following: 
It only confuses the issue, however, to introduce such terms 
as “the work of nature” and the “laws of nature.” For these 
are vague and malleable terms infected with too much 
ambiguity and equivocation. Everything that happens may 
be deemed “the work of nature,” and any patentable 
composite exemplifies in its properties “the laws of nature.” 
Arguments drawn from such terms for ascertaining 
patentability could fairly be employed to challenge almost 
every patent.178 
Justice Frankfurter further took issue with the majority’s application 
of its own framework, stating: 
Nor can it be contended that there was no invention because 
the composite has no new properties other than its 
ingredients in isolation. [The patentee’s] mixture does in 
fact have the new property of multi-service applicability. 
Multi-purpose tools, multivalent vaccines, vitamin complex 
composites, are examples of complexes whose sole new 
property is the conjunction of the properties of their 
components. Surely the Court does not mean unwittingly to 
pass on the patentability of such products by formulating 
criteria by which future issues of patentability may be 
prejudged.179 
Justice Frankfurter would have instead found the patentee’s claims 
invalid under an apparent “full scope” enablement theory,180 because 
 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  Id. at 134–35 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 179.  Id. at 135. 
 180.  See supra notes 95–98 and accompanying text. 
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while the patent disclosed only that certain specific strains of bacteria 
were non-inhibiting, it attempted to broadly claim all mixtures 
containing any strains of bacteria that were non-inhibiting.181 
About thirty-two years after Funk Bros., in the 1980 case of 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty,182 the Supreme Court once again addressed 
the patent eligibility of a claimed invention relating to bacteria. The 
patent at issue claimed a genetically engineered bacterium capable of 
breaking down crude oil.183 Unlike in Funk Bros., the Chakrabarty 
Court expressly analyzed the language of the Patent Act pertaining to 
patent eligibility, codified in section 35 U.S.C. § 101.184 
The Court began by “caution[ing] that courts ‘should not read 
into the patent laws limitations and conditions which the legislature 
has not expressed.’”185 Addressing the statutory categories of patent-
eligible subject matter (i.e., “any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter”),186 the Court reasoned that, 
“[i]n choosing such expansive terms as ‘manufacture’ and 
‘composition of matter,’ modified by the comprehensive ‘any,’ 
Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given 
wide scope.”187 The Court further noted that the term “‘composition 
of matter’ has been construed consistent with its common usage to 
include ‘all compositions of two or more substances and . . . all 
composite articles, whether they be the results of chemical union, or 
 
 181.  Id. at 133–34 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[The patentee] makes no claim that 
Funk Brothers used the same combination of strains that he had found mutually compatible. He 
appears to claim that since he was the originator of the idea that there might be mutually 
compatible strains and had practically demonstrated that some such strains exist, everyone else is 
forbidden to use a combination of strains whether they are or are not identical with the 
combinations that [the patentee] selected and packaged together. . . . The consequences of such a 
conclusion call for its rejection. Its acceptance would require, for instance in the field of alloys, 
that if one discovered a particular mixture of metals, which when alloyed had some particular 
desirable properties, he could patent not merely this particular mixture but the idea of alloying 
metals for this purpose, and thus exclude everyone else from contriving some other combination 
of metals which, when alloyed, had the same desirable properties.”). 
 182.  447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 183.  Id. at 305. 
 184.  Id. at 307 (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a 
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” (quoting 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101)). 
 185.  Id. at 308 (quoting United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 199 
(1933)). 
 186.  35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). 
 187.  Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308 (quoting Dubilier, 289 U.S. at 199). 
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of mechanical mixture, or whether they be gases, fluids, powders or 
solids.’”188 
Turning to the legislative history of the Patent Act of 1952, the 
Court stated that “the Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 
Act inform us that Congress intended statutory subject matter to 
‘include anything under the sun that is made by man.’”189 The Court 
viewed this as reflecting “Jefferson’s philosophy that ‘ingenuity 
should receive a liberal encouragement.’”190 
Referring to prior cases, the Chakrabarty Court acknowledged 
the existence of certain per se patent-eligibility exclusions: 
This is not to suggest that § 101 has no limits or that it 
embraces every discovery. The laws of nature, physical 
phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not 
patentable. Thus, a new mineral discovered in the earth or a 
new plant found in the wild is not patentable subject matter. 
Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that 
E=mc2; nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity. 
Such discoveries are “manifestations of . . . nature, free to 
all men and reserved exclusively to none.”191 
However, the patentee’s genetically engineered bacterium was patent 
eligible, the Court held, because “[h]is claim is not to a hitherto 
unknown natural phenomenon, but to a nonnaturally occurring 
manufacture or composition of matter—a product of human 
ingenuity ‘having a distinctive name, character [and] use.’”192 The 
Court distinguished Funk Bros. on the basis that, while the patent in 
Funk Bros. recited a mixture of naturally occurring bacteria, the 
patentee in Chakrabarty had “produced a new bacterium with 
markedly different characteristics from any found in nature.”193 
 
 188.  Id. (quoting Shell Development Co. v. Watson, 149 F. Supp. 729, 280 (D.C. 1957)). 
 189.  Id. at 309 (emphasis added) (quoting S. REP. NO. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952); 
H.R. REP. NO. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1952)). The Court also noted that the same language 
was employed by P.J. Federico, a principal draftsman of the 1952 recodification, in his testimony 
regarding that legislation: “[U]nder section 101 a person may have invented a machine or a 
manufacture, which may include anything under the sun that is made by man. . . .” Id. at 309 n.6 
(quoting Hearings on H.R. 3760 before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the 
Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 37 (1951)). 
 190.  Id. at 308–09 (quoting 5 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 75–76 (Washington ed. 
1871)). 
 191.  Id. at 309 (emphasis added) (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 
U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (internal citations omitted)). 
 192.  Id. at 309–10 (quoting Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615 (1887)). 
 193.  Id. at 310 (emphasis added). 
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C.  Benson’s Nutshell 
Beginning in the 1970s, the Supreme Court decided three 
landmark cases concerning the patent eligibility of “process” claims 
directed to the use of mathematical formulas or algorithms. These 
cases raised issues pertaining to the Court’s per se exclusion of 
“abstract ideas” from patent eligibility. 
In 1972, in Gottschalk v. Benson,194 the Supreme Court 
considered a patent directed to a method of converting binary-coded 
decimal (BCD) numbers into pure binary using a general purpose 
computer.195 The Court described the method as an “algorithm” that 
was “not limited to any particular art or technology, to any particular 
apparatus or machinery, or to any particular end use.”196 The 
question presented, the Court said, was “whether the method 
described and claimed is a ‘process’ within the meaning of the Patent 
Act.”197 
However, the Benson Court’s brief reference to the Patent Act 
and the “process” category of patent-eligible subject matter was 
apparently mere lip service. Without making any attempt to engage 
in statutory interpretation or to analyze the Act’s legislative history, 
the Court immediately looked to the dicta and unsupported 
statements of the Court’s own precedents, stating as follows: 
The Court stated in [Mackay Radio] that “[w]hile a 
scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not 
patentable invention, a novel and useful structure created 
with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may be.” That 
statement followed the longstanding rule that “[a]n idea of 
itself is not patentable.” [Rubber-Tip Pencil]. “A principle 
in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a 
 
 194.  409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
 195.  Id. at 64–66. 
The decimal system uses the digits 0-9 arranged in placeholder positions representing powers of 
ten. For example, the number 13 in decimal format represents 10 (1*10^1) + 3 (3*10^0). 
A pure binary system uses only the digits 0 and 1, arranged in placeholder positions representing 
powers of two. Thus, the decimal number 13 in pure binary is represented as 1101, 
conceptualized as 8 (1*2^3) + 4 (1*2^2) + 0 (0*2^1) + 1 (1*2^0). 
A binary-coded decimal (BCD) system is the same as pure binary, except that each digit of a 
decimal number is individually represented by its four-digit binary form. Thus, the number 13 in 
BCD form is represented as 0001 0011. 
The patent at issue in Benson was directed to an algorithm for converting BCD numbers into pure 
binary. Thus, for the number 13, it would convert 0001 0011 (BCD) into 1101 (pure binary). 
 196.  Id. at 64–65. 
 197.  Id. at 64 (citing and quoting 35 U.S.C. §§ 100(b) and 101 (1970)). 
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motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in 
either of them an exclusive right.” [Le Roy]. Phenomena of 
nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and 
abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are 
the basic tools of scientific and technological work. As we 
stated in [Funk Bros.], “He who discovers a hitherto 
unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a 
monopoly of it which the law recognizes. If there is to be 
invention from such a discovery, it must come from the 
application of the law of nature to a new and useful end.”198 
The Benson Court then analogized the claimed method of BCD-
to-binary conversion to the overbreadth of Claim Eight in Morse,199 
stating that “the ‘process’ claim is so abstract and sweeping as to 
cover both known and unknown uses of the BCD to pure binary 
conversion.”200 The Court further reasoned that, because “[t]he 
mathematical formula involved here has no substantial practical 
application except in connection with a digital computer, . . . the 
patent would wholly preempt the mathematical formula and in 
practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself.”201 
Accordingly, the Court found that the claimed method of BCD-to-
binary conversion failed to recite patent-eligible subject matter.202 
In the end, Benson offered little more than the “nutshell” that 
claims directed to “algorithm[s]” are not patent eligible: 
What we come down to in a nutshell is the following. It is 
conceded that one may not patent an idea. But in practical 
effect that would be the result if the formula for converting 
BCD numerals to pure binary numerals were patented in 
this case. The mathematical formula involved here has no 
substantial practical application except in connection with a 
digital computer, which means that if the judgment below is 
affirmed, the patent would wholly pre-empt the 
 
 198.  Id. at 67 (citing and quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 
130 (1948); Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939); 
Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498, 507 (1874); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 
U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852)). 
 199.  Id. at 68–69 (citing and quoting O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853)); see 
also supra notes 84–99 and accompanying text. 
 200.  Id. at 68 (emphasis added). 
 201. Id. at 71–72 (emphasis added). 
 202.  Id. at 72–73. 
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mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a 
patent on the algorithm itself.203 
As Judge Rich aptly stated in his concurring opinion in Application 
of Christensen,204 “[t]he Supreme Court in Benson appears to have 
held that claims drafted in such terms [to cover an ‘algorithm’] are 
not patentable—for what reason remaining a mystery.”205 
As a side note, the Benson Court at one point repeated the 
dictum of Cochrane v. Deener regarding the definition of a 
“process,” stating, “Transformation and reduction of an article ‘to a 
different state or thing’ is the clue to patentability of a process claim 
that does not include particular machines.”206 However, the Court 
then clarified this language: 
It is argued that a process patent must either be tied to a 
particular machine or apparatus or must operate to change 
articles or materials to a ‘different state or thing.’ We do not 
hold that no process patent could ever qualify if it did not 
meet the requirements of our precedents.207 
D.  The “Inventive Concept” Conundrum: Flook and Diehr 
The Supreme Court’s next major foray into patent-eligible 
subject matter came in 1978, in Parker v. Flook.208 Unlike the claims 
in Benson (at least as the Supreme Court interpreted them), the 
claims in Flook did not attempt to claim an algorithm itself. Rather, 
they claimed a specific industrial process that included the use of a 
novel209 algorithm in one of its steps.210 In fact, the Court noted that 
Flook’s claims did not “cover every conceivable application” of the 
applicant’s algorithm.211 
Specifically, Flook claimed a method of updating “alarm limits” 
(i.e., numeric warning thresholds) used to signal the presence of 
abnormal conditions during a catalytic conversion process.212 The 
 
 203.  Id. at 71–72 (1972). 
 204.  478 F. 2d 1392 (C.C.P.A. 1973) 
 205.  Id. at 1396. 
 206.  Benson, 409 U.S. at 70 (quoting Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876)). 
 207.  Id. at 71 (emphasis added). 
 208.  437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
 209. The Court noted that, “[f]or the purpose of our analysis, we assume that respondent’s 
formula is novel and useful and that he discovered it.” Id. at 588. 
 210.  Flook, 437 U.S. at 596–97 (appendix to opinion of the Court). 
 211.  Id. at 586. 
 212.  Id. at 585. 
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claimed method generally comprised three steps: (1) measuring the 
present value of a process variable (e.g., temperature) during a 
catalytic conversion process; (2) calculating an updated alarm limit 
using both the process variable and a mathematical algorithm; and 
(3) adjusting the alarm limit to reflect the updated value.213 Noting 
that the “only novel feature” of the claimed method was the 
mathematical formula, the Court framed the issue as “whether the 
discovery of this feature makes an otherwise conventional method 
eligible for patent protection.”214 
The Court began its analysis by noting that “[t]his case turns 
entirely on the proper construction of § 101 of the Patent Act, which 
describes the subject matter that is eligible for patent protection.”215 
However, after merely quoting the statute, the Court immediately 
concluded that “[t]he plain language of § 101 does not answer the 
question.”216 The Court acknowledged that the claimed method was 
“a ‘process’ in the ordinary sense of the word,” but it found that such 
a “literal reading” of the Patent Act was incorrect.217 
The Flook Court reached this conclusion without any discussion 
of legislative history or traditional canons of statutory 
construction.218 Rather, the Court once again looked to its own 
precedents. First referring to Benson, the Court reasoned that “[t]he 
holding that the discovery of [the BCD-to-binary] method could not 
be patented as a ‘process’ forecloses a purely literal reading of 
§ 101.”219 The Court explained that, because “an algorithm, or 
mathematical formula, is like a law of nature, Benson applied the 
established rule that a law of nature cannot be the subject of a 
patent.”220 As evidence of the “established rule,” the Court quoted 
language from many of the cases discussed above, including Le Roy, 
Morse, Cochrane, Tilghman, Mackay Radio, and Funk Bros.221 The 
 
 213.  Id. 
 214.  Id. at 588. 
 215.  Id. 
 216.  Id. 
 217.  Id. at 588–89. 
 218.  Id. 
 219.  Id. at 589 (emphasis added) (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972)). 
 220.  Id. (citing Benson, 409 U.S. at 71–72) (emphasis added). 
 221.  Id. at 589–92 (citing and quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Incculant Co., 333 U.S. 
127, 130 (1948); Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939); 
Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 728 (1880); Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787–88 (1876); 
O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112–21 (1853); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 
156, 175 (1852)). 
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Court rejected the argument that, “if a process application 
implements a principle in some specific fashion, it automatically falls 
within the patentable subject matter of § 101.”222 Rather, the Court 
explained, “[t]he rule that the discovery of a law of nature cannot be 
patented rests, not on the notion that natural phenomena are not 
processes, but rather on the more fundamental understanding that 
they are not the kind of ‘discoveries’ that the statute was enacted to 
protect.”223 As support for this proposition, the Court cited a patent 
law treatise.224 
The patentee argued that, unlike the process in Benson, the 
claims at issue in Flook did not “wholly preempt the mathematical 
formula,” as the claims were limited to catalytic conversion 
processes, and they included additional steps such as updating the 
alarm limit.225 However, the Court rejected the “notion that post-
solution activity, no matter how conventional or obvious in itself, can 
transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process,” 
because any “competent draftsman could attach some form of post-
solution activity to almost any mathematical formula,” thereby 
“exalt[ing] form over substance.”226 
Thus, in analyzing the specific claims at issue, the Flook Court 
again appeared to adopt a two-step approach similar to that applied 
in Funk Bros.227 First, the Court identified what it viewed as the 
unpatentable “law of nature” or “idea” underlying the claims—in this 
case, the “mathematical algorithm” for calculating alarm limits.228 
Second, the Court considered whether the claims recited some 
“inventive concept” beyond the mathematical algorithm itself.229 For 
this analysis, the Court reasoned that the mathematical algorithm, “as 
one of the ‘basic tools of scientific and technological work,’ [must 
be] treated as though it were a familiar part of the prior art.”230 In 
other words, the Court effectively analyzed Flook’s claim as though 
its novel algorithm were not part of the claim at all. The Court 
 
 222.  Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978). 
 223.  Id. 
 224.  Id. at 593 n.15 (quoting P. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS 4, at 13 (1975)). 
 225.  Id. at 589–90. 
 226.  Id. at 590 (emphasis added). 
 227.  See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Incculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131–32 (1948). 
 228.  Flook, 437 U.S. at 589–90. 
 229.  Id. at 594. 
 230.  Id. at 591–92 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)); see also id. at 
594. 
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explained that the claimed “process is unpatentable under § 101, not 
because it contains a mathematical algorithm as one component, but 
because once that algorithm is assumed to be within the prior art, the 
application, considered as a whole, contains no patentable 
invention.”231 Essentially excising the algorithm of step 2 from the 
claim, the Court concluded that the remaining method steps were 
already well-known in the art, and on that basis concluded that 
Flook’s claim was not directed to patent-eligible subject matter: 
Here it is absolutely clear that respondent’s application 
contains no claim of patentable invention. The chemical 
processes involved in catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons 
are well known, as are the practice of monitoring the 
chemical process variables, the use of alarm limits to trigger 
alarms, the notion that alarm limit values must be 
recomputed and readjusted, and the use of computers for 
“automatic monitoring-alarming.”232 
The Court thus held that “the discovery of such a phenomenon [i.e., 
an algorithm or formula] cannot support a patent unless there is some 
other inventive concept in its application.”233 Summing up, the Court 
stated, “[v]ery simply, our holding today is that a claim for an 
improved method of calculation, even when tied to a specific end 
use, is unpatentable subject matter under § 101.”234 
The Flook Court recognized that the case raised significant 
policy issues as to the proper scope of patent protection, but it 
announced that it was up to Congress, not the Court, to resolve those 
policy issues.235 This was somewhat ironic, given that the Court 
never explained why Congress’s broad language in § 101 did not 
itself settle the question, nor did the Court identify the specific 
statutory basis for its rejection of Flook’s claims as patent ineligible. 
Indeed, the Court elsewhere indicated that its decision was based on 
the “absence of precedent [from its own case law] supporting 
 
 231. Id. at 594. 
 232.  Id. at 594–95 (emphasis added). 
 233.  Id. at 594. 
 234.  Id. at 595 n.18. 
 235.  Id. at 595–96. (“Difficult questions of policy concerning the kinds of programs that may 
be appropriate for patent protection and the form and duration of such protection can be answered 
by Congress on the basis of current empirical data not equally available to this tribunal. It is our 
duty to construe the patent statutes as they now read, in light of our prior precedents, and we must 
proceed cautiously when we are asked to extend patent rights into areas wholly unforeseen by 
Congress.”). 
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patentability”—case law, in fact, that the Court recognized was from 
a different era of technology.236 
Justice Stewart dissented, joined by Chief Justice Burger and 
Justice Rehnquist.237 Justice Stewart took issue with the majority’s 
conflation of patent eligibility (§ 101) with the separate requirements 
of novelty (§ 102) and obviousness (§ 103): 
The Court today says it does not turn its back on [its] well-
settled precedents, but it strikes what seems to me an 
equally damaging blow at basic principles of patent law by 
importing into its inquiry under 35 U.S.C. § 101 the criteria 
of novelty and inventiveness. Section 101 is concerned only 
with subject-matter patentability. Whether a patent will 
actually issue depends upon the criteria of §§ 102 and 103, 
which include novelty and inventiveness, among many 
others. It may well be that under the criteria of §§ 102 and 
103 no patent should issue on the process claimed in this 
case, because of anticipation, abandonment, obviousness, or 
for some other reason. But in my view the claimed process 
clearly meets the standards of subject-matter patentability 
of § 101.238 
In 1981, three years after Flook, the Supreme Court decided 
Diamond v. Diehr.239 Similar to the “method for updating alarm 
limits” invalidated in Flook, the Court again considered the patent 
eligibility of an industrial process that included the use of a 
mathematical formula. The industrial process in Diehr was a process 
for molding and curing synthetic rubber.240 The claimed process 
generally comprised the steps of: (1) constantly measuring the 
temperature inside a rubber molding press; (2) feeding the 
measurements into a computer that would repeatedly recalculate the 
cure time using a known mathematical formula (the “Arrhenius 
equation”); and (3) causing the computer to signal a device to open 
the press at the optimal time.241 
 
 236.  Id. at 595 (“To a large extent our conclusion is based on reasoning derived from opinions 
written before the modern business of developing programs for computers was conceived. The 
youth of the industry may explain the complete absence of precedent supporting patentability.”). 
 237.  Id. at 598 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 238.  Id. at 600. 
 239.  450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
 240.  Id. at 177. 
 241.  Id. at 178–79 & n.5. 
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Unlike in Flook, however, the Diehr Court found that this 
process was a patent-eligible application of a mathematical 
formula.242 In attempting to distinguish Flook, the Court reasoned as 
follows: 
Parker v. Flook presented a similar situation. The claims 
were drawn to a method for computing an ‘alarm limit.’ An 
‘alarm limit’ is simply a number and the Court concluded 
that the application sought to protect a formula for 
computing this number. . . . In contrast, the respondents 
here do not seek to patent a mathematical formula. Instead, 
they seek patent protection for a process of curing synthetic 
rubber. Their process admittedly employs a well-known 
mathematical equation, but they do not seek to pre-empt the 
use of that equation. Rather, they seek only to foreclose 
from others the use of that equation in conjunction with all 
of the other steps in their claimed process. These include 
installing rubber in a press, closing the mold, constantly 
determining the temperature of the mold, constantly 
recalculating the appropriate cure time through the use of 
the formula and a digital computer, and automatically 
opening the press at the proper time.243 
Focusing on the physical steps of the claimed process, the Diehr 
Court recited the dictum from Cochrane v. Deener defining the term 
“process,” stating as follows: “A process is a mode of treatment of 
certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or series of 
acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and 
reduced to a different state or thing.”244 The Court further cited the 
related dictum from Benson: “Transformation and reduction of an 
article ‘to a different state or thing’ is the clue to the patentability of 
a process claim that does not include particular machines.”245 The 
Court then applied this language to the patent at issue: 
Analyzing respondents’ claims according to the above 
statements from our cases, we think that a physical and 
chemical process for molding precision synthetic rubber 
products falls within the § 101 categories of possibly 
 
 242.  Id. at 192–93. 
 243.  Id. at 186–87 (emphasis added). 
 244.  Id. at 183 (quoting Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787–88 (1876)). 
 245.  Id. at 184 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972)). 
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patentable subject matter. That respondents’ claims involve 
the transformation of an article, in this case raw, uncured 
synthetic rubber, into a different state or thing cannot be 
disputed. The respondents’ claims describe in detail a step-
by-step method for accomplishing such, beginning with the 
loading of a mold with raw, uncured rubber and ending with 
the eventual opening of the press at the conclusion of the 
cure. Industrial processes such as this are the types which 
have historically been eligible to receive the protection of 
our patent laws.246 
Justice Stevens dissented, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, 
and Blackmun.247 The dissent argued that the relevant facts of Diehr 
were “strikingly reminiscent” of those in Flook: 
[Flook] involved the use of a digital computer in connection 
with a catalytic conversion process. During the conversion 
process, variables such as temperature, pressure, and flow 
rates were constantly monitored and fed into the computer; 
in [Diehr], temperature in the mold is the variable that is 
monitored and fed into the computer. In Flook, the digital 
computer repetitively recalculated the ‘alarm limit’—a 
number that might signal the need to terminate or modify 
the catalytic conversion process; in [Diehr], the digital 
computer repetitively recalculates the correct curing time—
a number that signals the time when the synthetic rubber 
molding press should open. 
The essence of the claimed discovery in both cases was an 
algorithm that could be programmed on a digital computer.248 
In our view, Flook and Diehr are irreconcilable. They conflict in 
a number of respects: 
First, the Diehr Court did not apply the two-step “inventive 
concept” analysis employed in Flook and previously employed in 
 
 246.  Id. at 184 (emphasis added); see also id. at 192 (“[W]hen a claim containing a 
mathematical formula implements or applies that formula in a structure or process which, when 
considered as a whole, is performing a function which the patent laws were designed to protect 
(e.g., transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing), then the claim satisfies the 
requirements of § 101.” (emphasis added)). 
 247.  Id. at 193 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 248.  Id. at 209. 
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Funk Bros.249 Rather, the Diehr Court expressly held that “the 
‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process 
itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of 
a claim falls within the § 101 categories.”250 
Second, Diehr retreated from Flook’s holding “that a 
mathematical algorithm must be assumed to be within the ‘prior 
art,’” as a literal application of this rule “would, if carried to its 
extreme, make all inventions unpatentable because all inventions can 
be reduced to underlying principles of nature which, once known, 
make their implementation obvious.”251 The Diehr Court’s patent-
eligibility analysis thus did not effectively excise the algorithm from 
the claims, in direct contrast to the methodology employed in Flook. 
Third, Flook and Diehr are factually indistinguishable regarding 
the grounds relevant to the patent-eligibility inquiry. The Diehr 
Court purported to distinguish Flook under the theory that the claims 
in Flook sought to protect a “mathematical formula,” whereas “the 
respondents [in Diehr] do not seek to patent a mathematical 
formula.”252 But that statement is simply not accurate. As discussed 
above, the applicant in Flook did not attempt to patent a 
mathematical formula. Instead, exactly as in Diehr, Flook attempted 
to patent an industrial process that simply used a mathematical 
formula in one of its steps. The Diehr Court further noted that the 
respondents’ “process admittedly employs a well-known 
mathematical equation, but they do not seek to pre-empt the use of 
 
 249.  See id. at 204 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that, “[u]nder [the Flook] procedure, the 
algorithm is treated for § 101 purposes as though it were a familiar part of the prior art; the claim 
is then examined to determine whether it discloses ‘some other inventive concept.’” (quoting 
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591–95 (1978))). 
 250.  Id. at 188–89; see also id. at 189–91 (“It has been urged that novelty is an appropriate 
consideration under § 101. Presumably, this argument results from the language in § 101 referring 
to any ‘new and useful’ process, machine, etc. Section 101, however, is a general statement of the 
type of subject matter that is eligible for patent protection ‘subject to the conditions and 
requirements of this title.’ Specific conditions for patentability follow and § 102 covers in detail 
the conditions relating to novelty. The question therefore of whether a particular invention is 
novel is ‘wholly apart from whether the invention falls into a category of statutory subject 
matter.’ . . . In this case, it may later be determined that the respondents’ process is not deserving 
of patent protection because it fails to satisfy the statutory conditions of novelty under § 102 or 
nonobviousness under § 103. A rejection on either of these grounds does not affect the 
determination that respondents’ claims recited subject matter which was eligible for patent 
protection under § 101.” (citations omitted)). 
 251.  Id. at 189 n.12. 
 252.  Id. at 186–87. 
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that equation.”253 But this was equally true in Flook. Indeed, the 
Flook Court specifically noted that Flook’s claims did not “cover 
every conceivable application” of the applicant’s algorithm.254 
The conflict between Flook and Diehr is even apparent in the 
lineup of the Justices in each case. In Flook, Justice Stevens authored 
the majority opinion (joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, 
Blackmun, White, and Powell), and Justice Stewart dissented (joined 
by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist).255 In Diehr, Justice 
Rehnquist authored the majority opinion (joined by Chief Justice 
Burger and Justices Stewart, White, and Powell), and Justice Stevens 
dissented (joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun).256 
Notably, Justices White and Powell were the only Justices that were 
members of the majority in both cases. The inconsistencies between 
the Court’s opinions in Flook and Diehr thus appear to be explained 
by the fact that Justices White and Powell switched factions, for 
reasons unknown. In our view, the conflict between Flook and Diehr 
continues to generate significant confusion in the case law on § 101. 
Following Diehr, the Supreme Court was largely silent 
regarding the issue of patent-eligible subject matter for nearly thirty 
years.257 Then, beginning in 2010, the Supreme Court decided three 
more cases concerning patent eligibility: Bilski v. Kappos,258 Mayo 
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,259 and 
Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.260 
These cases substantially covered the gamut of patent-eligible 
subject matter, addressing the “abstract idea,” “law of nature,” and 
“physical phenomena” exceptions, respectively. 
E.  The Abstract Concept of Abstractness: Bilski 
In Bilski, decided in 2010, the Supreme Court considered a 
patent application which claimed a method of hedging financial risk 
in commodities markets.261 The application also included dependent 
 
 253.  Id. at 187. 
 254.  Flook, 437 U.S. at 586. 
 255.  Id. at 584. 
 256.  Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176. 
 257.  The one exception was J.E.M Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 
124 (2001), which concerned statutory provisions specific to the protection of crossbred plants. 
 258.  130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 259.  132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
 260.  133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
 261.  Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3224. Claim 1 of the patent application in Bilski reads as follows: 
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claims limiting the method’s use to “energy” commodities, as well as 
a claim directed to using well-known random analysis techniques to 
determine how much a seller would gain from each transaction under 
different weather patterns.262 The Court held that all claims failed to 
recite patent-eligible subject matter under § 101.263 In doing so, the 
Court affirmed the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, but rejected the lower court’s reasoning. 
In an effort to clarify the confused state of patent-eligibility 
jurisprudence, the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, had adopted the 
“machine-or-transformation test” as the “sole test” governing the 
patent eligibility of a claimed “process.”264 Under this test, a claimed 
process would be patent eligible under § 101 only if: “(1) it is tied to 
a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular 
article into a different state or thing.”265 In the Federal Circuit’s 
view, the Supreme Court had “enunciated” this as the “definitive 
test” for the patent eligibility of a process, based on statements made 
by the Court in Cochrane, Benson, Flook, and Diehr.266 Finding that 
the claimed method of hedging risk did not satisfy either prong of the 
 
A method for managing the consumption risk costs of a commodity sold by a 
commodity provider at a fixed price comprising the steps of: 
(a) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider and consumers 
of said commodity wherein said consumers purchase said commodity at a fixed rate 
based upon historical averages, said fixed rate corresponding to a risk position of said 
consumers; 
(b) identifying market participants for said commodity having a counter-risk position 
to said consumers; and 
(c) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider and said market 
participants at a second fixed rate such that said series of market participant 
transactions balances the risk position of said series of consumer transactions. 
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 949 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc); see also Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3223–24 
(same). 
 262.  Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3224. 
 263.  Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2111, 2116–18. 
 264. Id. at 3224 (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 954–56). 
 265.  Id. (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 954). 
 266.  See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 
U.S. 175, 192 (1981) (holding that use of mathematical formula in process “transforming or 
reducing an article to a different state or thing” constitutes patent-eligible subject matter); Parker 
v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 n.9 (1978) (“An argument can be made [that the Supreme] Court has 
only recognized a process as within the statutory definition when it either was tied to a particular 
apparatus or operated to change materials to a ‘different state or thing.’”); Gottschalk v. Benson, 
409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972) (“Transformation and reduction of an article ‘to a different state or thing’ 
is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not include particular machines.”); 
Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876) (“A process is . . . an act, or a series of acts, 
performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing.”)). 
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machine-or-transformation test, the Federal Circuit found that all 
claims failed to recite patent-eligible subject matter under § 101.267 
In reviewing the Federal Circuit’s decision, the Bilski Court 
began by reaffirming that “[t]he Court’s precedents provide three 
specific exceptions to § 101’s broad patent eligibility principles: 
‘laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.’”268 For 
perhaps the first time, the Court openly conceded that “these 
exceptions are not required by the statutory text,” although it 
opined—without explanation—that “they are consistent with the 
notion that a patentable process must be ‘new and useful.’”269 Citing 
the famous dicta of Le Roy v. Tatham, the Court reasoned that, “in 
any case, these exceptions have defined the reach of the statute as a 
matter of statutory stare decisis going back 150 years.”270 And thus, 
the Court reaffirmed the authority of its own precedents, divorced 
from any actual statutory interpretation.271 
However, in reviewing the Federal Circuit’s adoption of the 
machine-or-transformation test, the Court inconsistently cautioned 
that “courts should not read into the patent laws limitations and 
conditions which the legislature has not expressed.”272 The Court 
further stated that, “as in all statutory construction, ‘[u]nless 
otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, 
contemporary, common meaning.’”273 “Any suggestion in this 
Court’s case law that the Patent Act’s terms deviate from their 
ordinary meaning [had] only been an explanation for the exceptions 
for laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas”—i.e., the 
exceptions to the statute that the Supreme Court had itself created.274 
 
 267.  Bilski, 545 F.3d at 963–66. 
 268.  Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)). 
 269.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 270.  Id. (citing Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 174–75 (1852)); see also supra 
note 82 and accompanying text. 
 271.  Given the history of the Supreme Court’s patent-eligibility jurisprudence reviewed here, 
and the Court’s own recognition in Bilski that its judicial exceptions to section 101 are beyond the 
statutory text, it is somewhat ironic that the Court concluded its analysis in Bilski with the 
statement that, “[t]oday, the Court once again declines to impose limitations on the Patent Act 
that are inconsistent with the Act’s text.” Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231. 
 272.  Id. at 3226 (citations omitted) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 273.  Id. (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 274.  Id. 
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The Court reasoned that it was “unaware of any ‘ordinary, 
contemporary, common meaning’ of the definitional terms ‘process, 
art or method’ that would require these terms to be tied to a machine 
or to transform an article.”275 The Court had never endorsed the 
machine-or-transformation test as the “exclusive test” for the patent 
eligibility of a process; rather, in Benson, the Court had “explicitly 
declined to ‘hold that no process patent could ever qualify if it did 
not meet [machine or transformation] requirements.’”276 Thus, the 
Court held that, while the “machine-or-transformation test is a useful 
and important clue, an investigative tool, . . . [it] is not the sole test 
for deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible ‘process.’”277 
The Court further rejected arguments that computer programs278 and 
business methods279 were per se excluded from patent eligibility. 
The Bilski Court declined to “define further what constitutes a 
patentable ‘process.’”280 Instead, the Court directed lower courts to 
“look[] to the guideposts in Benson, Flook, and Diehr.”281 These 
precedents, the Court held, show that the claims at issue recited 
unpatentable “abstract ideas.”282 But aside from referring to Benson, 
Flook, and Diehr, the Court did not explain how lower courts should 
assess whether a claim is directed to non-statutory subject matter as 
an “abstract idea.” The Court did not define what an “abstract idea” 
is in this context. The Court also did not explain how to distill an 
“abstract idea” from a claim, nor did it identify the types of claim 
elements that may be disregarded—for example, as mere “post-
solution activity”—in determining whether a claim is impermissibly 
directed to an “abstract idea.” 
Turning to Bilski’s claims, the Court characterized two claims as 
broadly reciting the “concept of hedging, or protecting against risk,” 
which the Court held was “an unpatentable abstract idea, just like the 
 
 275.  Id. (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981)). 
 276.  Id. at 3227 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972)). 
 277.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 278.  Id. at 3227 (“It is true that patents for inventions that did not satisfy the machine-or-
transformation test were rarely granted in earlier eras . . . But this fact does not mean that 
unforeseen innovations such as computer programs are always unpatentable.”). 
 279.  Id. at 3228 (“Section 101 similarly precludes the broad contention that the term ‘process’ 
categorically excludes business methods.”). 
 280.  Id. at 3231. 
 281.  Id. 
 282.  Id. at 3229–30. 
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algorithms at issue in Benson and Flook.”283 As in Benson, the Court 
reasoned that “[a]llowing petitioners to patent risk hedging would 
pre-empt use of this approach in all fields, and would effectively 
grant a monopoly over an abstract idea.”284 
The Court characterized the narrower claims as “broad examples 
of how hedging can be used in commodities and energy markets.”285 
In finding these claims invalid, the Court cited Flook for the 
principle that “limiting an abstract idea to one field of use or adding 
token postsolution components did not make the concept 
patentable.”286 In the Court’s view, “[t]hese claims attempt to patent 
the use of the abstract idea of hedging risk in the energy market and 
then instruct the use of well-known random analysis techniques to 
help establish some of the inputs into the equation”—limitations 
which the Court reasoned “add even less to the underlying abstract 
principle than the invention in Flook, [which] was at least directed to 
the narrower domain of signaling dangers in operating a catalytic 
converter.”287 
Notably, in relying on Flook to find that mere “field of use” 
limitations and “token postsolution” activity did not render an 
underlying abstract idea patent eligible, the Bilski Court effectively 
applied the two-step “inventive concept” analysis employed in Flook 
and Funk Bros., even if it did not explicitly acknowledge doing so.288 
F.  Return of the “Inventive Concept”: Mayo 
Two years later, in the 2012 case of Mayo Collaborative 
Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., the Supreme Court 
unanimously reaffirmed its two-step “inventive concept” analysis, 
finding that a claimed medical diagnostic method was not patent 
 
 283.  Id. at 3231. 
 284.  Id. 
 285.  Id. 
 286.  Id. 
 287.  Id. 
 288. See id. at 3230 (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589–90 (1978)) (rejecting the 
proposition that “post-solution activity, no matter how conventional or obvious in itself, can 
transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process” (emphasis added)). Indeed, the 
Bilski Court repeatedly stressed the lack of inventiveness in the claimed method steps. See id. at 
3231 (“Hedging is a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce 
and taught in any introductory finance class.” (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1013 (2008) 
(Rader, J., dissenting))); id. at 3224, 3231 (holding that the addition of “well-known random 
analysis techniques” did not make the claimed method of hedging patent eligible) (emphasis 
added). 
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eligible.289 The patent claims at issue in Mayo were directed to a 
method of determining the optimal dosage of thiopurine drugs for 
patients with autoimmune diseases.290 Because the way in which 
patients metabolize thiopurine varies, it was difficult to determine 
whether a patient’s dosage was too high (risking harmful side 
effects) or too low (and thus possibly ineffective).291 However, the 
patentees discovered that certain concentrations of thiopurine 
metabolites in the blood were correlated with the dosage level being 
either too high or too low.292 The patentees claimed this discovery in 
the form of process claims that generally recited the following 
method steps: (1) an “administering” step—giving a patient a dose of 
thiopurine; (2) a “determining” step—measuring the patient’s 
thiopurine metabolite level; and (3) a “wherein” step—wherein a 
metabolite level below or above specific threshold levels “indicate[s] 
a need” to respectively increase or decrease the thiopurine dosage.293 
The Mayo Court began by reiterating its “long held” rule that 
“[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not 
patentable.”294 These “are the basic tools of scientific and 
technological work,” the Court explained, the monopolization of 
which “might tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to 
promote it.”295 The Court noted that, “to transform an unpatentable 
law of nature into a patent-eligible application of such a law, one 
must do more than simply state the law of nature while adding the 
words ‘apply it.’”296 The Court proceeded to analyze the claimed 
method under its two-step “inventive concept” framework. 
First, the Court identified the “law of nature” underlying the 
claims, which it characterized as “relationships between the 
concentration in the blood of certain thiopurine metabolites and the 
likelihood that the drug dosage will be ineffective or induce harmful 
side effects.”297 The Court reasoned that these relationships were “a 
consequence of the ways in which thiopurine compounds are 
 
 289.  Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012). 
 290.  Id. at 1294–95. 
 291.  Id. at 1295. 
 292.  Id. 
 293.  Id.; see also id. at 1297 (characterizing the claims as having “administering,” 
“determining,” and “wherein” steps). 
 294.  Id. at 1293 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 295.  Id. (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). 
 296.  Id. at 1294. 
 297.  Id.; see also id. at 1296 (same). 
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metabolized by the body—entirely natural processes”—and thus 
were not patent eligible.298 
Second, the Court expressly held that, to be patent eligible, “a 
process that focuses upon the use of a natural law [must] also contain 
other elements or a combination of elements, sometimes referred to 
as an ‘inventive concept,’ sufficient to ensure that the patent in 
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the natural 
law itself.”299 Under this analysis, the Court explained, pre- or 
“‘post-solution activity’ that is purely ‘conventional or obvious . . . 
can[not] transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable 
process.’”300 
Reviewing its precedents, the Court noted that it had previously 
applied the “inventive concept” analysis in Flook,301 Funk Bros.,302 
and Bilski.303 The Mayo Court also suggested that it applied the 
“inventive concept” analysis in Diehr.304 The Mayo Court reasoned 
that Diehr had “nowhere suggested that all [of the claimed] steps [in 
the rubber curing process], or at least the combination of those steps, 
were in context obvious, already in use, or purely conventional.”305 
In the Mayo Court’s view, “[t]hese other steps apparently added to 
the formula something that in terms of patent law’s objectives had 
significance—they transformed the process into an inventive 
application of the formula.”306 
The Mayo Court turned Diehr on its head. In analyzing subject-
matter eligibility, the Diehr Court never considered whether the 
 
 298.  Id. at 1297. 
 299.  Id. at 1294 (emphasis added) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978)). 
 300.  Id. at 1298–99 (quoting Flook, 437 U.S. at 589, 590). 
 301.  Id. at 1294 (citing Flook, 437 U.S. at 594); id. at 1299 (noting that, in Flook, “the notion 
that alarm limit values must be recomputed and readjusted, and the use of computers for 
‘automatic monitoring-alarming’ were all ‘well known,’ to the point where, putting the formula to 
the side, there was no ‘inventive concept’ in the claimed application of the formula” (quoting 
Flook, 437 U.S. at 594)). 
 302.  Id. at 1294 (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 
(1948)) (“If there is to be invention from [a discovery of a law of nature], it must come from the 
application of the law of nature to a new and useful end.”). 
 303.  Id. (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (“[T]he prohibition against 
patenting abstract ideas ‘cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a 
particular technological environment’ or adding ‘insignificant postsolution activity.’” (citation 
omitted)); id. at 1300–01 (quoting Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231) (acknowledging the fact that some 
claims limited the method of hedging to energy markets and specified “well-known random 
analysis techniques . . . did not make the concept patentable”). 
 304.  Id. at 1298–99 (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177–79, 187 (1981)). 
 305.  Id. at 1299 (emphasis added) (citing Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187). 
 306.  Id. (emphasis added). 
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claimed process entailed an “inventive application” of the Arrhenius 
formula. To the contrary, Diehr expressly held that the novelty and 
subject-matter eligibility inquiries entail completely separate 
determinations: “[t]he question therefore of whether a particular 
invention is novel is wholly apart from whether the invention falls 
into a category of statutory subject matter.”307 As the Diehr Court 
elaborated, “the ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or 
even of the claimed process as a whole, is of no relevance in 
determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the 
§ 101 categories.”308 In an attempt to reconcile its precedents, the 
Mayo Court engaged in some revisionist history. 
In any event, applying the “inventive concept” test to the case at 
hand, the Mayo Court found that the claims at issue did not “add 
enough to their statements of the [metabolite] correlations” to satisfy 
the test.309 The Court reasoned that “the steps in the claimed 
processes (apart from the natural laws themselves) involve[d] well-
understood, routine, conventional activity previously engaged in by 
researchers in the field.”310 For example, with respect to the claimed 
“administering” step, the Court noted that “doctors used thiopurine 
drugs to treat patients suffering from autoimmune disorders long 
before anyone asserted these claims.”311 Similarly, the Court 
reasoned that the “determining” step of testing a patient’s metabolite 
levels merely “tells doctors to engage in well-understood, routine, 
conventional activity previously engaged in by scientists who work 
in the field.”312 The Court further viewed the “wherein” step as 
merely “tell[ing] a doctor about the relevant natural laws” and 
suggesting to “take those laws into account” when treating a 
patient.313 Finally, the Court found that reciting these three steps in 
an ordered combination added nothing inventive to the underlying 
laws of nature, as “[a]nyone who wants to make use of these laws 
must first administer a thiopurine drug and measure the resulting 
metabolite concentrations.”314 
 
 307.  Diehr, 450 U.S. at 190 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 308.  Id. at 188–189. 
 309.  Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297. 
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In addition to applying the “inventive concept” analysis, the 
Mayo Court also emphasized general concerns regarding 
preemption.315 The Court again cited Morse—an enablement 
case316—for the proposition that a patent claim must not be so broad 
as to “inhibit further discovery by improperly tying up the future use 
of laws of nature.”317 In applying this amorphous principle to the 
claims at issue, the Court reasoned as follows: 
The laws of nature at issue here are narrow laws that may 
have limited applications, but the patent claims that embody 
them nonetheless implicate this concern. They tell a treating 
doctor to measure metabolite levels and to consider the 
resulting measurements in light of the statistical 
relationships they describe. In doing so, they tie up the 
doctor’s subsequent treatment decision whether that 
treatment does, or does not, change in light of the inference 
he has drawn using the correlations. And they threaten to 
inhibit the development of more refined treatment 
recommendations . . . that combine [the patentee’s] 
correlations with later discovered features of metabolites, 
human physiology or individual patient characteristics.318 
The Mayo Court additionally rejected the theory, applied by the 
Federal Circuit below, that the machine-or-transformation test 
rendered the claims patent eligible “since they involve transforming 
the human body by administering a thiopurine drug and transforming 
the blood by analyzing it to determine metabolite levels.”319 The 
Court held that these transformations were “irrelevant” and that, at 
any rate, “in stating that the ‘machine-or-transformation’ test is an 
‘important and useful clue’ to patentability, we have neither said nor 
implied that the test trumps the ‘law of nature’ exclusion.”320 
Finally, in finding the patent claims invalid, the Mayo Court 
suggested that the claimed diagnostic method may be distinguishable 
from drug treatment methods: “Unlike, say, a typical patent on a new 
drug or a new way of using an existing drug, the patent claims do not 
 
 315. Id. 1292, 1294, 1299. 
 316.  See supra notes 92–98 and accompanying text. 
 317.  Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301. 
 318.  Id. at 1302 (emphasis added). 
 319.  Id. 
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confine their reach to particular applications of [natural] laws.”321 
However, the Court offered no explanation or reasoning to support 
any such distinction. 
In fact, such a distinction—between diagnostic methods and 
drug treatment methods—would make little sense within the 
framework of the Mayo Court’s analysis. Consider a patent directed 
to the novel discovery that an existing drug known to treat disease X 
can also be administered to treat disease Y. The patentee accordingly 
files for a “typical” patent on this “new way of using an existing 
drug.”322 But under Mayo, the fact that this drug can treat disease Y is 
surely a “law of nature,” because the drug’s therapeutic effects on 
disease Y are the “consequence of . . . entirely natural processes.”323 
The specific manner in which the drug is administered—e.g., orally 
or intravenously—is also surely conventional. As a result, the 
claimed method would presumably be patent ineligible under Mayo, 
as there is no “inventive concept” supporting the treatment method 
aside from the “law of nature” that the drug can treat disease Y. 
Precisely because patents directed to drug treatment methods such as 
this are, in fact, “typical,” applying Mayo’s law of nature/inventive 
concept test would have a devastating effect on the U.S. 
pharmaceutical industry. This is no doubt why the Mayo Court 
attempted to waive off such fears—even while failing to provide a 
principled basis for distinguishing patent-ineligible diagnostic 
methods from drug treatment methods. 
G.  Retreat of the “Inventive Concept”: Myriad 
The Supreme Court issued its most recent decision regarding 
patent eligibility on June 13, 2013, in the case of Association for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.324 In that case, Myriad 
had discovered the precise location and coding of two human DNA 
sequences—the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes—which, when mutated, 
indicate a substantially increased risk of breast or ovarian cancer.325 
This knowledge enabled Myriad to develop tests for assessing cancer 
risk by analyzing a patient’s DNA.326 Myriad sought to patent its 
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discovery in the form of “composition of matter” claims directed to 
(a) “isolated” DNA sequences relating to the BRCA1 and BRCA2 
genes; and (b) synthetically created DNA sequences, known as 
complementary DNA (“cDNA”), derived from the BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 genes.327 For the reasons below, the Court unanimously held 
that cDNA is (generally) a patent-eligible “composition of matter,” 
whereas isolated DNA is an unpatentable “product of nature.”328 
Human DNA in its natural state is encoded with a sequence of 
millions of chemically joined nucleotide pairs, with the nucleotide 
pairs connected by covalent bonds in a “double helix” structure.329 
Contiguous segments of the DNA’s nucleotide sequence known as 
“exons” contain coding information for creating amino acids.330 The 
remaining segments, which do not code for amino acids, are known 
as “introns.”331 The BRCA1 and BRCA2 sequences discovered by 
Myriad are each about eighty thousand nucleotides long.332 If only 
the exon sequences are counted, BRCA1 is about 5,500 nucleotides 
long, and BRCA2 is about 10,200 nucleotides long.333 
Two DNA manipulation techniques were relevant to Myriad’s 
patent claims. First, well-known laboratory methods could be used to 
isolate segments of DNA—e.g., the BRCA1 or BRCA2 sequences, 
or any contiguous segment thereof—by breaking the covalent bonds 
that connect the segment to the rest of the DNA sequence.334 Second, 
other well-known laboratory methods could be used to create cDNA 
by synthetically removing all intron sequences from a DNA segment, 
leaving only the exon sequences behind (which remain sequenced in 
their natural order, save for the absence of any intervening 
introns).335 As stated, Myriad’s patents recited multiple “composition 
of matter” claims directed to isolated DNA and to cDNA.336 
The Court began its analysis by reiterating the exceptions to 
§ 101: “Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are 
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not patentable.”337 However, the Court cautioned that this rule “is not 
without limits,” as “‘all inventions at some level embody, use, 
reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or 
abstract ideas,’ and ‘too broad an interpretation of this exclusionary 
principle could eviscerate patent law.’”338 The Court framed the 
ultimate issue by quoting the language of § 101, stating that “[w]e 
must apply this well-established standard to determine whether 
Myriad’s patents claim any ‘new and useful . . . composition of 
matter.’”339 
The Court first considered Myriad’s claims directed to isolated 
DNA. Claim 1, for example, recited “[a]n isolated DNA coding for a 
BRCA1 polypeptide”—i.e., the entire isolated BRCA1 sequence.340 
Claim 5 similarly recited “[a]n isolated DNA having at least 15 
nucleotides of the DNA of claim 1,” effectively claiming any 
isolated DNA segment containing a sequence of fifteen or more 
nucleotides found within the BRCA1 sequence.341 In analyzing these 
claims, the Court stated the following: 
It is undisputed that Myriad did not create or alter any of the 
genetic information encoded in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 
genes. The location and order of the nucleotides existed in 
nature before Myriad found them. Nor did Myriad create or 
alter the genetic structure of DNA. Instead, Myriad’s 
principal contribution was uncovering the precise location 
and genetic sequence of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes 
within chromosomes 17 and 13.342 
The Court compared Myriad’s isolated DNA claims to Chakrabarty, 
in which the Court had held that a claim to a modified bacterium was 
patent eligible because “the patent claim was ‘not to a hitherto 
unknown natural phenomenon, but to a nonnaturally occurring 
manufacture or composition of matter.’”343 In contrast, the Court 
reasoned, “Myriad found the location of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 
 
 337.  Id. at 2116 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 
1289, 1290 (2012)). 
 338.  Id. at 2116. 
 339.  Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)). 
 340.  Id. at 2113. 
 341.  Id. 
 342.  Id. at 2116 (emphasis added). 
 343.  Id. at 2116–17 (emphasis added) (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 
(1980)). 
 
Fall 2013] PATENT-ELIGIBILITY 173 
genes, but that discovery, by itself, does not render the BRCA genes 
‘new . . . composition[s] of matter’ that are patent eligible.”344 The 
act of isolating a naturally occurring DNA sequence did not change 
this conclusion, the Court held, as merely “separating that gene from 
its surrounding genetic material is not an act of invention.”345 
Accordingly, the Court held that “naturally occurring, isolated DNA 
segments” are “product[s] of nature” which are not patent eligible.346 
The Court next turned to Myriad’s cDNA claims. Claim 2, for 
example, recited cDNA derived from isolated BRCA1—i.e., a 
nucleotide sequence containing only the exons from BRCA1, with all 
intervening introns removed.347 Claim 6 similarly recited “[a]n 
isolated DNA having at least fifteen nucleotides of the DNA of claim 
2,” effectively claiming any sequence of fifteen or more nucleotides 
found within cDNA derived from the BRCA1 sequence.348 
The Court reasoned that “cDNA does not present the same 
obstacles to patentability as naturally occurring, isolated DNA 
segments,” because “creation of a cDNA sequence . . . results in an 
exons-only molecule that is not naturally occurring.”349 The Court 
found it irrelevant that “[t]he nucleotide sequence of [the exons in] 
cDNA is dictated by nature, not by the lab technician.”350 The key 
fact, the Court held, was that “the lab technician unquestionably 
creates something new when cDNA is made.”351 As a result, the 
Court held, “cDNA is not a ‘product of nature’ and is patent eligible 
under § 101.”352 The one exception, the Court held, was for “very 
short series of DNA [with] no intervening introns to remove when 
creating cDNA,” resulting in cDNA that is still “indistinguishable 
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from natural DNA.”353 Thus, the determinative factor in the Court’s 
analysis was whether the exact nucleotide sequence claimed is 
“naturally occurring.”354 In this regard, we view Myriad as 
representing a significant (and welcome) departure from the Supreme 
Court’s “inventive concept” jurisprudence. 
As we have surveyed above, the Supreme Court’s “inventive 
concept” jurisprudence—beginning with Funk Bros. and continuing 
in at least Flook, Bilski, and Mayo—generally teaches the following: 
The fact that a patent claim is not specifically directed to a verboten 
judicial exception does not suffice to render the claim patent eligible. 
Instead, the claim must include some specific “inventive” concept 
separate and apart from the ineligible subject matter. For example, 
the patentee in Funk Bros. claimed a non-naturally occurring mixture 
of inoculants that was not, per se, a “law of nature”—or even a 
“product of nature.” The problem for the Court was that, putting 
aside the discovery of the law of nature and the naturally occurring 
inoculants individually, the claimed mixture “is hardly more than an 
advance in the packaging of the inoculants.”355 In other words, the 
claims lacked an inventive concept beyond the patent-ineligible 
elements of the patentee’s discovery. Similarly in Mayo, the claims 
were not directed to a law of nature per se, but rather to a diagnostic 
method that applied a law of nature. But because the application 
involved merely conventional “post-solution activity,” the claims 
were deemed directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. 
Myriad completely abandoned—sub silentio—the Court’s prior 
“inventive concept” framework. The Court’s determination that the 
claimed cDNA was not “naturally occurring” ended the patent-
eligibility analysis. The Court did not proceed to apply an “inventive 
concept” test, or examine whether the (patent-eligible) cDNA 
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differed from the (patent-ineligible) isolated DNA as a result of mere 
“post-solution” activity. 
Perhaps most notably, the facts in Myriad were neatly aligned 
for another application of the Court’s “inventive concept” test. The 
patentee’s discovery was undoubtedly a “law of nature” in the 
lexicon of Funk Bros. and Mayo: the patentee discovered that DNA 
sequences at a “precise location” in the human genome are 
associated with a significant increase in an individual’s risk of 
developing breast and ovarian cancer when mutated.356 The patentee 
could not claim those isolated DNA sequences (the BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 genes), because such claims are directed to a “product of 
nature,” which is per se patent ineligible.357 The patentee also 
applied well-known processes to those patent-ineligible DNA 
sequences to produce cDNA sequences. In fact, the Court even 
expressly acknowledged that the cDNA was created through 
“processes similarly well known in the field of genetics.”358 
Nevertheless, the Court held that cDNA was patent eligible under 
§ 101—despite the fact that those claims were based on nothing 
more than applying well-known processes (cDNA synthesizing 
techniques) to the patent-ineligible discovery of the BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 genes.359 The Court required no “inventive concept” beyond 
the patent-ineligible discovery of the patentee.360 Instead, the Court 
applied a bright-line rule, determining simply whether the claimed 
subject matter was naturally occurring or not.361 
The Court’s decision in Myriad diverged from prior case law in 
other significant respects as well. Importantly, the Myriad Court 
omitted any discussion of concerns relating to “preemption,” which 
factored heavily in the Court’s prior decisions in Benson, Flook, 
Diehr, Bilski, and Mayo.362 Indeed, the Court did not once utter any 
 
 356.  Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2110–11. 
 357.  Id. at 2111. 
 358.  Id. at 2112. 
 359.  Id. at 2111. 
 360.  Id. 
 361.  Id. at 2111, 2121. 
 362.  See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012) 
(noting that the Court’s cases “warn us against upholding patents that claim process that too 
broadly preempt the use of a natural law”); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010) 
(“Allowing petitioners to patent risk hedging would pre-empt use of this approach in all fields 
and would effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract idea.”); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 
175, 187 (1981) (“Their process admittedly employs a well-known mathematical equation, but 
they do not seek to pre-empt the use of that equation. Rather, they seek only to foreclose from 
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variation of the word “preempt” in the Myriad opinion. In finding 
isolated DNA patent ineligible, the Court focused solely on the fact 
that the specific sequence claimed was “naturally occurring”—i.e., a 
“product of nature.”363 The Court did not seek to justify this holding 
by referring to concerns that downstream uses of the isolated DNA 
would be preempted. Similarly, in finding cDNA patent eligible, the 
Court again focused solely on the fact that the specific nucleotide 
sequence claimed was “not naturally occurring.”364 In other words, 
unlike DNA, the cDNA was a “new . . . composition[] of matter” and 
therefore was patent eligible under § 101.365 The Court did not 
analyze what quantum of downstream innovation might be 
preempted by the patent claims covering cDNA sequences derived 
from the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes. 
Finally, it is notable that the Myriad Court did not even cite the 
prior cases of Le Roy, Morse, Rubber-Tip Pencil, Cochrane, 
Dolbear, Mackay Radio, Benson, Flook, Diehr, or Bilski—
precedents which have typically been cited ad nauseum in patent-
eligibility cases. Rather, the Myriad Court relied heavily on 
Chakrabarty, a case in which the Court took perhaps its most 
expansive view of patent eligibility in noting that “Congress intended 
statutory subject matter to ‘include anything under the sun that is 
made by man.’”366 
As will be discussed throughout the remainder of this Article, 
we believe that Myriad’s foregoing deviations from precedent 
present an opportunity for the Supreme Court to hit “reset” on its 
patent-eligibility jurisprudence, providing a new foundation for a 
clear and workable framework that is firmly grounded in the 
statutory text. 
 
others the use of that equation in conjunction with all of the other steps in their claimed 
process.”); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978) (finding claim directed to patent-ineligible 
subject matter, even though the claim technically did not “wholly preempt” the underlying 
mathematical formula); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972) (“The mathematical 
formula involved here has no substantial practical application except in connection with a digital 
computer, which means that if the judgment below is affirmed, the patent would wholly preempt 
the mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself.”). 
 363.  Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2111, 2116–18. 
 364.  Id. at 2111, 2119 (emphasis added). 
 365.  Id. at 2110 (emphasis added). 
 366.  Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. NO. 1979, 82d 
Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1952)); see also Myriad, 
133 S. Ct. at 2109 (“Diamond v. Chakrabarty is central to the patent eligibility inquiry . . . .”). 
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IV.  THE SYMPTOMS: CONFOUNDING THE LOWER COURTS 
The concerns Justice Frankfurter expressed in his concurring 
opinion in Funk Bros.—that it “only confuses the issue” to 
“introduce such terms as ‘the work of nature’ and the ‘laws of 
nature’” into the § 101 analysis367—proved prescient. The “vague 
and malleable terms” on which the Supreme Court erected its 
“judicial exceptions” to § 101 have sown confusion and 
disagreement in the lower courts tasked with the difficult job of 
applying inconsistent Supreme Court precedents.368 The Supreme 
Court’s renewed interest in patent-eligible subject matter beginning 
with Bilski has only exacerbated confusion in the lower courts. 
Nowhere has the chaos wrought by the Supreme Court’s patent-
eligibility jurisprudence been more pronounced than in the case of 
CLS Bank International v. Alice Corp. Pty Ltd., recently decided by 
the Federal Circuit en banc.369 In CLS Bank, the Federal Circuit set 
out to clarify the Supreme Court’s “abstract idea” exception to § 101 
as it pertains to software-related claims.370 The result, however, was 
inconclusive at best, as no majority of the en banc panel could agree 
on a coherent interpretation of the relevant Supreme Court case law. 
The claims at issue in CLS Bank were directed to a 
computerized trading platform for settling financial transactions 
using a trusted third-party intermediary.371 There were three types of 
claims at issue: method claims, computer-readable medium, and 
system claims.372 The method claims generally claimed the following 
steps: (1) creating a “shadow record” that mirrors the accounts for 
each party; (2) obtaining a start-of-day balance for each party; (3) 
adjusting the shadow records for each transaction throughout the 
day; and (4) instructing, at the end of each day, the parties to settle 
the trades for which funds are available.373 The parties stipulated that 
these claims required computer implementation.374 The computer-
readable medium claims recited “computer readable storage medium 
 
 367.  Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 134–35 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 368.  Id. 
 369.  CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc). 
 370. Id. at 1277 (Lourie, J., concurring) (explaining that “[w]hat is needed is a consistent, 
cohesive, and accessible approach to the § 101 analysis—a framework that will provide guidance 
and predictability for patent applicants and examiners, litigants, and the courts”). 
 371.  Id. at 1274. 
 372.  Id. at 1274, 1284. 
 373.  Id. at 1285. 
 374.  Id. 
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having computer readable program code” for performing the same 
method.375 Likewise, the system claims recited a “data processing 
system,” a “data storage unit,” and a “computer” programmed 
specifically to perform the same method.376 
The district court held that all claims were patent ineligible 
under § 101.377 A divided panel of the Federal Circuit reversed, 
finding all claims patent eligible.378 The court then voted to rehear 
the case en banc. In a two-sentence per curiam judgment, the en banc 
court affirmed the district court decision that all claims at issue were 
patent ineligible under § 101.379 This judgment was followed by six 
opinions, none of which garnered a majority. The en banc court was 
evenly divided (5-5) as to the patent eligibility of the system 
claims.380 Procedurally, the tie vote operated as an affirmance, 
leaving the district court ruling of patent ineligibility unchanged. 
And while a majority of seven judges agreed that the method and 
computer-readable medium claims were patent ineligible, no 
majority agreed as to the legal rationale for that conclusion.381 Chief 
Judge Rader aptly summarized the discord: 
No portion of any opinion issued today other than our Per 
Curiam Judgment garners a majority. The court is evenly 
split on the patent eligibility of the system claims. Although 
a majority of the judges on the court agree that the method 
claims do not recite patent eligible subject matter, no 
majority of those judges agrees as to the legal rationale for 
that conclusion. Accordingly, though much is published 
today discussing the proper approach to the patent 
eligibility inquiry, nothing said today beyond our judgment 
has the weight of precedent.382 
Judge Lourie and Chief Judge Rader authored the primary 
opinions.383 Judge Lourie’s proposed framework can be summarized 
as proceeding along the following steps: 
 
 375.  Id. at 1287–88. 
 376.  Id. at 1289. 
 377.  Id. at 1275. 
 378.  Id. at 1273. 
 379.  Id. at 1273 (per curiam). 
 380.  Id. at 1292 n.1 (Rader, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 381.  Id. 
 382.  Id. 
 383.  Id. at 1273 (Lourie, J., concurring); Id. at 1292 (Rader, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
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First, the court must ask whether the claim literally falls within 
the scope of § 101—i.e., does the claim literally recite a “process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter”?384 Applying this 
step, Judge Lourie found that the claimed method, computer-readable 
medium, and system claims each fell within the § 101 categories.385 
Second, assuming the claim literally falls within § 101, “the 
analysis turns to the judicial exceptions to subject-matter 
eligibility.”386 With respect to the “abstract idea” exception, the 
initial question to ask is, “Does the claim pose any risk of 
preempting an abstract idea”?387 Judge Lourie found that each of the 
claims at issue in CLS Bank raised such concerns.388 
Third, if the claim poses a risk of preempting an “abstract idea,” 
then the court must unambiguously “identify and define whatever 
fundamental concept appears wrapped up in the claim.”389 Judge 
Lourie defines an “abstract idea” as a “disembodied concept . . . a 
basic building block of human ingenuity, untethered from any real-
world application.”390 Judge Lourie identified the abstract idea 
underlying the claims at issue as “the abstract idea of reducing 
settlement risk by effecting trades through a third-party intermediary 
(here, the supervisory institution) empowered to verify that both 
parties can fulfill their obligations before allowing the exchange—
i.e., a form of escrow.”391 
Finally, the “balance of the claim” is evaluated to “determine 
whether it contains additional substantive limitations that narrow, 
confine, or otherwise tie down the claim so that, in practical terms, it 
does not cover the full abstract idea itself.”392 Judge Lourie equates 
his requirement for “additional substantive limitations” with the 
Supreme Court’s “inventive concept test.”393 However phrased, what 
is needed is a “product of human ingenuity,” which must be more 
than a “well-understood, routine, conventional activity previously 
engaged in by researchers in the field,” “token or trivial limitations,” 
 
 384.  Id. at 1282 (Lourie, J., concurring); accord 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 385.  Id. at 1285, 1288–89 (Lourie, J., concurring). 
 386.  Id. at 1282. 
 387.  Id. 
 388.  Id. at 1286, 1288–89. 
 389.  Id. at 1282. 
 390.  Id. at 1286. 
 391.  Id. 
 392.  Id. at 1282. 
 393.  Id. 
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“bare field-of-use limitations,” or “insignificant post-solution 
activity.”394 Applying this standard, Judge Lourie found that all 
claims at issue failed to recite an “inventive concept” beyond the 
underlying “abstract idea” he had identified.395 In particular, for the 
system claims, Judge Lourie found that the claimed hardware 
limitations “provide no significant ‘inventive concept’” and “are 
instead akin to stating the abstract idea of third-party intermediation 
and adding the words: ‘apply it’ on a computer.”396 
Chief Judge Rader proposed a framework that led to the 
opposite conclusion on the system claims, which he found to be 
patent eligible.397 The first few steps of Chief Judge Rader’s 
framework track Judge Lourie’s framework: Does the claim literally 
recite a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, 
and if so, does the claim have “elements of abstractness” that warrant 
“further examination of its eligibility”?398 Chief Judge Rader offered 
a different definition for an “abstract idea” itself, which he defined as 
an idea that “has no reference to material objects or specific 
examples—i.e., is not concrete.”399 Chief Judge Rader identified the 
particular “abstract idea” underlying the claims at issue as “the 
general and theoretical concept of using a neutral intermediary in 
exchange transactions to reduce risk that one party will not honor the 
deal, i.e., an escrow arrangement.”400 
Finally, Chief Judge Rader’s approach asks whether the claim, 
considered as a whole, includes “meaningful limitations restricting it 
to an application, rather than merely an abstract idea.”401 Under this 
inquiry, a claim may be “meaningfully limited” if, for example, “it 
requires a particular machine implementing a process or a particular 
transformation of matter,” or if “in addition to the abstract idea, the 
claim recites added limitations which are essential to the 
invention.”402 For Chief Judge Rader, this is not an “inventiveness” 
inquiry—”whether a new process, machine, and so on is ‘inventive’ 
 
 394.  Id. at 1283 (citations omitted). 
 395.  Id. at 1286–87, 1288, 1290–91 
 396.  Id. at 1291. 
 397.  Id. at 1292 (Rader, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 398.  Id. at 1311. 
 399.  Id. at 1299. 
 400.  Id. at 1311. 
 401.  Id. at 1299. 
 402.  Id. at 1301. 
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is not an issue under Section 101.”403 Moreover, in Chief Judge 
Rader’s view, “Pre-emption is only a subject matter eligibility 
problem when a claim preempts all practical uses of an abstract 
idea,” because “it is important to remember that all patents ‘pre-
empt’ some future innovation in the sense that they preclude others 
from commercializing the invention without the patentee’s 
permission.”404 
Applying this standard, Chief Judge Rader concluded that the 
asserted system claims were patent eligible, as the claims recited 
“meaningful limitations” such as “a computer, a first party device, a 
data storage unit, and a communications controller.”405 He further 
noted that “a claim embodying [a] machine itself, with all its 
structural and functional limitations, [will] rarely, if ever, be an 
abstract idea.”406 
In short, the Federal Circuit was deeply divided on how to 
analyze (1) whether a claim is impermissibly directed to an “abstract 
idea,” including how to even define what an “abstract idea” is; 
(2) whether a claim includes a sufficient “inventive concept” in 
addition to a patent-ineligible “abstract idea,” and the role of 
“inventiveness” in the § 101 analysis; and (3) the role of 
“preemption” in the § 101 analysis. Judge Moore had perhaps the 
harshest assessment of the court’s en banc handiwork, remarking that 
“[t]here has never been a case which could do more damage to the 
patent system than this one.”407 More generally, Judge Moore 
observed: “I am concerned that the current interpretation of § 101, 
and in particular the abstract idea exception, is causing a free fall in 
the patent system.”408 
Needless to say, it would be a massive understatement to 
observe that in CLS Bank the Federal Circuit failed to find 
meaningful guidance in the Supreme Court’s “guideposts” regarding 
patent eligibility, including Benson, Flook, Diehr, Bilski, and Mayo. 
Indeed, two patent-eligibility cases the Federal Circuit has decided 
since CLS Bank only serve to further highlight the divisions in the 
court as to the proper approach for analyzing patent eligibility. 
 
 403.  Id. at 1294. 
 404.  Id. at 1300. 
 405.  Id. at 1307 (emphasis removed). 
 406.  Id. at 1305. 
 407.  Id. at 1313 n.1 (Moore, J., dissenting in part). 
 408.  Id. at 1313. 
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In Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, the court addressed the 
patent eligibility of a method for distributing copyrighted content 
over the Internet, where the user receives the product for free in 
exchange for viewing an advertisement, and the advertiser pays for 
the copyrighted content.409 The district court had held that the 
claimed method was patent ineligible and dismissed the patentee’s 
complaint.410 Applying the framework he proposed in CLS Bank, 
Chief Judge Rader held that the claimed method was patent eligible 
under § 101, reversing the decision of the district court.411 
Chief Judge Rader drew a distinction between claiming an 
abstract idea itself, which is patent ineligible, and claiming an 
application of an abstract idea, which is patent eligible.412 Chief 
Judge Rader characterized the “abstract idea” underlying the claims 
as the “idea that advertising can be used as a form of currency.”413 
However, focusing on the specific steps recited in the claims, Chief 
Judge Rader held that the claims were not directed to the abstract 
idea itself, but to a specific application of the idea, which involved 
“an extensive computer interface.”414 
Judge Lourie concurred, agreeing that the abstract idea at issue 
was “us[ing] advertising as an exchange or currency.”415 And like the 
majority, he found that the claims “require more than just that 
abstract idea as part of the claimed method.”416 In particular, Judge 
Lourie found that, “unlike the method claims in CLS Bank,” the 
“added limitations in these claims represent significantly more than 
the underlying abstract idea of using advertising as an exchange or 
currency and, as a consequence, do not preempt the use of that idea 
in all fields.”417 
Chief Judge Rader and Judge Lourie recently squared off in yet 
another patent-eligibility case in Accenture Global Services v. 
Guidewire Software.418 But unlike in Ultramercial, they reached 
 
 409.  Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1337–38 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 410.  Id. at 1337. 
 411.  Id. 
 412.  Id. at 1343. 
 413.  Id. at 1349. 
 414.  Id. at 1352. 
 415.  Id. (Lourie, J., concurring). 
 416.  Id. 
 417.  Id. 
 418.  Accenture Global Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 
2013). 
 
Fall 2013] PATENT-ELIGIBILITY 183 
different conclusions regarding the outcome. The claims at issue in 
Accenture were directed to systems and methods for generating tasks 
to be performed in an insurance organization.419 The representative 
system claim included a number of structural limitations, including: 
an “insurance transaction database” organized in a particular way; a 
“task library database”; a “client component” with a specified 
functionality; and a “server component” with an “event processor,” 
“task engine” and “task assistant” programmed in a particular way.420 
The district court had held that the claims were directed to “concepts 
for organizing data” and ruled that they were patent ineligible under 
§ 101 as abstract ideas.421 
Judge Lourie disagreed with the district court’s characterization 
of the underlying “abstract idea” at issue. Judge Lourie instead 
articulated the abstract idea as “generating tasks [based on] rules . . . 
to be completed upon the occurrence of an event.”422 Nevertheless, 
based on this definition of the “abstract idea,” Judge Lourie agreed 
with the district court that the system claim was not directed to 
 
 419.  Id. at 1337–38. 
 420.  Id. at 1338–39. Claim 1 of the patent at issue reads in its entirety as follows: 
A system for generating tasks to be performed in an insurance organization, the system 
comprising: 
an insurance transaction database for storing information related to an insurance 
transaction, the insurance transaction database comprising a claim folder containing the 
information related to the insurance transaction decomposed into a plurality of levels 
from the group comprising a policy level, a claim level, a participant level and a line 
level, wherein the plurality of levels reflects a policy, the information related to the 
insurance transaction, claimants and an insured person in a structured format; 
a task library database for storing rules for determining tasks to be completed upon an 
occurrence of an event; 
a client component in communication with the insurance transaction database 
configured for providing information relating to the insurance transaction, said client 
component enabling access by an assigned claim handler to a plurality of tasks that 
achieve an insurance related goal upon completion; and 
a server component in communication with the client component, the transaction 
database and the task library database, the server component including an event 
processor, a task engine and a task assistant; 
wherein the event processor is triggered by application events associated with a change 
in the information, and sends an event trigger to the task engine; wherein in response to 
the event trigger, the task engine identifies rules in the task library database associated 
with the event and applies the information to the identified rules to determine the tasks 
to be completed, and populates on a task assistant the determined tasks to be 
completed, wherein the task assistant transmits the determined tasks to the client 
component. 
Id. 
 421.  Id. at 1340. 
 422.  Id. at 1344 (alterations in original) (citation omitted). 
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patent-eligible subject matter, stating that “[t]he limitations of the 
system claims of the ‘284 patent do not provide sufficient additional 
features or limit the abstract concept in a meaningful way.”423 
However, he did not explain why one could not “generat[e] tasks 
based on rules to be completed upon the occurrence of an event” 
without using the specific “insurance transaction database,” “task 
library database,” “client component,” and “server component” as 
claimed. 
Judge Lourie also distinguished Ultramercial, stating that “[t]he 
claims in Ultramercial contained additional limitations from the 
abstract idea of using advertising as currency, such as limiting the 
transaction to an Internet website, offering free access conditioned on 
viewing a sponsor message, and only applying to a media 
product.”424 He did not, however, explain why limiting a claim to an 
“Internet website” should have greater significance, for purposes of a 
§ 101 analysis, than limiting a claim to the insurance field. Nor did 
he explain why the specific claim limitations he singled out from the 
claim at issue in Ultramercial were more concrete than the claim 
limitations recited in the system claim at issue in Accenture, such as 
the specific “insurance transaction database,” “task library database,” 
“client component,” and “server component,” all claimed in a 
particular way. 
Chief Judge Rader dissented, stating the following: 
[A]ny claim can be stripped down, simplified, generalized, 
or paraphrased to remove all of its concrete limitations, 
until at its core, something that could be characterized as an 
abstract idea is revealed. A court cannot go hunting for 
abstractions by ignoring the concrete, palpable, tangible 
limitations of the invention the patentee actually claims.425 
In sum, the deeply conflicted Federal Circuit cases described 
above—CLS Bank,426 Ultramercial,427 and Accenture428—clearly 
exemplify the chaos that has been wrought by the Supreme Court’s 
patent-eligibility jurisprudence. Apparently recognizing this fact, on 
 
 423.  Id. at 1345. 
 424.  Id. 
 425.  Id. at 1346 (Rader, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC., 722 F.3d 
1335, 1344 (2013)). 
 426.  717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc). 
 427.  722 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 428.  728 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
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December 6, 2013, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear CLS 
Bank.429 As of the date of this writing, CLS Bank remains under 
consideration by the Court, teeing off an opportunity for yet another 
landmark § 101 decision. 
V.  THE DIAGNOSIS: STATUTORY ABANDONMENT 
In this part, we assess whether the Supreme Court’s body of 
patent-eligibility jurisprudence is consistent with a sound analysis of 
the Patent Act under traditional principles of statutory interpretation. 
We conclude that the Court’s exceptions to patent eligibility for 
“laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas” are 
overbroad, misguided, and largely inconsistent with the statute.430 
While we do find statutory support for a subset of the Court’s 
exceptions—namely, “products of nature”—we feel the Court has 
failed to properly articulate the basis for and scope of this exclusion. 
Ultimately, we agree with the resonating plea of Chief Judge Rader 
of the Federal Circuit: “When all else fails, consult the statute!”431 
A.  Lost in the Echo Chamber 
In Flook, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the patent-
eligibility inquiry “turns entirely on the proper construction of § 101 
of the Patent Act.”432 It should therefore be axiomatic that the inquiry 
necessarily “begin[s] with the language of the statute.”433 The Court 
has further recognized that, “in patent law, as in all statutory 
construction, ‘[u]nless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted 
as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.’”434 
Indeed, the “Court has ‘more than once cautioned that [lower] courts 
should not read into the patent laws limitations and conditions which 
the legislature has not expressed.’”435 
 
 429.  Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 734 (2013) (granting petition for writ 
of certiorari). 
 430. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 
U.S. 303, 309 (1980)). 
 431.  CLS Bank, 717 F.3d at 1335 (Rader, C.J., additional reflections) (emphasis added). 
 432.  Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588 (1978). 
 433.  Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981); see also Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 
647, 656 (1986) (“Here, as in other contexts, the starting point in construing a statute is the 
language of the statute itself.”). 
 434.  Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226 (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182). 
 435.  Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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Given the foregoing principles—which should generally be 
uncontroversial—it is remarkable how little effort the Supreme Court 
has actually devoted to analyzing § 101 using traditional tools of 
statutory interpretation. Quite simply, the Court has not practiced 
what it preaches. As our review of history has shown,436 the Court 
has repeatedly looked past substantive analysis of the statute, 
choosing instead to craft sweeping and vaguely defined exceptions to 
patent eligibility based on little more than dicta and unsupported 
statements, repeated and compounded in a judicial echo chamber. 
For clarity, we succinctly connect the dots below. 
In Le Roy (1852), a case where patent eligibility was not at 
issue,437 the Court stated, in dictum and without any statutory 
analysis, that “[a] principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an 
original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can 
claim in either of them an exclusive right.”438 The Court thereafter 
expressly relied upon this statement as support for the judicial 
exceptions in Funk Bros., Benson, Flook, Chakrabarty, Diehr, Bilski, 
and Mayo.439 
In Morse (1853), which is best viewed as an enablement case,440 
the Court found a broad claim invalid because it recited a genus (the 
use of electromagnetism for printing characters at a distance) while 
the specification disclosed only a species (the telegraph).441 
 
 436.  See supra Part III. 
 437.  Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 176–77 (1852) (primary issue on appeal was 
the propriety of a jury instruction pertaining to novelty; issue of patent eligibility was “not in the 
case”). 
 438.  Id. at 175. 
 439.  Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012) 
(“The Court has long held that [§ 101] contains an important implicit exception. [L]aws of nature, 
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(citing Le Roy, 55 U.S. at 175)); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225, 3230 (2010) (noting 
that the judicial exceptions “have defined the reach of the statute as a matter of statutory stare 
decisis going back 150 years” (citing Le Roy, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 174)); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 
U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (quoting Le Roy, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 175); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 
U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (“The laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have been 
held not patentable.” (citing Le Roy, 55 U.S. (14. How.) at 175)); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 
589 (1978) (quoting Le Roy, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 175); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 
(1972) (quoting Le Roy, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 175); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 
333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (“[P]atents cannot issue for the discovery of phenomena of nature.” 
(citing Le Roy, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 175)). 
 440.  O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 118–21 (1853); see also supra note 94 (“We 
join a number of commentators in making the straightforward yet important observation that 
Morse was decided on enablement grounds.”). 
 441.  Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 120. 
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However, the Court recast Morse’s holding in Tilghman (1881), 
stating, in dictum, that “[t]he eighth claim of Morse’s patent was 
held to be invalid, because it was regarded by the court as being not 
for a process, but for a mere principle. . . . that is, a claim to the 
exclusive use of one of the powers of nature for a particular 
purpose.”442 The Court thereafter expressly relied upon Morse and/or 
Tilghman as support for the judicial exceptions in Benson, Flook, 
Chakrabarty, Diehr, Bilski, and Mayo.443 The Court now interprets 
Morse as standing for the vague proposition that a patent may not 
“too broadly preempt the use of a natural law.”444 
In Rubber-Tip Pencil (1874), a decision best viewed as an 
obviousness case,445 the Court stated, in dictum, that “[a]n idea of 
itself is not patentable, but a new device by which it may be made 
practically useful is.”446 The Court thereafter expressly relied upon 
this unsupported statement in Benson (1981) to establish “the 
longstanding rule that ‘[a]n idea of itself is not patentable,’”447 thus 
forming the “abstract ideas” exception to patent eligibility.448 
In Cochrane (1876), after waiving off patent-eligibility 
concerns, the Court stated, in dictum, that a “process” is “an act, or a 
series of acts, performed upon the subject matter to be transformed 
and reduced to a different state or thing.”449 The Court thereafter 
 
 442.  Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 726 (1880) (citing Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 62). 
 443.  Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294, 1300–02 (citing Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 112–20); 
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3253 (citing Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 113); Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187–88 
(citing Morse, 56 U.S. at 62); Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (citing Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 
112–21); Flook, 437 U.S. at 592 (citing Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 112–21); id. at 589 (citing 
Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 728); Benson, 409 U.S. at 68–69 (citing Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 111–
13); id. at 70 (citing Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 721, 729). 
 444.  Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294 (citing Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 112–20) (emphasis added); 
id. at 1301 (“The Court has repeatedly emphasized . . . a concern that patent law not inhibit 
further discovery by improperly tying up the future use of laws of nature.” (citing Morse, 56 U.S. 
(15 How.) at 112–20)); see also Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3253 (citing Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 
113) (describing Morse as “explaining that Morse’s patent on electromagnetism for writing would 
preempt a wide swath of technological developments.”). 
 445.  Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498, 507 (1874); see also supra 
note 107 and accompanying text (collecting cases classifying Rubber-Tip Pencil as an 
obviousness case). 
 446.  Rubber-Tip, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 507. 
 447.  Benson, 409 U.S. at 67 (quoting Rubber-Tip Pencil, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 507). 
 448.  See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185 (“Excluded from such patent protection are laws of nature, 
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.” (citing Benson, 409 U.S. at 67)). 
 449.  Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876). 
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quoted this definition in Benson and Flook,450 and it applied the 
definition to find a process claim patent eligible in Diehr.451 The 
Court then clarified in Bilski that the so-called “machine-or-
transformation test” is a “useful and important clue,” but “is not the 
sole test” for the patent eligibility of a claimed process.452 Finally, 
the Court further clarified in Mayo that satisfying the machine-or-
transformation test does not “trump[] the ‘law of nature’ 
exclusion.”453 
In Mackay Radio (1939), after finding a claimed radio antenna 
patent eligible, the Court stated, in dictum and without citation to 
authority, that “[w]hile a scientific truth, or the mathematical 
expression of it, is not patentable invention, a novel and useful 
structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may 
be.”454 The Court later cited Mackay Radio as support for the judicial 
exceptions in Funk Bros., Benson, Flook, Diehr, and Mayo.455 
In Funk Bros. (1948), the Court expressly held that “patents 
cannot issue for the discovery of the phenomena of nature” or “laws 
of nature,” as they are “part of the storehouse of knowledge . . . free 
to all men and reserved exclusively to none.”456 The Court further 
held that even an “application of [a] newly-discovered natural 
principle” is not patent eligible unless it includes some “invention” 
 
 450.  Benson, 409 U.S. at 70 (“Transformation and reduction of an article ‘to a different state 
or thing’ is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not include particular 
machines.” (quoting Cochrane, 94 U.S. at 787–88)); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588 n.9 
(1978) (“An argument can be made . . . that this Court has only recognized a process as within the 
statutory definition when it either was tied to a particular apparatus or operated to change 
materials to a ‘different state or thing.’” (quoting Cochrane, 94 U.S. at 787–88)). In both cases, 
however, the Court noted that it was “not hold[ing] that no process patent could ever qualify if it 
did not meet the requirements of our prior precedents.” Benson, 409 U.S. at 71; see also Flook, 
437 U.S. at 588 n.9. (“As in Benson, we assume that a valid process patent may issue even if it 
does not meet one of these qualifications of our earlier precedents.”). 
 451.  Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184 (“That respondents’ claims involve the transformation of an 
article, in this case raw, uncured synthetic rubber, into a different state or thing cannot be 
disputed.” (citing Benson, 409 U.S. at 70; Cochrane, 94 U.S. at 787–88)). 
 452.  Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010). 
 453.  Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303 (2012) (citing 
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225). 
 454.  Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939). 
 455.  See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (citing 
Mackay Radio, 306 U.S. at 94); Benson, 409 U.S. at 67 (quoting Mackay Radio, 306 U.S. at 94); 
Flook, 437 U.S. at 591 (quoting and analyzing Mackay Radio, 306 U.S. at 94); Diehr, 450 U.S. at 
188 (“We think this statement in Mackay takes us a long way toward the correct answer in this 
case.”) (quoting Mackay Radio, 306 U.S. at 94)); Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294 (quoting Mackay 
Radio, 306 U.S. at 94). 
 456.  Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130. 
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beyond the natural principle itself, rather than a mere “simple 
step.”457 The Court did not conduct any analysis of the Patent Act in 
reaching these holdings; rather, it relied upon the Court’s prior 
unsupported statements in cases such as Le Roy and Mackay 
Radio.458 The Court thereafter relied upon Funk Bros. in at least 
Flook and Mayo as support for what became the two-step “inventive 
concept” test.459 
In Benson (1972), the Court held that “abstract intellectual 
concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific 
and technological work.”460 The Court further held that a patent 
claim may not “wholly preempt the [use of a] mathematical formula” 
or “algorithm.”461 The Court conducted no analysis of § 101 in 
reaching these holdings, beyond citing the statutory language in a 
footnote.462 Rather, the Court based its ruling entirely upon 
unsupported statements from prior cases such as Le Roy, Morse, 
Rubber-Tip Pencil, Cochrane, Tilghman, Mackay Radio, and Funk 
Bros.463 
In Flook (1978), the Court superficially acknowledged that the 
patent-eligibility inquiry “turns entirely on the proper construction of 
§ 101 of the Patent Act.”464 However, after merely quoting the 
statute in a footnote,465 the Court held that “[t]he plain language of 
§ 101 does not answer the question.”466 Without conducting any 
statutory analysis, the Court reasoned that the “holding [of 
 
 457.  Id. at 132. 
 458.  Id. at 130 (citing Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852); Mackay Radio, 
306 U.S. at 94). 
 459.  See Flook, 437 U.S. at 591–92 (quoting Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130); Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 
at 1294 (“[The Court’s precedents] insist that a process that focuses upon the use of a natural law 
[must] also contain other elements or a combination of elements, sometimes referred to as an 
‘inventive concept,’ sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more 
than a patent upon the natural law itself.”); id. (quoting Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130 (“If there is 
to be invention from [a discovery of a law of nature], it must come from the application of the law 
of nature to a new and useful end.”)). 
 460.  Benson, 409 U.S. at 67. 
 461.  Id. at 71–72. 
 462.  Id. at 64 n.2 (quoting 35 U.S.C. §§ 100(b) & 101 (1952)). 
 463.  Id. at 67–70 (citing and quoting Le Roy, 55 U.S. at 175; O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 
111–13 (1853)); Mackay Radio, 30 U.S. at 94; Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130; Tilghman v. Proctor, 
102 U.S. 707, 721 (1880); Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876); Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. 
v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498, 507 (1874)). 
 464.  Flook, 437 U.S. at 588. 
 465.  Id. at 588 n.8 (quoting 35 U.S.C. §§ 100(b) & 101 (1952)). 
 466.  Id. at 588. 
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Benson] . . . forecloses a purely literal reading of § 101,”467 ignoring 
that Benson never actually analyzed the statute. The Court cast 
Benson as having “[r]eason[ed] that an algorithm, or mathematical 
formula, is like a law of nature,” applying the “established rule that a 
law of nature cannot be the subject of a patent.”468 As support for the 
“established rule,” the Flook Court cited and quoted prior cases such 
as Le Roy, Morse, Cochrane, Tilghman, Mackay Radio, and Funk 
Bros.469 
In Chakrabarty (1980), the Court acknowledged the three 
judicial exceptions to patent eligibility, stating that “laws of nature, 
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not 
patentable.”470 As support for this proposition, the Court cited 
Le Roy, Morse, Funk Bros., Benson, and Flook.471 
In Diehr (1981), the Court again stated that “[t]his Court has . . . 
recognized limits to § 101,” including exclusions for “laws of nature, 
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.”472 As support, the Court 
cited Le Roy, Morse, Rubber-Tip Pencil, Cochrane, Mackay Radio, 
Funk Bros., Benson, Flook, and Chakrabarty.473 
In Bilski (2010), the Court reaffirmed that “[t]he Court’s 
precedents provide three specific exceptions to § 101’s broad patent 
eligibility principles: ‘laws of nature, physical phenomena, and 
abstract ideas.’”474 The Court relied upon Le Roy, Cochrane, Funk 
Bros., Benson, Flook, Chakrabarty, and Diehr.475 The Court 
 
 467.  Id. at 589 (analyzing Benson, 409 U.S. at 67) (emphasis added). 
 468.  Id. (citing Benson, 409 U.S. at 71–72) (emphasis added). 
 469.  Id. at 588–92 (citing and quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 
127, 130 (1948); Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939); 
Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 728 (1880); Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787–88 (1876); 
O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112–21 (1853); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 
156, 175 (1852)). 
 470.  Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (emphasis added). 
 471.  Id. (citing Le Roy, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 175; Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 112–21; Funk 
Bros., 333 U.S. at 130; Benson, 409 U.S. at 67; Flook, 437 U.S. at 584). 
 472.  Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). 
 473.  Id. at 185–88 (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309; Flook 437 U.S. at 590; Benson 409 
U.S. at 71; Mackay Radio, 306 U.S. at 94; Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 
498, 507 (1874); Le Roy, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 175) (citing Flook, 437 U.S. at 586; Benson, 409 
U.S. 63; Funk Bros., 333 U.S. 127; Cochrane, 94 U.S. at 780; Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62; Le 
Roy, 55 U.S. 156). 
 474.  Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309) 
(emphasis added). 
 475.  Id. at 3225–31 (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 177, 182, 187, 188, 191–92, 192–93, 195; 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308, 309, 315; Flook, 437 U.S. at 588, 590, 594; Benson, 409 U.S. at 
67, 70, 71, 72; Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130; Cochrane, 94 U.S. at 788) (citing Diehr, 450 U.S. 
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similarly relied solely upon prior case law when reaffirming the three 
judicial exceptions in Mayo (2012)476 and Myriad (2013).477 
Thus, our review of history makes it painfully clear that, in more 
than 160 years of jurisprudence—spanning from Le Roy (1852) to 
the present—the Supreme Court has failed to address a simple and 
yet fundamental question: Where in the Constitution, the Patent Act, 
or the relevant legislative history does the Court find support for the 
“laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas” exceptions 
to patent eligibility? 
To the contrary, in Bilski (2010), the Court finally threw up its 
hands and conceded that “these exceptions are not required by the 
statutory text,” thus abandoning all pretense of statutory 
interpretation.478 Instead, the Court chose to hang its hat on the 
concept that “these exceptions have defined the reach of the statutes 
as a matter of statutory stare decisis going back 150 years.”479 
But the doctrine of stare decisis is an extraordinarily weak 
justification for adhering to the current status quo of patent-eligibility 
jurisprudence. “Stare decisis is a ‘principle of policy,’ and not ‘an 
inexorable command.’”480 Indeed, “the fact that a decision has 
proved ‘unworkable’ is a traditional ground for overruling it.”481 
Moreover, “[b]eyond workability, the relevant factors in deciding 
whether to adhere to the principle of stare decisis include the 
antiquity of the precedent, the reliance interests at stake, and of 
 
175; Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308–09; Flook, 437 U.S. 584; Benson, 409 U.S. 63; Le Roy, 55 
U.S. (14 How.) at 174–75). 
 476.  Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293–94 (2012) 
(“The Court has long held that [§ 101] contains an important implicit exception. ‘[L]aws of 
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas’ are not patentable.” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185) (citing Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309; Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 
at 112–20; Le Roy, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 175)). 
 477.  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013) 
(“We have ‘long held that [§ 101] contains an important implicit exception[:] Laws of nature, 
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293)). 
 478.  Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225 (emphasis added). 
 479. Id. (citing Le Roy, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 174–75); see also Le Roy, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 
174–75 (“[A] principle is not patentable. A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an 
original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an 
exclusive right.”). 
 480.  United States v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856 (1996) (quoting Helvering 
v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991)). 
 481.  Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 792 (2009) (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 
808, 827 (1991)). 
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course whether the decision was well reasoned.”482 Here, the factors 
on balance weigh against a rigid application of stare decisis. 
First, as we discussed in Part IV, supra, the current morass of 
case law surrounding the Supreme Court’s judicial exceptions to 
patent eligibility has thoroughly confounded lower courts, proving 
wholly unworkable in practice. Further, the Supreme Court has 
rejected attempts by the Federal Circuit to craft more workable 
standards such as the “machine-or-transformation test,” offering no 
alternative guidance other than a cryptic direction to “look[] to the 
guideposts” in the Court’s vague and inconsistent precedents.483 
Second, reliance interests do not justify strict adherence to stare 
decisis in this instance. Given the unworkability, unpredictability, 
and inconsistency of the Supreme Court’s precedents, it defies logic 
to uphold the status quo of patent eligibility under the guise of 
“protect[ing] the legitimate expectations of those who live under the 
law.”484 Indeed, “a precedent that has proven unworkable may 
generate minimal reliance because stakeholders are simply unable to 
predict what results it will yield.”485 Moreover, as we discuss below 
and in Part VI, infra, applying the traditional tools of statutory 
interpretation to § 101 would likely result in an expansion of patent-
eligible subject matter. Such a change would not frustrate the 
reliance interests of parties who have invested in research and 
development in anticipation of obtaining a patent. Likewise, any 
countervailing reliance on the presumed invalidity of existing patents 
under § 101 is at best highly speculative given the unworkability and 
inconsistent application of the judicial exceptions. Further, because a 
correct and workable statutory interpretation of § 101 should reduce 
 
 482.  Id. at 792–93 (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)). 
 483.  See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231; see also id. at 3229–30 (“Rather than adopting categorical 
rules that might have wide-ranging and unforeseen impacts, the Court resolves this case narrowly 
on the basis of this Court’s decisions in Benson, Flook, and Diehr, which show that petitioners’ 
claims are not patentable processes because they are attempts to patent abstract ideas.”). 
 484.  Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 716 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
 485.  Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 411, 424 
(2010); see also Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Economic Perspective: An Economic Analysis 
of the Supreme Court’s Doctrine of Precedent, 78 N.C. L. REV. 643, 669–70 (2000) (“[W]hen 
precedent produces confusion in the form of unpredictable results, the costs from retaining the 
‘unworkable’ decision generally may outweigh the uncertainty created by overturning the 
precedent.”); BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 151 (1921) 
(“There should be greater readiness to abandon an untenable position when the rule to be 
discarded may not reasonably be supposed to have determined the conduct of the litigants.”). 
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uncertainty in the doctrine’s application, the decision of whether to 
apply stare decisis should not require the typical step of “balanc[ing] 
the importance of having . . . questions decided against the 
importance of having them decided right.”486 
Third, as we have demonstrated, the precedents giving rise to the 
judicial exceptions to patent eligibility are not even based on a 
“badly reasoned” statutory interpretation of § 101;487 rather, they 
have been created out of whole cloth based on unsupported and 
misunderstood dicta, without even the pretense that they represent a 
reasoned statutory interpretation of § 101.488 Further, for the reasons 
discussed in Parts V.B–F, infra, the Court’s “precedent[s] 
demonstrably conflict[] with the statutory or constitutional 
provision[s] [they] purport[] to interpret,” thereby further 
diminishing the weight that should be placed on any reliance 
interests.489 Indeed, “stare decisis cannot possibly be controlling 
when . . . the decision[s] in question ha[ve] been proved manifestly 
erroneous.”490 
Finally, while “considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily in 
the area of statutory construction, where Congress is free to change 
[the] Court’s interpretation of its legislation,”491 the Court has “never 
applied stare decisis mechanically to prohibit overruling [the 
Court’s] earlier decisions determining the meaning of statutes.”492 
“Nor is this a case where [the Court] should ‘place on the shoulders 
of Congress the burden of the Court’s own error,’”493 for “[i]t is at 
best treacherous to find in Congressional silence alone the adoption 
of a controlling rule of law.”494 Indeed, because the judicial 
exceptions have been created out of thin air, rather than based on any 
 
 486.  Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 378 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 487.  Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 800 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 488.  See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (conceding that the judicial 
exceptions are “not required by the statutory text”). 
 489.  Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1062 
(2003). 
 490.  United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 521 (1995). 
 491.  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 233 (2009) (quoting Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 
U.S. 720, 736 (1977)). 
 492.  Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 695 (1978). 
 493.  Id. (quoting Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 70 (1946)); see also Altria Group, 
Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 108 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“When a decision of this Court 
has failed to properly interpret a statute, we should not ‘place on the shoulders of Congress the 
burden of the Court’s own error.’” (quoting Girouard, 322 U.S. at 69–70)). 
 494.  Girouard, 328 U.S. at 69. 
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interpretation of specific language in the Patent Act, it is difficult to 
fathom how Congress might effectively overrule the Court’s morass 
of patent-eligibility jurisprudence without potentially running into 
unintended consequences. In sum, this is an area where the Court 
should clean up its own mess. 
B.  Preemption: The Statutory Scheme 
The Court has repeatedly emphasized preemption as a chief 
policy concern underlying the judicial exceptions excluding “laws of 
nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas” from patent 
eligibility. The Court first invoked preemption as a rationale for the 
judicial exceptions in Benson, holding that a patent claim may not 
“wholly pre-empt the [use of a] mathematical formula” or 
“algorithm.”495 The Court thereafter discussed preemption as a 
rationale for the judicial exceptions in Flook,496 Diehr,497 Bilski,498 
and Mayo,499 even when analyzing claims that did not wholly 
preempt a law of nature, physical phenomena, or abstract idea.500 
The concept of preemption encompasses two logically distinct 
issues.501 First, an overbroad patent claim might be said to preempt 
embodiments within its scope that the patentee did not describe and 
thus presumably did not invent.502 Second, a patent claim might be 
 
 495.  Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972). 
 496.  Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589–90 (1978). 
 497.  Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981) (“Their process admittedly employs a well-
known mathematical equation, but they do not seek to pre-empt the use of that equation. Rather, 
they seek only to foreclose from others the use of that equation in conjunction with all of the 
other steps in their claimed process.”). 
 498.  Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010) (“Allowing petitioners to patent risk 
hedging would pre-empt use of this approach in all fields, and would effectively grant a 
monopoly over an abstract idea.”). 
 499.  Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012). 
(“[The Court’s precedents] warn us against upholding patents that claim processes that too 
broadly preempt the use of a natural law.” (citing Benson, 409 U.S. at 71–72); O’Reilly v. Morse, 
56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112–120 (1853)). 
 500.  See, e.g., Flook, 437 U.S. at 589–90 (acknowledging that the patentee did “not seek to 
‘wholly preempt the mathematical formula,’ since there are uses of his formula outside the 
petrochemical and oil-refining industries,” yet finding that the addition of mere “post-solution 
activity” was insufficient to “transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process”); 
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231 (finding that a set of claims directed to hedging in “energy markets” 
was not patent eligible, even though it did not “pre-empt use of [hedging] in all fields,” because 
merely “limiting an abstract idea to one field of use or adding token postsolution components 
[does] not make the concept patentable”). 
 501.  See generally Katherine J. Strandburg, Much Ado About Preemption, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 
563, 570–86 (2013) (recognizing the two distinct threads of the preemption analysis). 
 502.  See id. 
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said to preempt downstream innovation that requires the use of the 
claimed embodiments.503 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has 
often conflated these distinct concepts in its patent-eligibility 
rulings.504 However, at any rate, a close analysis reveals that neither 
preemption thread provides support for the judicial exceptions to 
§ 101. 
The first preemption thread—i.e., the concern that an overbroad 
patent claim might preempt embodiments within its scope that the 
patentee did not describe and thus presumably did not invent—was 
the situation presented in Morse. In that case, the patent described a 
single species of invention (i.e., the telegraph), yet broadly claimed a 
genus (i.e., the use of electromagnetism, by any means, to print 
characters at a distance).505 As the Court explained in finding 
Morse’s overbroad claim invalid, “he claims an exclusive right to use 
a manner and process which he has not described and indeed had not 
invented, and therefore could not describe when he obtained his 
patent.”506 That is, “he claims what he has not described in the 
manner required by law.”507 As we have explained, claim 
overbreadth of this type is a concern that is relevant to the 
enablement requirement of § 112.508 That is, “[t]o be enabling [under 
§ 112], the specification of a patent must teach those skilled in the art 
how to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention without 
‘undue experimentation.’”509 As the Federal Circuit has explained: 
Enablement serves the dual function in the patent system of 
ensuring adequate disclosure of the claimed invention and 
 
 503.  See id. at 573; Kevin Emerson Collins, Bilski and the Ambiguity of “An Unpatentable 
Abstract Idea”, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 37, 59 (2011) (“The problem in Benson is not a 
problem of an abstract claim that describes too many distinct things/methods not invented by the 
inventor, . . . but rather a problem of a claim that describes things/methods that were actually 
invented but that are abstract because they have too many end-uses and are thus insufficiently 
applied to merit patent protection.”). 
 504.  Strandburg, supra note 501, at 570–73. 
 505.  Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 120. 
 506.  Id. at 113 (emphasis added). 
 507.  Id. at 120 (emphasis added). 
 508.  See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012); see also Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Labs, 720 F.3d 
1380, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“Claims are not enabled when, at the effective filing date of the 
patent, one of ordinary skill in the art could not practice their full scope without undue 
experimentation.”); MagSil Corp. v. Hitachi Global Storage Techs., Inc., 687 F.3d 1377, 1380 
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 
1997); Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2008)); supra notes 93–94 and 
accompanying text (examining the enablement requirement of § 112(a)). 
 509.  MagSil, 687 F.3d at 1380 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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of preventing claims broader than the disclosed invention. 
This important doctrine prevents both inadequate disclosure 
of an invention and overbroad claiming that might 
otherwise attempt to cover more than was actually invented. 
Thus, a patentee chooses broad claim language at the peril 
of losing any claim that cannot be enabled across its full 
scope of coverage. The scope of the claims must be less 
than or equal to the scope of the enablement to ensure that 
the public knowledge is enriched by the patent specification 
to a degree at least commensurate with the scope of the 
claims.510 
“It is a truism that the claims of a patent define the invention 
that is claimed.”511 As such, while the full scope of a claimed 
invention must be enabled by a commensurate description in the 
specification, this § 112 disclosure requirement has no logical 
relevance to whether the type of invention claimed is patent eligible 
under § 101. Indeed, if a claim recites a type of invention which is 
not patent eligible, that conclusion should always hold true, even if 
the specification does enable the full scope of the claim. Conversely, 
if the specification of a patent fails to enable the full scope of a claim 
under § 112, it does not follow that the type of invention claimed 
may never be patented under § 101. Thus, disclosure issues falling 
under the first preemption thread should always be analyzed under 
§ 112, separate and distinct from the patent-eligibility analysis under 
§ 101. 
Indeed, conflating § 112 with § 101 runs the risk of invalidating 
all patents which claim a particular type of invention, merely because 
a particular patent had an inadequate specification. Yet, this is 
effectively what the Court has done by repeatedly citing Morse—an 
enablement case—as support for the judicial exceptions to § 101.512 
 
 510.  Id. at 1380–81 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 511.  Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Dakocytomation Cal., Inc., 517 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). 
 512.  See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 
(2012) (citing Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 112–20) (holding that a patent claim may not “too 
broadly preempt the use of a natural law”); id. at 1301 (expressing “a concern that patent law not 
inhibit further discovery by improperly tying up the future use of laws of nature”); Bilski v. 
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3253 (2010) (“[E]xplaining that Morse’s patent on electromagnetism 
for writing would preempt a wide swath of technological developments.” (citing Morse, 56 U.S. 
(15 How.) at 113)). 
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The second preemption thread—i.e., the concern that a patent 
claim might preempt downstream innovation requiring the use of the 
claimed embodiments—was the concern first expressed in Benson. 
The Benson Court described the claimed invention as follows: 
They claimed a method for converting binary-coded 
decimal (BCD) numerals into pure binary numerals. The 
claims were not limited to any particular art or technology, 
to any particular apparatus or machinery, or to any 
particular end use. They purported to cover any use of the 
claimed method in a general-purpose digital computer of 
any type.513 
. . . . 
Here the ‘process’ claim is so abstract and sweeping as to 
cover both known and unknown uses of the BCD to pure 
binary conversion. The end use may (1) vary from the 
operation of a train to verification of drivers’ licenses to 
researching the law books for precedents and (2) be 
performed through any existing machinery or future-
devised machinery or without any apparatus.514 
The Benson Court was concerned with the potential downstream 
uses of the claimed BCD-to-binary conversion process, holding that, 
because the process “has no substantial practical application except 
in connection with a digital computer, . . . the patent would wholly 
pre-empt the [use of the] mathematical formula.”515 Unlike in Morse, 
there was no suggestion in Benson that the disclosure in the patent’s 
specification was insufficient to enable the full scope of the claims. 
Nonetheless, the Benson Court relied upon Morse as support for its 
preemption analysis, recasting that case as having invoked the 
second thread of preemption concerns regarding downstream uses.516 
In Mayo, the Court elaborated as to its reasoning underlying the 
second preemption thread and its purported relation to § 101, stating: 
These statements [from the Court’s precedents regarding 
preemption] reflect the fact that, even though rewarding 
with patents those who discover new laws of nature and the 
like might well encourage their discovery, those laws and 
 
 513.  Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64 (1972) (emphasis added). 
 514.  Id. at 68 (emphasis added). 
 515.  Id. at 71–72 (emphasis added). 
 516.  Id. at 68–69. 
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principles, considered generally, are “the basic tools of 
scientific and technological work.” And so there is a danger 
that the grant of patents that tie up their use will inhibit 
future innovation premised upon them, a danger that 
becomes acute when a patented process amounts to no more 
than an instruction to “apply the natural law,” or otherwise 
foreclose more future invention than the underlying 
discovery could reasonably justify.517 
With the foregoing line of reasoning, the Court has apparently 
decided that certain patents are simply undesirable on policy 
grounds. In certain cases, the Court is making an arbitrary and 
subjective determination that the benefits of granting a patent to 
incentivize innovation are outweighed by the preemptive scope of 
the exclusive rights granted by the patent. As the Mayo Court further 
explained: 
[T]he underlying functional concern here is a relative one: 
how much future innovation is foreclosed relative to the 
contribution of the inventor. A patent upon a narrow law of 
nature may not inhibit future research as seriously as would 
a patent upon Einstein’s law of relativity, but the creative 
value of the discovery is also considerably smaller. And, as 
we have previously pointed out, even a narrow law of 
nature (such as the one before us) can inhibit future 
research. 
In any event, our cases have not distinguished among 
different laws of nature according to whether or not the 
principles they embody are sufficiently narrow. And this is 
understandable. Courts and judges are not institutionally 
well suited to making the kinds of judgments needed to 
distinguish among different laws of nature. And so the 
courts have endorsed a bright-line prohibition against 
patenting laws of nature, mathematical formulas and the 
like, which serves as a somewhat more easily administered 
proxy for the underlying “building-block” concern.518 
In a surprising twist, the Court has admitted that the judiciary is 
“not institutionally well suited” to make policy judgments as to the 
 
 517.  Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301 (citations omitted). 
 518.  Id. at 1303 (emphasis altered) (citations omitted). 
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value of certain patents to society.519 Yet, rather than simply omitting 
preemption considerations from the § 101 analysis, the Court has 
paradoxically decided that the solution is “a bright-line prohibition 
against patenting laws of nature, mathematical formulas and the 
like.”520 But in drawing a purported “bright-line” in the form of the 
judicial exceptions to § 101, the Court has ironically made the 
precise kind of policy judgment it admits the judiciary is ill-equipped 
to handle. The Court has further ignored the practical reality that, 
without clear definitions for “abstract ideas,” “laws of nature,” and 
“physical phenomena,” the application of the judicial exceptions is 
inherently subjective and prone to result-driven policy decisions. 
At any rate, in declaring certain types of subject matter patent 
ineligible based on the Court’s view that patent rights would 
“foreclose[] more future invention than the underlying discovery 
could reasonably justify,”521 the Court has “usurp[ed] the legislative 
role,”522 frustrating a detailed statutory scheme specifically designed 
by Congress to balance (a) the policy goal of incentivizing 
innovation through the grant of exclusive patent rights, with (b) the 
preemptive effects that exclusive patent rights have on downstream 
innovation. 
For example, in § 101, Congress chose to limit patent eligibility 
solely to “new and useful process[es], machine[s], manufacture[s], or 
composition[s] of matter.”523 This provision reflects a conscious 
policy determination by Congress that granting limited patent 
monopolies to incentivize these types of innovations—and no 
others—is ultimately beneficial to society. 
At the same time, Congress enacted numerous provisions 
specifically designed to moderate the preemptive effects inherent to 
exclusive patent rights. In § 102, Congress chose to grant patents 
solely for innovations that are novel,524 reflecting the view that a 
patent should not capture that which is already in the public domain. 
Similarly, Congress excluded “obvious” advancements over the prior 
art from patentability under § 103,525 reflecting the view that some 
 
 519.  Id. 
 520.  Id. 
 521.  Id. at 1301. 
 522.  In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 997 (2008) (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 523.  35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 524. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). 
 525. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006). 
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innovations are too simplistic or trivial to justify the grant of a patent 
monopoly. With the written description and enablement requirements 
of § 112,526 Congress required patentees to disclose their invention to 
the public as a “quid pro quo of the right to exclude,”527 while at the 
same time limiting claim scope to that which the patentee has 
actually invented and described.528 And with the definiteness 
requirement set out in § 112,529 Congress required patentees “to 
apprise potential infringers of the scope of the claims.”530 Finally, 
and perhaps most importantly, under § 154, Congress limited the 
term of a patent to twenty years from the filing date of the earliest 
application to which the patent claims priority.531 In doing so, 
Congress has made a policy determination that granting exclusive 
patent rights for up to twenty years is a justifiable price to pay in 
order to incentivize innovation. 
In short, Congress has made a detailed policy determination that, 
upon balancing the interests, it is ultimately beneficial to society to 
grant exclusive patent rights (1) for up to twenty years,532 (2) for 
“new and useful process[es], machine[s], manufacture[s], or 
composition[s] of matter,”533 (3) provided that such inventions are 
novel,534 non-obvious,535 disclosed in a fully enabling written 
description,536 and claimed with sufficient definiteness.537 Yet, the 
Court has crafted sweeping judicial exceptions to § 101 based 
primarily on a policy view that “some categories of invention 
 
 526.  35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012). 
 527.  J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001) (quoting 
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974)). 
 528.  MagSil Corp. v. Hitachi Global Storage Techs., Inc., 687 F.3d 1377, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 
2012); see also Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Labs, 720 F.3d 1380, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
(“Claims are not enabled when, at the effective filing date of the patent, one of ordinary skill in 
the art could not practice their full scope without undue experimentation.”); supra notes 93–94 
and accompanying text. 
 529.  35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012). 
 530.  Young v. Lumenis, Inc., 492 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 531.  35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006) (“Subject to the payment of fees under this title, such grant 
shall be for a term beginning on the date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the 
date on which the application for patent was filed in the United States or, if the application 
contains a specific reference to an earlier filed application or applications under section 120, 121, 
or 365(c), from the date on which the earliest such application was filed.”). 
 532.  35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006). 
 533.  35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 534.  35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). 
 535.  35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006). 
 536.  35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012). 
 537.  35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012). 
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deserve no protection” because they have too many downstream 
uses.538 In doing so, the Court has upset the balance of this calibrated 
statutory scheme, substituting the will of the judiciary for that of 
Congress. 
Finally, it is important to note that all patents “preempt” 
downstream innovations that require use of the claimed invention.539 
This is the very essence and purpose of exclusive patent rights540—
that one who improves upon another’s patented invention may still 
be precluded from practicing the claimed elements of the original 
invention. “A ‘blocking patent’ is an earlier patent that must be 
licensed in order to practice a later patent.”541 Indeed, the “Supreme 
Court has long acknowledged the ‘well established’ rule that ‘an 
improver cannot appropriate the basic patent of another and that the 
improver without a license is an infringer and may be sued as 
such.’”542 Indeed, this principle was even reflected in the Patent Act 
of 1793, which stated the following: 
[A]ny person, who shall have discovered an improvement in 
the principle of any machine, or in the process of any 
composition of matter, which shall have been patented, and 
shall have obtained a patent for such improvement, he shall 
not be at liberty to make, use or vend the original discovery, 
nor shall the first inventor be at liberty to use the 
improvement.543 
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, preemption issues 
have no business being included in the § 101 inquiry regarding 
patent-eligible subject matter. The first thread of preemption 
concerns—i.e., that an overbroad patent claim might preempt 
embodiments within its scope that the patentee did not describe and 
thus presumably did not invent—is appropriately addressed under the 
“full scope” enablement doctrine of § 112. The second thread of 
preemption concerns—i.e., that a patent claim may preempt 
 
 538.  In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Rader, J., dissenting). 
 539.  See Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 2, 1 Stat. 318 (1793). 
 540.  See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964) (explaining that 
patents are given to encourage invention by rewarding inventors with the right to exclude others 
from the use of the invention). 
 541.  Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting 
Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. A-Roo Co., 222 F.3d 1372, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
 542.  Id. (quoting Temco Elec. Motor Co. v. Apco Mfg. Co., 275 U.S. 319, 328 (1928)). 
 543.  Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 2, 1 Stat. 318 (1793) (emphasis altered). 
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downstream innovation which requires the use of the claimed 
invention—has already been specifically addressed in a detailed and 
balanced statutory scheme enacted by Congress. 
Perhaps for these reasons, the Supreme Court’s most recent 
§ 101 decision in Myriad did not mention the concept of preemption. 
The Myriad Court found cDNA patent eligible without conducting 
any inquiry as to what quantum of downstream biotech research 
would be preempted by Myriad’s patent.544 The Myriad Court relied 
heavily on Chakrabarty for its holding, which had previously been 
an outlier with respect to its omission of any preemption analysis.545 
This was a welcome departure from Mayo, decided only a year 
earlier, in which the Court relied heavily on preemption concerns.546 
C.  Abstraction: Yet Another Statutory Scheme 
In Le Roy (1852), the Supreme Court stated in dictum that “[a] 
principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a 
motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of 
them an exclusive right.”547 In Rubber-Tip Pencil (1874), the Court 
further stated in dictum that “[a]n idea of itself is not patentable.”548 
In Benson (1984), the Court relied upon these statements to hold that 
“abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the 
basic tools of scientific and technological work.”549 
But what exactly is an “idea,” a “principle,” or an “abstract 
intellectual concept”? The Benson Court held that a mathematical 
algorithm for converting BCD numerals to pure binary was a patent-
ineligible “idea.”550 The Court vaguely defined the term “algorithm” 
as a “procedure for solving a given type of mathematical 
problem.”551 The Court thereafter reaffirmed in Flook (1978) and 
Diehr (1981) that algorithms are patent ineligible,552 with the Court 
 
 544.  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2119 (2013). 
 545.  Id. at 2116–17 (analyzing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305–10 (1980)). 
 546.  Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1301–03 (2012).; 
see also supra notes 517–521 and accompanying text (discussing various cases in which the 
Court addressed patent preemption concerns in its analysis). 
 547.  Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852). 
 548.  Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498, 507 (1874). 
 549.  Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (citing Le Roy, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 175; 
Rubber-Tip Pencil, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 507). 
 550.  Id. at 71–72 (emphasis added). 
 551.  Id. at 65. 
 552.  Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978). 
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describing the applicable judicial exception as an exclusion of 
“abstract ideas.”553 However, aside from merely holding that 
algorithms fall within the judicial exception, the Court in Benson, 
Flook, and Diehr offered no definition or explanation as to what 
constitutes an “abstract idea.” 
In Bilski (2010), despite the fact that the claims at issue recited a 
series of specific method steps, the Court characterized the claims as 
broadly reciting the “concept of hedging, or protecting against risk,” 
which the Court held was “an unpatentable abstract idea.”554 The 
Court did not define what an “abstract idea” is, nor did it explain 
what types of claim elements may be disregarded in determining 
whether a claim is impermissibly directed to an “abstract idea.” 
Rather, the Court merely directed lower courts to “look[] to the 
guideposts in Benson, Flook, and Diehr.”555 
So what then is an “abstract idea,” and what is the statutory 
basis for the corresponding judicial exception to § 101? As discussed 
at length in Part V.B, supra, the “abstract ideas” exception cannot be 
justified merely by concerns regarding preemption, as Congress has 
enacted a detailed statutory scheme specifically designed to balance 
preemption concerns against the goal of incentivizing innovation. 
Nor can the exception be justified based on any vague notion 
that “one may not patent an idea,”556 or that “[a]n idea of itself is not 
patentable.”557 These holdings are simply illogical and are in plain 
conflict with the statute. All inventions are ideas at varying levels of 
generality. Every patent specification describes the ideas conceived 
by the patentee. Every patent claim defines the scope of the ideas the 
patentee seeks to protect. Indeed, conception—the very touchstone of 
invention under the patent laws—is by definition an “idea”: the 
“formation in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent 
idea of the complete and operative invention.”558 Further, the only 
way to make an invention something more than an idea is to actually 
reduce it to practice—e.g., an item actually built or a process actually 
performed. But the Patent Act does not require actual reduction to 
practice. “It is well settled that an invention may be patented before 
 
 553.  Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185. 
 554.  Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010). 
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 556.  Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972). 
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it is reduced to practice,”559 as “constructive reduction to practice 
occurs when a patent application on the claimed invention is 
filed.”560 Indeed, the Court in Dolbear expressly held that Alexander 
Graham Bell could patent his idea for transmitting voices 
electronically, even though he had not yet reduced his conception to 
practice: 
It is quite true that when Bell applied for his patent he had 
never transmitted telegraphically spoken words so that they 
could be distinctly heard and understood at the receiving 
end of his line, but in his specification he did describe 
accurately and with admirable clearness his process—that is 
to say, the exact electrical condition that must be created to 
accomplish his purpose—and he also described, with 
sufficient precision to enable one of ordinary skill in such 
matters to make it, a form of apparatus which, if used in the 
way pointed out, would produce the required effect, receive 
the words, and carry them to and deliver them at the 
appointed place.561 
Setting aside preemption concerns and the nonexistent rule 
against patenting “ideas,” any justification for the “abstract ideas” 
exception to § 101 can only lie in the concept of abstraction itself. 
But what exactly are the Court’s concerns when it asks whether a 
claimed invention is too “abstract” to be patent eligible under § 101? 
The exception cannot be justified by mere concerns that a 
claimed invention is too vague or poorly defined to be patentable. 
Congress has already specifically addressed such concerns with the 
claim-definiteness requirement of § 112,562 under which a patent 
claim is invalid if “a person of ordinary skill in the art could not 
determine the bounds of the claim.”563 Nor can the “abstract ideas” 
exception be justified by a concern that a patent claim is overbroad 
and captures embodiments that the patentee did not invent. As we 
discussed at length in Part V.B, supra, such concerns are already 
addressed by § 112 and the “full scope” enablement doctrine, under 
 
 559.  Pfaff v. Wells Elecs. Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 61 (1998). 
 560.  Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 561.  Dolbear v. Am. Bell. Tel. Co., 126 U.S. 1, 535 (1888). 
 562.  35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012) (“The specification shall conclude with one or more claims 
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 563.  Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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which “the specification of a patent must teach those skilled in the art 
how to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention without 
‘undue experimentation.’”564 
The “abstract ideas” exception similarly cannot be justified 
merely by concerns that the claimed invention is too basic, too 
simplistic, or too trivial to be patentable. Congress expressly 
addressed such concerns with the non-obviousness requirement of 
§ 103, under which a patent claim is invalid if the “claimed invention 
as a whole would have been obvious . . . to a person having ordinary 
skill in the art.”565 Indeed, under the Court’s holding in KSR 
International Co. v. Teleflex, a fact finder may invoke “common 
sense” to find a patent claim invalid for obviousness.566 
Ultimately, we believe the statutory scheme enacted by 
Congress already systematically eliminates “abstract ideas” from 
patentability. Stated differently—if a patent claim (a) recites an 
invention that is novel567 and non-obvious,568 (b) has a definite claim 
scope,569 and (c) has a claim scope which is fully enabled by the 
specification,570 then that patent claim by definition does not recite an 
“abstract idea.” The judicial exception to § 101 for “abstract ideas” 
therefore serves no purpose other than to sow confusion and 
encourage subjective validity determinations outside the appropriate 
statutory frameworks regarding novelty, non-obviousness, 
definiteness, and enablement. Accordingly, we propose that the 
“abstract ideas” exception to § 101 should be relegated to the dustbin 
of history. 
D.  An “Inventive Concept”: Conflating Eligibility with Obviousness 
The “inventive concept” test originated in Funk Bros. (1948), 
wherein the Court held that even an “application of [a] newly-
discovered natural principle” is not patent eligible unless it includes 
some “invention” beyond the natural principle itself, rather than a 
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mere “simple step.”571 The Court later relied upon Funk Bros. when 
expressly applying the “inventive concept” test in Flook and 
Mayo.572 
The “inventive concept” test for patent eligibility is a two-step 
inquiry: First, the Court will identify the “laws of nature, physical 
phenomena, [or] abstract ideas” underlying the claim at issue.573 
Second, the Court will analyze the claim’s “other elements” to 
determine whether they collectively recite an “inventive concept” 
that is “sufficient to ensure that the patent [claim] in practice 
amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the natural law 
itself.”574 For this analysis, the law of nature, physical phenomenon, 
or abstract idea the Court identifies as underlying the claim “is 
treated as though it were a familiar part of the prior art,” effectively 
excising it from the claim.575 The required “inventive concept” will 
then be found in the claim’s “other steps” or elements only if they 
recite more than “well-understood, routine, conventional activity 
previously engaged in by researchers in the field.”576 Mere pre- or 
“‘post-solution activity’ that is purely ‘conventional or obvious’” is 
insufficient.577 
In a nutshell, the “inventive concept” test effectively asks 
whether patent claims are obvious in view of their underlying “laws 
of nature, physical phenomena, [or] abstract ideas,” which are 
“treated as though [they] were a familiar part of the prior art.”578 This 
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inquiry is fraught with flaws that make it inconsistent with the Patent 
Act and wholly unworkable in practice. 
Importantly, the “inventive concept” test improperly conflates 
the patent-eligibility inquiry (§ 101) with the distinct issue of 
whether a patent claim is invalid due to obviousness (§ 103).579 
Justice Stewart highlighted this concern with his dissent in Flook.580 
The conflation of patent eligibility with obviousness directly 
conflicts with the statute. For reference, we recite the current 
versions of §§ 101 and 103 below: 
[Section 101.] Whoever invents or discovers any new and 
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may 
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and 
requirements of this title.581 
[Section 103.] A patent for a claimed invention may not be 
obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not 
identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the 
differences between the claimed invention and the prior art 
are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have 
been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed 
invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to 
which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not 
be negated by the manner in which the invention was 
made.582 
Section 101 plainly does not include any language that would 
suggest an obviousness inquiry. Rather, it expressly defines the 
categories of subject matter that are eligible for patenting, “subject to 
the conditions and requirements of this title.”583 When section 103 
was added with the Patent Act of 1952, it was titled: “Conditions for 
patentability; non-obvious subject matter.”584 The Senate Committee 
Report to the 1952 Act confirmed that the non-obviousness 
requirement of § 103 is one of the “conditions and requirements of 
this title,” stating the following: 
 
 579.  Compare 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012), with 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). 
 580.  Flook, 437 U.S. at 598, 600 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 581.  35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 582.  35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 583.  35 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added). 
 584.  Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 103, 66 Stat. 792, 798 (1952) (emphasis added). 
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Section 101 sets forth the subject matter that can be 
patented, “subject to the conditions and requirements of this 
title.” The conditions [u]nder which a patent may be 
obtained follow, and section 102 covers the conditions 
relating to novelty . . . . 
. . . . 
Section 103, for the first time in our statute, provides a 
condition which exists in the law and has existed for more 
than 100 years, but only by reason of decisions of the courts 
. . . . Section 103 states this requirement in the title.585 
Because § 101 defines the categories of subject matter that “can 
be” patented “subject to the conditions and requirements” of § 103, 
it is clear that an invention may fall within the categories of patent-
eligible subject matter (§ 101) even if it is ultimately unpatentable 
due to obviousness (§ 103). Any other interpretation would make the 
phrase “subject to the conditions and requirements of this title” mere 
statutory “surplusage,”586 as this qualifier would be unnecessary if a 
non-obviousness requirement were already subsumed within § 101. 
As a corollary, the mere fact that a particular invention is obvious 
under § 103 cannot mean that all inventions of the same type 
necessarily fall outside the § 101 categories. Conflating the patent-
eligibility and non-obviousness requirements therefore confuses the 
issues and risks unintended consequences—for example, the blanket 
invalidation of an entire field of patents under § 101, based on a 
particular bad patent that could otherwise be disposed of under 
§ 103. 
The conflation of patent eligibility with non-obviousness is 
further inconsistent with the statute due to the element of time. The 
current version of § 103—which became effective on September 16, 
2012, as part of the America Invents Act—asks whether an invention 
would have been obvious “before the [patent’s] effective filing 
date.”587 Similarly, the previous version of § 103 asked whether the 
invention would have been obvious “at the time the invention was 
made.”588 In contrast, there is no reference to time in § 101; it simply 
 
 585.  S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399 (emphasis 
added). 
 586.  See, e.g., Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2034, 2043 (2012). 
 587.  35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012) (effective Sept. 16, 2012). 
 588.  35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006) (effective Dec. 10, 2004–Sept. 15, 2012). 
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lists the categories of subject matter that have been, are currently, 
and always will be patent eligible.589 Yet, by conflating the patent-
eligibility and non-obviousness inquiries, the Court has effectively 
imported a time element into § 101 which can be determinative of 
patent eligibility. 
For example, under the “inventive concept” test, a patent claim 
that would recite patent-eligible subject matter if filed today might be 
held patent ineligible under § 101 if filed tomorrow, solely because 
certain claim elements have in the interim become “well-understood, 
routine, [or] conventional.”590 This might result even if the core 
discovery is still novel at the later date, since the analysis treats any 
underlying law of nature, physical phenomenon, or abstract idea “as 
though it were a familiar part of the prior art.”591 Under the same 
logic, even if a claimed invention has been held patent eligible under 
§ 101, a later improvement upon the same invention might be held 
patent ineligible. This issue may arise, in particular, when (a) the 
point of novelty of the improvement is viewed as a new or more 
refined understanding of an underlying law of nature, physical 
phenomenon, or abstract idea—which will nonetheless be treated as 
“a familiar part of the prior art,”592 and (b) the “other steps” which 
made the original claim patent eligible have since become “well-
understood, routine, [or] conventional” and thus cannot save the 
improvement from being found patent ineligible.593 Such a result 
cannot be squared with the plain language of § 101, which expressly 
mandates that, if an invention is a patent-eligible “process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter,” then “any new and useful 
improvement thereof” must be patent eligible as well.594 
In addition to its inconsistency with the statute, the “inventive 
concept” test is wholly unworkable in practice. The core problem is 
that the analysis invites subjectivity at its initial step, under which a 
court must first identify the “laws of nature, physical phenomena, 
[or] abstract ideas” that are “underlying” the patent claim at issue.595 
This is an inherently subjective exercise, because (a) the Supreme 
 
 589.  35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 590.  Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012). 
 591.  Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591–92, 594 (1978). 
 592.  Id. 
 593.  Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294. 
 594.  35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 595.  Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293–94 (emphasis added). 
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Court has not defined what constitutes a law of nature, physical 
phenomenon, or abstract idea, and (b) the task of articulating the 
principle underlying a patent claim is unbounded by the limitations 
actually recited in the claim. A court is thus free to subjectively 
articulate the underlying principle at any level of generality it 
pleases. And because the underlying principle is then “treated as 
though it were a familiar part of the prior art”596—effectively 
excising it from the claim—this initial subjective characterization of 
the underlying principal can effectively swallow the entire analysis. 
For example, in Funk Bros., when considering a claimed 
inoculant mixture comprising multiple strains of bacteria that would 
not inhibit each other’s effects, the Supreme Court characterized the 
“natural principle” underlying the claim as the “discovery that 
certain strains of the several species of these bacteria are non-
inhibitive and may thus be safely mixed.”597 But in characterizing the 
underlying “natural principle” with such specificity and then treating 
it as though it were well known, the Court effectively excised the key 
point of novelty from the claim, leading the Court to declare the 
claimed invention patent ineligible on the ground that the remaining 
claim elements failed to recite an inventive concept.598 To be sure, 
the Court could have instead characterized the underlying 
“phenomena of nature” at a higher level of generality, such as “the 
existence of the individual strains of bacteria in nature.” Such a 
characterization would not have excised the inventive concept—i.e., 
that certain strains of bacteria can be mixed without inhibiting each 
other—and thus might have resulted in the claim being held patent 
eligible. 
As another example, in Judge Lourie’s plurality opinion in CLS 
Bank, he characterized the “abstract idea” underlying the claims as 
the “idea of reducing settlement risk by effecting trades through a 
third-party intermediary (here, the supervisory institution) 
empowered to verify that both parties can fulfill their obligations 
before allowing the exchange—i.e., a form of escrow.”599 Effectively 
excising these elements from the claims, Judge Lourie found that all 
 
 596.  Flook, 437 U.S. at 591–92, 594. 
 597.  Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 132 (1948). 
 598.  Id. at 131–32. 
 599.  CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Lourie, 
J., concurring). 
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claims failed to recite an inventive concept and thus were not patent 
eligible.600 But the “abstract idea” at issue could have been defined at 
a higher level of generality, such as “the idea of reducing settlement 
risk,” or “the concept of escrow.” Such broader characterizations 
likely would have significantly changed the analysis and may have 
instead resulted in a finding of patent eligibility. 
Indeed, both Judge Lourie and Chief Judge Rader took such an 
approach in Ultramercial, broadly characterizing the underlying 
“abstract idea” as the “idea that advertising can be used as a form of 
currency.”601 Unlike in CLS Bank, this more generalized articulation 
of the “abstract idea” left enough specific elements in the claims for 
the court to find that they recited patent-eligible subject matter.602 
In short, the result of the “inventive concept” analysis is significantly 
impacted—and in many cases dominated—by the initial subjective 
determination as to what claim limitations are subsumed within the 
articulated law of nature, physical phenomenon, or abstract idea. 
Finally, the “inventive concept” test’s treatment of all laws of 
nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas “as though [they are] 
a familiar part of the prior art” is fundamentally flawed.603 While we 
do acknowledge in Part VI.B, infra, that a limited variation of this 
rule may be appropriate in certain circumstances—e.g., for products 
of nature in an obviousness analysis under § 103—the Court’s 
current use of the rule in the § 101 analysis is dangerously 
overbroad. 
First, there can be no logical justification for treating all 
“abstract ideas” as though they are well known in the art. One may 
certainly come up with an idea that is novel and non-obvious, yet 
which can be viewed as too “abstract” for patenting. But if that idea 
is then refined to a concrete application recited in a patent claim, 
there is no logical reason the initial “abstract” idea should suddenly 
lose its status as a point of novelty or as the patentee’s conception. 
Such a rule “could eviscerate patent law,”604 because “any claim can 
be stripped down, simplified, generalized, or paraphrased to remove 
all of its concrete limitations, until at its core, something that could 
 
 600.  Id. at 1292. 
 601.  Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2013); id. at 1355 
(Lourie, J., concurring). 
 602.  Id. at 1354 (majority opinion); id. at 1355 (Lourie, J., concurring). 
 603.  Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591–92, 594 (1978). 
 604.  Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012). 
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be characterized as an abstract idea is revealed.”605 The “inventive 
concept” test thus allows a court to excise and ignore a chunk of each 
patent claim at the onset of every § 101 analysis. For example, 
Alexander Graham Bell’s patent in Dolbear606 could have been 
characterized as embodying the “abstract idea” of transmitting 
sounds at a distance by varying the intensity of electricity to mimic 
sound vibrations. Luckily for Bell, the “inventive concept” test did 
not yet exist at that time, because this “abstract idea”—Bell’s key 
point of novelty—might have been treated as well known and 
excised from his claim, potentially rendering the claim patent 
ineligible. 
Second, treating as well known everything that can be 
characterized as a “law of nature” or a “natural principle” directly 
conflicts with the fact that “discoveries” constitute patent-eligible 
subject matter. Moreover, as with abstract ideas, this rule “would, if 
carried to its extreme, make all inventions unpatentable because all 
inventions can be reduced to underlying principles of nature which, 
once known, make their implementation obvious.”607 We address 
these issues at length over the next two sections. 
E.  Patent-Eligible Subject Matter Includes “Discoveries” 
The Court has repeatedly held that the mere discovery of “a 
scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not [a] 
patentable invention.”608 Indeed, a distinction between invention and 
mere discovery appears to have factored heavily into the “inventive 
concept” framework the Court has applied in many § 101 cases. 
For example, in Funk Bros., when considering a claimed 
inoculant mixture comprising multiple strains of bacteria that would 
not inhibit each other’s effects, the Court stated the following: 
[The patentee] does not create [the] state of inhibition or of 
non-inhibition in the bacteria. Their qualities are the work 
of nature. Those qualities are of course not patentable. For 
patents cannot issue for the discovery of phenomena of 
nature. The qualities of these bacteria, like the heat of the 
 
 605.  Ultramercial, 722 F.3d at 1344. 
 606.  Dolbear v. Am. Bell. Tel. Co., 126 U.S. 1 (1888). 
 607.  Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 189 n.12 (1981). 
 608.  Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939) 
(emphasis added). 
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sun, electricity, or the qualities of metals, are part of the 
storehouse of knowledge of all men. They are 
manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and 
reserved exclusively to none. He who discovers a hitherto 
unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a 
monopoly of it which the law recognizes. If there is to be 
invention from such a discovery, it must come from the 
application of the law of nature to a new and useful end.609 
The Court held that the principle underlying the claimed inoculant 
mixture—i.e., that certain strains of bacteria were mutually non-
inhibiting—was “no more than the discovery of some of the 
handiwork of nature and hence [was] not patentable.”610 “[H]owever 
ingenious the discovery of that natural principle,” the Court 
reasoned, the mere “aggregation of species [of bacteria into a single 
mixture] fell short of invention within the meaning of the patent 
statutes.”611 
The Court has similarly “held that the discovery of a novel and 
useful mathematical formula may not be patented.”612 For example, 
when the Flook Court considered a claimed method of updating 
alarm limits using a mathematical formula, the Court “assume[d] that 
[the] respondent’s formula [was] novel and useful and that he 
discovered it.”613 However, the Court went on to hold that “the 
discovery of such a phenomenon cannot support a patent unless there 
is some other inventive concept in its application.”614 The Court 
further reasoned that, because a mathematical formula is itself 
unpatentable, “it is treated as though it were a familiar part of the 
prior art.”615 The Flook Court ultimately held that, “once [the] 
algorithm is assumed to be within the prior art,” the claimed method 
of updating alarm limits “contains no patentable invention.”616 
Likewise, in Mayo, the Court considered a claimed method of 
determining an optimal drug dosage based on metabolite levels in a 
 
 609.  Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (emphases added). 
 610.  Id. at 131 (emphasis added). 
 611.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 612.  Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591–92, 585 (1978) (emphasis added) (citing Gottschalk 
v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972)). 
 613.  Id. at 588. 
 614.  Id. at 594 (emphasis added). 
 615.  Id. at 591–92 (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 67); id. at 594. 
 616.  Id. at 594 (emphasis added). 
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patient’s blood.617 The Court characterized the “law of nature” 
underlying the claim as “natural laws describing the relationships 
between the concentration in the blood of certain [drug] metabolites 
and the likelihood that the drug dosage will be ineffective or induce 
harmful side-effects.”618 The Court reasoned that the discovery of 
this metabolite-to-drug-dosage correlation was not patent eligible, as 
it was merely “a consequence of the ways in which [the drugs] are 
metabolized by the body—entirely natural processes.”619 “‘If there is 
to be invention from [a discovery of a law of nature],’” the Court 
reasoned, “‘it must come from the application of the law of nature to 
a new and useful end.’”620 Setting aside the discovery of the natural 
correlation, the Court found that the remaining steps were nothing 
but “well-understood, routine, conventional activity” which included 
no “inventive concept,” rendering the claim patent ineligible.621 
Thus, in the three examples discussed above, the Court held that 
the mere “discovery” of (a) the fact that certain bacteria strains were 
mutually non-inhibiting,622 (b) a mathematical formula for updating 
alarm limits,623 and (c) a correlation between metabolite levels and 
optimal drug dosage,624 all did not constitute patentable “invention.” 
What the Court failed to explain, however, is how these holdings 
overcome the plain language of the Constitution and the Patent Act. 
As we have discussed, the Intellectual Property Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress: “To promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”625 
By its plain language, the Intellectual Property Clause clearly 
contemplates that “Inventors” include those who make 
 
 617.  Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct 1289, 1294–95 (2012). 
 618.  Id. at 1294; see also id. at 1296 (“Prometheus' patents set forth laws of nature—namely, 
relationships between concentrations of certain metabolites in the blood and the likelihood that a 
dosage of a thiopurine drug will prove ineffective or cause harm.”). 
 619.  Id. at 1297. 
 620.  Id. at 1294 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. 
Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)). 
 621.  Id. at 1298. 
 622.  Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). 
 623.  Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588 (1978). 
 624.  Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294–95. 
 625.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added). 
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“Discoveries,” and it expressly authorizes Congress to grant 
“exclusive Right[s]” for such “Discoveries.”626 
Indeed, equating inventorship with discovery was consistent 
with the commonly understood meaning of these terms in 1787, at 
the time of the Constitutional Convention. For example, the 
Dictionary of the English Language, in versions published in both 
1768 and 1792, provided the following definitions: 
To DISCOVER. . . . 1. To show; to disclose; to bring to 
light. 2. To make known. 3. To find out; to espy. 
. . . . 
DISCOVERY. . . . 1. The act of finding any thing hidden. 
2. The act of revealing or disclosing a secret. 
. . . . 
To INVENT. . . . 1. To discover; to find out; to excogitate. 
. . . . 
INVENTION. . . . 1. Fiction. 2. Discovery. 3. Excogitation; 
act of producing something new. 
. . . . 
INVENTOR. . . . 1. A finder out of something new.627 
Moreover, as we discussed in Part II, supra,628 the Committee of 
Eleven considered proposals from James Madison and Charles 
Pinckney when drafting the Intellectual Property Clause. Pinckney 
proposed to “grant patents for useful inventions,” while Madison 
proposed protections for “useful knowledge and discoveries.”629 The 
Committee of Eleven apparently merged the two proposals, 
authorizing Congress to grant “Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their . . . Discoveries.”630 The inclusion of the word “Discoveries” in 
the Intellectual Property Clause was thus clearly no accident. 
Consistent with the spirit and scope of congressional authority 
granted by the Intellectual Property Clause, section 101 of the Patent 
Act defines the categories of patent-eligible subject matter as 
 
 626.  Id. 
 627.  SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (3d ed. 1768) (emphasis 
added) (citations omitted). See also SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE (10th ed. 1792) (substantially the same definitions). 
 628.  See supra notes 15–24 and accompanying text. 
 629.  THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 14, at 321–22, 324–
25 (emphases added); see supra notes 15–24 and accompanying text. 
 630.  Id. at 505 (emphasis added). 
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follows: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and 
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to 
the conditions and requirements of this title.”631 
This language—”whoever invents or discovers”—is clear and 
unambiguous. Moreover, consistent with the Intellectual Property 
Clause, the Patent Act even equates inventorship with discovery in 
an express definition, stating: “When used in this title unless the 
context otherwise indicates—(a) The term “invention” means 
invention or discovery.”632 
Finally, it should be noted that the current version of the Patent 
Act cited above is not an aberration, as the statute has expressly 
made inventions and discoveries patent eligible from the very 
beginning, dating all the way back to the Patent Act of 1790.633 
This brings us back to the Supreme Court’s holdings. Despite 
the clear statutory and constitutional support for the patent eligibility 
of “discoveries” that fall within the § 101 categories, the Court has 
held that “patents cannot issue for the discovery of phenomena of 
nature” or “laws of nature,” as these are “free to all men and reserved 
exclusively to none.”634 In the Court’s view, “however ingenious the 
discovery of [a] natural principle may have been,” it falls “short of 
invention within the meaning of the patent statutes.”635 The Court 
 
 631.  35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 632.  35 U.S.C. § 100(a) (2012) (emphasis added). This definition was added “to avoid 
repetition of the phrase ‘invention or discovery’ and its derivatives throughout the revised title.” 
See S. Rep. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2409. 
 633.  See, e.g., Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 101, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified at 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter . . . may obtain a patent therefor . . . .” (emphasis added)); Patent Act of 
1930, ch. 312, § 4886, 46 Stat. 375 (1930) (“Any person who has invented or discovered any new 
and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter . . . may . . . obtain a patent 
therefor.” (emphasis added)); Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 24, 16 Stat. 198–217 (1870) (“any 
person who has invented or discovered any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter . . . may obtain a patent therefor.” (emphasis added)); Patent Act of 1836, 
ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117 (1836) (“any person or persons having discovered or invented any new 
and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter” may seek a patent therefor 
(emphasis added)); Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318 (1793) (authorizing the “Secretary 
of State, to cause letters patent to be made out . . . giving a short description of the said invention 
or discovery, and thereupon granting to such petitioner” (emphasis added)); Patent Act of 1790, 
ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109 (1790) (anyone who has “invented or discovered any useful art, 
manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein” may seek a patent therefor 
(emphasis added)). 
 634.  Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (emphasis added). 
 635. Id. at 131 (emphasis added). 
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requires patent claims to recite elements that embody an “inventive 
concept,” disregarding the discovery of any natural principle.636 
For all the reasons discussed above, such holdings are clearly 
erroneous, as they are in direct conflict with the plain language of 
both the Constitution and the Patent Act. This illustrates yet another 
reason why the judicial exceptions to § 101 for “laws of nature, 
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas” are fundamentally 
flawed.637 
But what then are the implications of discoveries being patent 
eligible? If one “discovers” a chemical process naturally occurring in 
a swamp, or a plant growing in the jungle, do these discoveries 
respectively constitute a patent-eligible “process” and “composition 
of matter” under § 101? The answer is undoubtedly no. And the 
reason, once again, is firmly grounded in statute. To obtain a patent, 
one must invent or discover something “new.”638 
F.  Patent-Eligible Subject Matter Must Be “New” 
We turn now to the most overlooked word in § 101—”new.” 
Section 101 states: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and 
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or 
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent 
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”639 
The word “new” in § 101 provides concrete statutory support for 
a subset—though certainly not the entire scope—of the judicial 
exceptions excluding “laws of nature” and “physical phenomena” 
from patent eligibility.640 The Supreme Court has flirted with this 
prospect, vaguely suggesting that the judicial exceptions “are 
consistent with the notion that a patentable process must be ‘new and 
useful.’”641 However, the Court has not expressly analyzed or 
explained how the word “new” informs the § 101 inquiry. 
The first Patent Act, enacted in 1790, did not include the word 
“new” in the definition of patent-eligible subject matter. Rather, the 
 
 636.  Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012) 
(citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978)). 
 637. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 
U.S. 303, 309 (1980)). 
 638.  35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 639.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 640.  Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225 (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309). 
 641.  Id. 
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Act defined patent-eligible subject matter in section 1 as including 
“any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any 
improvement therein not before known or used.”642 
In the Patent Act of 1793, drafted by Thomas Jefferson,643 the 
definition of patent-eligible subject matter was modified to include 
“any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of 
matter, or any new or useful improvement [therein], not known or 
used before.”644 
The foregoing changes were significant for several reasons. 
First, in the 1790 Act, the definition of patent-eligible subject matter 
and the novelty requirement were both included in the same sentence 
of section 1, with novelty being reflected in the phrase “not before 
known or used.”645 Similar language regarding novelty was carried 
over into section 1 of the 1793 Act, in the phrase “not known or used 
before.”646 Yet, even though section 1 already contained express 
language pertaining to novelty, the 1793 revisions added the word 
“new” to section 1 in two places.647 Moreover, the word “new” was 
added as a qualifier immediately preceding the listed categories of 
patent-eligible subject matter, whereas the words “not known or used 
before” were retained later in the sentence.648 
The foregoing amendment in the 1793 Act strongly suggests that 
Congress (and Jefferson) intended the word “new” to have a different 
meaning in the context of patent-eligible subject matter, distinct from 
the concept of novelty that was already reflected in the phrase “not 
known or used before.”649 Otherwise, adding the word “new”—
twice, in the same sentence as “not known or used before”—would 
have been mere “surplusage.”650 We posit that the term “new” was 
 
 642.  Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109 (1790) (repealed 1793). 
 643.  Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318 (1793); see Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308–09 
(referencing Thomas Jefferson as the author of the 1793 Act). 
 644.  Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318 (1793) (emphases added). 
 645.  Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109 (1790) (repealed 1793). It was not until the 
Patent Act of 1952 that the categories of patent-eligible subject matter and the novelty 
requirement were separated into section 101 and section 102, respectively. See Patent Act of 
1952, ch. 950, §§ 101–02, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 101). 
 646.  Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318 (1793). 
 647.  See supra notes 642–644 and accompanying text. 
 648.  See Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318 (1793). 
 649.  Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (providing the modern novelty requirement). 
 650.  See Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2034, 2043 (2012) (noting that “the 
canon against surplusage . . . favors that [statutory] interpretation which avoids surplusage”); 
Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (explaining that the Court is “‘reluctan[t] to treat 
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added to the definition of patent-eligible subject matter specifically 
to clarify that something must be “new” to the world to be patent 
eligible, even if it was “not known or used before.” 
Our interpretation is supported by the fact that the word “new” 
was added to the statute at the same time as the “composition of 
matter” category of patent-eligible subject matter.651 At the time of 
the 1793 Act, the dictionary definition of “MATTER” included: 
“2. Materials; that of which anything is composed.”; and “9. Thing; 
object; that which has some particular relation.”652 The dictionary 
definition of “COMPOSITION” further included: “3. A mass formed 
by mingling different ingredients.”653 Under these broad definitions, 
any mass, object, or thing composed of two or more materials or 
substances could arguably be viewed as a “composition of matter.”654 
This would have been problematic, because an applicant might 
discover a “composition of matter” in nature—for example, any 
naturally occurring organism or thing composed of multiple 
elements—which was “not known or used before.” However, such a 
“composition of matter” would not be “new” to the world, as it 
existed in nature prior to its discovery. This suggests that the word 
“new” was added to the Patent Act specifically to clarify that 
naturally existing compositions of matter, as well as naturally 
occurring processes—i.e., “product[s] of nature”655 that are not 
“new” to the world—do not constitute patent-eligible subject matter. 
Indeed, when Congress re-codified the patent laws in 1952 and 
split the patent eligibility and novelty requirements into § 101 and 
§ 102 respectively, the word “new” was retained in § 101 as a 
 
statutory terms as surplusage’ in any setting” and is “especially unwilling to do so when the term 
occupies so pivotal a place in the statutory scheme” (quoting Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter 
Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 698 (1995)). 
 651.  Compare Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109 (1790) (repealed 1793), with Patent 
Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318 (1793). 
 652.  SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (8th ed. 1792). 
 653.  Id. 
 654.  Later definitions of “composition of matter” have been similar. See, e.g., Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (noting that “‘composition of matter’ has been construed 
consistent with its common usage to include ‘all compositions of two or more substances and . . . 
all composite articles, whether they be the results of chemical union, or of mechanical mixture, or 
whether they be gases, fluids, powders or solids’” (quoting Shell Dev. Co. v. Watson, 149 F. 
Supp. 279, 280 (D.C. 1957))). 
 655.  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013). 
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qualifier to the statutory categories.656 This is consistent with our 
view that patent-eligible subject matter must be “new” to the world 
under § 101, even if the claimed subject matter otherwise satisfies 
the novelty requirement of § 102.657 
How then does this relate to the judicial exceptions to § 101 for 
“laws of nature” and “physical phenomena”?658 As an initial matter, 
the word “new” appears to provide limited statutory support for a 
subset of these exceptions. For example, compositions of matter that 
exist in nature are “physical phenomena,” often referred to by the 
Supreme Court as “product[s] of nature.”659 Similarly, naturally 
occurring processes can be viewed as manifestations of the “laws of 
nature.” Because neither are “new” to the world, they cannot 
constitute patent-eligible subject matter under § 101. 
However, the judicial exceptions for “laws of nature” and 
“physical phenomena” are too vague and too broad to be completely 
justified by the “new” requirement of § 101. Even subject matter that 
is “new” to the world might still fail to pass muster under the judicial 
exceptions. Consider, for example, the following hypothetical: 
After spending billions of dollars on medical research, 
Cancer Research Corp. discovers that all forms of cancer 
that afflict humans are miraculously cured within 24 hours 
when 250–500mg of lunar dust is introduced into the 
bloodstream. Cancer Research Corp. seeks a patent 
claiming the following: “A method of curing cancer, 
comprising the steps of: (1) dissolving 250mg to 500mg of 
lunar dust in a liquid solution; (2) injecting said liquid 
solution containing said lunar dust into the bloodstream of a 
cancer patient; and (3) curing the patient of cancer.” 
 
 656.  See Patent Act of 1952, Pub L. No 82-593, §§ 101, 102, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified at 
35 U.S.C. §§ 100(b) & 101 (2012)). 
 657.  Of course, this is not to say that the word “new” in § 101 never overlaps with the novelty 
requirement of § 102. Indeed, the Committee Report to the 1952 Act recognized as much. See S. 
Rep. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399 (“Section 102, in 
general, may be said to describe the statutory novelty required for patentability, and includes, in 
effect, an amplification and definition of ‘new’ in section 101.”). We merely posit that the two 
requirements are slightly different in scope. Namely, something that is novel under § 102 might 
still not be “new” to the world under § 101—for example, when the claimed subject matter is a 
“composition of matter” that exists in nature, or a “process” that occurs in nature, but was 
previously unknown to those of skill in the art. 
 658.  Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309). 
 659.  Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2111. 
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Curing cancer by injecting dissolved lunar dust into a human’s 
bloodstream would clearly be a “process” that is “new” to the world, 
as there is no indication that such a process can be observed 
occurring in nature. Thus, under our interpretation of the statute, the 
claimed “process” would be patent eligible under § 101. 
In contrast, the patent eligibility of the method of curing cancer 
is less certain under the judicial exceptions to § 101, particularly 
under the two-step “inventive concept” test applied in Mayo. 
First, the Court would identify the “law of nature” underlying the 
claim, which it might characterize as “the natural law that 250–
500mg of lunar dust in the bloodstream reacts within the human 
body to cure cancer.”660 Second, the Court would analyze the claim’s 
“other elements” to look for an “inventive concept” that “amounts to 
significantly more than a patent upon the natural law itself.”661 The 
Court might view the steps of dissolving a powder and injecting a 
solution into the bloodstream as nothing but “well-understood, 
routine, conventional activity previously engaged in by researchers 
in the field.”662 Because “[a]nyone who wants to make use of the[] 
law[]” that lunar dust cures cancer would necessarily have to take 
these routine steps, the Court may find that the claim recites “nothing 
significantly more than an instruction to doctors to apply the 
applicable law[] when treating their patients.”663 It accordingly 
appears that a straightforward application of Mayo might result in the 
hypothetical method of curing cancer being held patent ineligible.664 
Thus, even though the hypothetical method of curing cancer 
would be a “process” that is “new” to the world—and would 
 
 660.  In Mayo, when considering a claimed method of determining optimal drug dosage based 
on metabolite levels in a patient’s blood, the Court characterized the “law of nature” underlying 
the claim as “natural laws describing the relationships between the concentration in the blood of 
certain [drug] metabolites and the likelihood that the drug dosage will be ineffective or induce 
harmful side-effects.” Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 
1294–96 (2012). 
 661.  Id. at 1294 (emphasis added) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978)). 
 662.  Id. at 1294. 
 663.  Id. at 1298. 
 664.  To be sure, the Mayo Court did suggest that diagnostic methods may somehow be 
distinguishable from treatment methods, stating: “Unlike, say, a typical patent on a new drug or a 
new way of using an existing drug, the patent claims do not confine their reach to particular 
applications of [natural] laws.” Id. at 1302. However, the Court offered no explanation or 
reasoning to support any such distinction. Id. Thus, it is difficult to fathom how the hypothetical 
method of treating cancer described herein can be anything but patent ineligible under Mayo, 
unless the framework and reasoning applied in Mayo is subsequently modified by the Court. 
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therefore be patent eligible under our interpretation of § 101—there 
is a good chance it might be found patent ineligible under the 
Supreme Court’s exception for “laws of nature” when applied using 
the prevailing “inventive concept” test. The foregoing hypothetical 
clearly exemplifies how the judicial exceptions—and in particular 
the “inventive concept” framework—are illogical and inconsistent 
with the plain language of the statute. As described in Part V.E, 
supra, the Constitution and the Patent Act both clearly provide for 
the patentability of “discoveries.” The statute could not be more clear 
on this point—whoever “discovers any new and useful process” has 
satisfied the requirements of § 101.665 Indeed, a new process of 
curing cancer by injecting lunar dust into the bloodstream would 
certainly be an earth-shattering discovery—precisely the kind of 
innovation the patent system is presumably intended to incentivize. 
As we have shown in this Part,666 the judicial exceptions to 
§ 101 for “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas” 
are overbroad, misguided, and largely inconsistent with the statute.667 
These exceptions clearly are “not required by the statutory text.”668 
Nor are they justified by “preemption” concerns, as Congress has 
enacted a detailed statutory scheme specifically designed to balance 
preemption concerns against the goal of incentivizing innovation.669 
Likewise, the “abstract ideas” exception is itself an abstraction in 
view of the statutory scheme, as claims which satisfy all of the 
conditions of patentability are by definition not abstract.670 The 
“inventive concept” test improperly conflates § 101 with § 103, is 
wholly unworkable in practice, and ignores the fact that 
“discoveries” can be patent eligible.671 Finally, although the word 
“new” in § 101 provides limited statutory support for a subset of the 
“laws of nature” and “physical phenomena” exceptions, these 
frameworks—in conjunction with the “inventive concept” test—are 
dangerously overbroad. As Justice Frankfurter aptly noted, 
“Everything that happens may be deemed ‘the work of nature,’ and 
 
 665.  35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (emphases added). 
 666.  See supra Part V. 
 667. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 
U.S. 303, 309 (1980)). 
 668.  Id.; see also supra Part V.A. 
 669.  See supra Part V.B. 
 670.  See supra Part V.C. 
 671.  See supra Parts V.D–E. 
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any patentable composite exemplifies in its properties ‘the laws of 
nature.’”672 As such, the inventive-concept test “would, if carried to 
its extreme, make all inventions unpatentable because all inventions 
can be reduced to underlying principles of nature which, once 
known, make their implementation obvious.”673 
Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, we propose that the 
judicial exceptions to § 101 for “laws of nature, physical phenomena, 
and abstract ideas,” as well as the “inventive concept” test, should be 
abandoned entirely. In their stead, we propose asking a simple and 
straightforward question that is grounded firmly in the statutory text: 
Is the claimed subject matter “new” to the world? 
VI.  THE CURE: HITTING THE “RESET” BUTTON 
In Parts I–V, we have provided an in-depth analysis of § 101, 
including its constitutional basis and legislative history, and we have 
surveyed more than 160 years of Supreme Court patent-eligibility 
jurisprudence, leading up to the Court’s recent decision in Myriad.674 
We have concluded that the Court’s “judicial exceptions” to § 101 
for “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas” are 
overbroad, misguided, inconsistent with the statute, and unworkable 
in practice. Accordingly, in this part, we endeavor to provide a 
“new” framework for the § 101 analysis that is clear, workable, and 
can predictably determine the subject-matter eligibility of any patent 
claim. Importantly, the framework we provide is grounded firmly in 
the statutory text, and it is consistent with the Court’s most recent 
patent-eligibility decision in Myriad. 
Indeed, as we have described at length, we believe the Myriad 
decision was a significant departure from the Court’s prior § 101 
jurisprudence. In particular, Myriad eschewed both the “inventive 
concept” test and any consideration of “preemption” concerns, two 
core principles which dominated most of the Court’s prior patent-
eligibility decisions.675 We propose that Myriad’s departure from 
precedent presents a unique opportunity for the Supreme Court to hit 
 
 672.  Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 134–35 (1948) (Frankfurter, 
J., concurring). 
 673.  Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 189 n.12 (1981). 
 674.  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2107 (2013). 
 675.  See supra Part III.G. 
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“reset” on its § 101 jurisprudence in future cases, using Myriad as a 
pivot point and foundation for a “new” interpretation of § 101. 
A.  Myriad to the Rescue: A “New” Framework for Patent Eligibility 
We propose that the judicial exceptions to § 101 for “laws of 
nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas”—as well as the 
“inventive concept” test and any “preemption” concerns—should all 
be eliminated from the patent-eligibility analysis. In their stead, we 
propose consulting the statutory language of § 101 itself, including 
(a) the listed categories of patent-eligible subject matter, and (b) the 
requirement that patent-eligible subject matter must be “new.”676 
Based on these express statutory requirements, we propose that a 
claim should be found to recite patent-eligible subject matter if and 
only if the following questions are both answered in the affirmative: 
“(1) Does the claim, considered as a whole, literally recite a ‘process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter?’ (2) If so, is the 
claimed process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter 
one that is ‘new’ to the world?” 
The proposed framework closely tracks the plain language of 
§ 101, which expressly states that “any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter” constitutes patent-
eligible subject matter.677 Moreover, the proposed framework is 
functionally equivalent to the two-step analysis the Supreme Court 
effectively applied in Myriad, the Court’s most recent patent-
eligibility decision. We elaborate below as to the application of the 
proposed framework to various actual and hypothetical fact patterns, 
including the facts of Myriad and other cases. 
Under the first step of the proposed framework, the court would 
focus on the categories of patent-eligible subject matter expressly 
listed in § 101—i.e., “process, machine, manufacture, or composition 
of matter.”678 The focus should be on what is literally recited in the 
patent claim, considering the claim as a whole. To the extent that 
multiple claims are at issue, each claim must be considered 
individually on its own merits. Ultimately, any claim that literally 
recites a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter—
under the plain and ordinary meaning of those terms—would satisfy 
 
 676.  35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 677.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 678.  Id. 
 
Fall 2013] PATENT-ELIGIBILITY 225 
the first step of the proposed framework. The analysis would then 
proceed to step two. On the other hand, if a patent claim fails to 
literally recite subject matter within the § 101 categories, the claim 
would immediately be found patent ineligible, ending the analysis. 
We do not further belabor the first step of the proposed analysis, 
as the Court has long considered the § 101 categories at the onset of 
virtually every patent-eligibility analysis, with this base requirement 
typically found to be satisfied. For example, before applying the 
judicial exceptions in Benson, Flook, Chakrabarty, Diehr, Bilski, 
Mayo, and Myriad, the Court initially found that the claims at issue 
in each case recited subject matter that literally fell within the § 101 
categories.679 As a practical matter, patent claims that recite subject 
matter literally outside of the § 101 categories are unlikely to be filed 
by patentees and even less likely to be issued by the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office. As such, this initial step of the 
proposed framework would generally serve as a “coarse eligibility 
filter,”680 weeding out or deterring claims that do not even attempt to 
recite patent-eligible subject matter under § 101. 
If the first requirement is satisfied—i.e., if the claim literally 
recites a “process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter”—then the second step of the framework focuses on the § 101 
requirement that patent-eligible subject matter must be “new.” As we 
have described at length, we believe the term “new” was added to the 
definition of patent-eligible subject matter specifically to clarify that 
something must be “new” to the world to be patent eligible under 
§ 101, regardless of whether the claimed subject matter is novel 
under § 102.681 For this analysis, we propose that claimed subject 
matter is “new” to the world if and only if the claimed “process, 
 
 679.  See Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2113, 2116–17 (finding that the claimed DNA sequences fell 
into the “composition of matter” category); Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294 (finding that the claims at 
issue “cover[ed] processes that help doctors who use thiopurine drugs . . . determine whether a 
given dosage level is too low or too high”); Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225 (“The present case involves 
an invention that is claimed to be a ‘process’ under § 101.”); Diehr, 450 U.S. at 177 (“The 
claimed invention is a process for molding raw, uncured synthetic rubber into cured precision 
products.”); Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (finding that the claim at issue was directed to a 
“manufacture or composition of matter”); Flook, 437 U.S. at 588 (“It is true, as respondent 
argues, that his method is a ‘process’ in the ordinary sense of the word.”); Benson, 409 U.S. at 68 
(noting that “the present case deals with a ‘process’ claim”). 
 680.  Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 681.  See supra Part V.F. 
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machine, manufacture, or composition of matter” does not typically 
occur or exist in nature absent human input or intervention. 
For clarity, it is helpful to describe what step two of the 
proposed framework is not. First, unlike the Court’s “inventive 
concept” test, the question of whether the claimed subject matter is 
“new” to the world does not involve any dissection of the patent 
claim at issue. The framework does not call for a subjective 
identification of any “abstract idea” or “law of nature” “underlying” 
the patent claim.682 Rather, as for step one, the claim should again be 
considered as a whole for step two of the analysis. In other words, 
the level of generality at which to analyze the claimed subject matter 
is dictated solely by the limitations actually recited in the claim—
nothing more, nothing less. This reflects the “‘bedrock principle’ of 
patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention.’”683 
Second, the analysis of whether the claimed subject matter is 
“new” to the world should not invoke any considerations regarding 
claim overbreadth, abstractness, or preemption. Such concerns are 
appropriately analyzed under the enablement and definiteness 
requirements of § 112.684 
Third, the § 101 requirement that patent-eligible subject matter 
must be “new” should not be confused with the novelty or non-
obviousness requirements. Because the patent-eligibility inquiry 
under § 101 has no time element, subject matter that is patent eligible 
today should never cease to be patent eligible, regardless of the level 
of knowledge in the art.685 Thus, the § 101 inquiry should not be 
concerned with who invented or discovered the claimed subject 
matter first, or with the simplicity of the claimed subject matter given 
the state of the art. Such concerns are appropriately addressed under 
the § 102 novelty and § 103 obviousness inquiries, respectively. The 
patent-eligibility inquiry under § 101 should be concerned solely 
with the type of subject matter claimed. Thus, under our proposal, the 
question of whether the claimed subject matter is “new” to the world 
as required by § 101 would hinge solely on whether the recited 
 
 682.  Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293–94 (emphasis added). 
 683.  Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Innova/Pure 
Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see also 
Altoona Publix Theatres v. Am. Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U.S. 477, 487 (1935) (“Under the statute, it 
is the claims of the patent which define the invention.”). 
 684.  See supra Parts V.B–C. 
 685.  See supra Part V.D. 
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“process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter” typically 
exists or occurs in nature absent human input or intervention, 
regardless of when the subject matter was invented or discovered. 
Fourth, the claimed subject matter will be considered “new” to 
the world so long as it does not typically exist or occur in nature 
absent human input or intervention. As the Myriad Court recognized, 
a mere “possibility that an unusual and rare phenomenon might 
randomly create” the claimed subject matter does not defeat its 
patent eligibility.686 In our view, subject matter that does not 
typically exist in nature can always be considered “new” under 
§ 101—given the ordinary meaning of that term—even if the claimed 
subject matter could in theory result from an improbable random 
occurrence. 
Finally, as a practical matter, the second step of our framework 
will likely have significance for only two of the four categories of 
statutory subject matter—the “process” and “composition of matter” 
categories.687 There are countless “process[es]” and “composition[s] 
of matter” that typically occur or exist in nature and thus cannot be 
considered “new” to the world. In contrast, if a claim recites subject 
matter that literally falls within the “machine” or “manufacture” 
categories of § 101, then the claimed subject matter is likely “new” 
to the world, as machines and manufactures by definition exist solely 
due to human activity—i.e., they are things “made by man.”688 
As an exemplary application of the proposed framework, we 
first revisit the facts of Myriad, the Court’s most recent patent-
eligibility decision.689 Myriad discovered two human DNA 
sequences—the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes—which can be used to 
assess a patient’s risk of developing breast or ovarian cancer.690 
Myriad sought patent claims directed to (a) isolated DNA sequences 
relating to the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, and (b) synthetically 
created cDNA sequences derived from the BRCA1 and BRCA2 
genes.691 
 
 686.  Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2119 n.8. 
 687.  35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 688.  Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952); 
H.R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1952)). 
 689.  Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2107; see also supra Part III.G. 
 690.  Id. at 2110–13. 
 691.  Id. at 2111–12. 
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Under the first step of the proposed framework, we assess 
whether each claim, considered as a whole, literally recites a 
“process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter”—i.e., 
subject matter literally within one of the § 101 categories. We find it 
clear that all of the claims at issue in Myriad literally recited 
“composition[s] of matter”—i.e., compositions of nucleotides which 
form the claimed DNA and cDNA sequences. We note that the 
Myriad Court reached the same preliminary conclusion.692 
With step one satisfied for all of Myriad’s challenged claims, we 
next ask whether the particular “composition of matter” recited in 
each claim is “new” to the world. For this analysis, a “composition of 
matter” is “new” to the world if and only if it does not typically exist 
in nature absent human input or intervention. Again, each patent 
claim at issue must be considered as a whole and on its own merits. 
If a claim reads on any composition of matter that is not “new” to the 
world, then it recites subject matter that is patent ineligible under 
§ 101. 
Proceeding under step two, we first consider Myriad’s claims 
directed to isolated DNA sequences. Exemplary Claim 1 recites “[a]n 
isolated DNA coding for a BRCA1 polypeptide”—i.e., the entire 
BRCA1 sequence.693 This claim clearly fails step two, as the BRCA1 
nucleotide sequence typically exists in nature, as part of the human 
genome, without human input or intervention. Likewise, dependent 
Claim 5 recites “[a]n isolated DNA having at least 15 nucleotides of 
the DNA of claim 1.”694 This claim similarly fails step two, as it 
reads on any contiguous sequence of 15+ nucleotides that naturally 
exists in the BRCA1 portion of the human genome. Accordingly, 
because Claims 1 and 5 both read on compositions of matter that are 
not “new” to the world, these claims each recite subject matter that is 
patent ineligible under § 101. 
Our framework’s treatment of the foregoing isolated DNA 
claims is consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Myriad. 
Specifically, the Myriad Court found that “[t]he location and order of 
the nucleotides existed in nature before Myriad found them.”695 
 
 692.  Id. at 2113, 2116–17 (finding that the claimed DNA and cDNA sequences each literally 
recited a “composition of matter”). 
 693.  Id. at 2113. 
 694.  Id. 
 695.  Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2116 (emphasis added) 
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Myriad’s discovery of the naturally occurring BRCA1 sequence thus 
did “not render the BRCA genes ‘new . . . composition[s] of matter’ 
that are patent eligible.”696 As such, the Court held that Myriad’s 
claims to isolated DNA sequences were invalid under § 101.697 
We next apply step two of the proposed framework to Myriad’s 
cDNA claims. Exemplary Claim 2, for example, recites a cDNA 
sequence derived from isolated BRCA1—i.e., a sequence containing 
only the exon nucleotides from BRCA1, with all intervening intron 
nucleotides removed.698 Unlike the sequences of Claims 1 and 5, the 
cDNA sequence recited in claim 2 does not typically exist in nature 
without human input or intervention, as the precise nucleotide 
sequence claimed presumably cannot be found in the human genome. 
As such, the cDNA recited in Claim 2 is a composition of matter that 
is “new” to the world, rendering it patent eligible under § 101. 
Our framework’s treatment of Claim 2 is likewise consistent 
with the Supreme Court’s holding in Myriad. The Court reasoned 
that “cDNA does not present the same obstacles to patentability as 
naturally occurring, isolated DNA segments,” because “creation of a 
cDNA sequence . . . results in an exons-only molecule that is not 
naturally occurring.”699 The key fact, the Court held, was that “the 
lab technician unquestionably creates something new when cDNA is 
made,” rendering the claimed cDNA patent eligible under § 101.700 
Claim 6 of Myriad’s patent is also directed to cDNA, but 
applying step two of our framework yields a different result. Claim 6 
recites “[a]n isolated DNA having at least 15 nucleotides of the DNA 
of claim 2,” effectively claiming any 15+ nucleotide sequence found 
in cDNA derived from the BRCA1 gene.701 As previously discussed, 
cDNA is created by removing intron sequences from isolated DNA, 
keeping only the exon sequences.702 But exon sequences are often 
more than 15 nucleotides in length.703 Claim 6 would thus read on 
any 15+ nucleotide sequence that naturally exists within a single 
exon of the BRCA1 gene. Therefore, assuming the BRCA1 gene 
 
 696.  Id. at 2117 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 101) (emphases added). 
 697.  Id. at 2119. 
 698.  Id. at 2113. 
 699.  Id. at 2119 (emphasis added). 
 700.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 701.  Id. 
 702.  Id. at 2112. 
 703.  See supra note 353. 
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includes at least one 15+ nucleotide exon, Claim 6 reads on one or 
more nucleotide sequences that are not “new” to the world, rendering 
the claim invalid under § 101. 
The foregoing conclusion regarding Claim 6 is again consistent 
with the Supreme Court’s holding in Myriad. Specifically, the Court 
held that cDNA was typically patent eligible, “except insofar as very 
short series of DNA may have no intervening introns to remove 
when creating cDNA.”704 “In that situation,” the Court held, “a short 
strand of cDNA may be indistinguishable from natural DNA.”705 In 
other words, to pass muster under § 101, a patent claim cannot read 
on any nucleotide sequence that exists in the human genome. 
Thus, under both the proposed framework and Myriad, the key 
factors to patent eligibility are (1) whether the claim literally recites a 
“process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter”; and 
(2) whether the claimed subject matter is “new” to the world. Under 
step one, Myriad’s claims recited nucleotide sequences, which are 
“composition[s] of matter.” Under step two, Myriad’s claims that 
solely read on nucleotide sequences that are “new” to the world are 
patent eligible (e.g., cDNA with intervening introns removed), 
whereas Myriad’s claims that read on one or more nucleotide 
sequences that exist in the human genome are not patent eligible 
(e.g., isolated BRCA1, or any contiguous portion thereof). 
We note that, in reaching its holding, the Myriad Court reasoned 
that the mere act of “isolating DNA from the human genome” does 
not render the isolated nucleotide sequence patent eligible.706 
We agree. In fact, such considerations are already subsumed within 
step two of our proposed framework, which asks whether the 
claimed process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter is 
“new” to the world. A contiguous nucleotide sequence extracted 
from the human genome cannot be considered a “new . . . 
composition of matter” in any reasonable sense; it can at most be 
viewed as a naturally existing “composition of matter” that has been 
found and harvested. For example, a plant found in nature does not 
become a “new . . . composition of matter” when clipped from its 
stem, nor does a slab of stone become “new” when extracted from a 
quarry. 
 
 704.  Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2119 (emphasis added). 
 705.  Id. 
 706.  Id. at 2118 (emphasis added). 
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But if “isolation” from nature does not confer patent eligibility, 
how should the law treat something like a wooden baseball bat, given 
that the bat is merely a piece of wood “isolated” from a tree? Myriad 
raised this hypothetical before the Supreme Court, contending that 
the clear patent eligibility of a wooden baseball bat necessitates the 
patent eligibility of an isolated DNA sequence.707 The Court rejected 
this argument and found isolated DNA patent ineligible, but it did 
not address the baseball-bat hypothetical in its opinion.708 Our 
proposed framework, however, offers a straightforward means for 
distinction: Look to the actual limitations recited in the claim. 
For example, a claim to a wooden baseball bat which merely 
recites “a piece of wood sufficient for a person to swing” would fail 
to satisfy § 101 under the proposed framework, as the claim would 
literally read on a “composition of matter” that typically exists in 
nature—e.g., a fallen tree branch. In contrast, a more specific claim 
to a wooden baseball bat might read something like the following: 
A wooden baseball bat turned from a single piece of wood, 
comprising: 
(a) a cylindrical barrel having a first diameter sufficient to 
strike a baseball; 
(b) a cylindrical handle having a second diameter less than 
said first diameter and sufficient for a person to grip; 
(c) a tapered portion connecting said barrel and said handle; 
and 
(d) a cylindrical knob connected to the base of said handle 
and having a third diameter less than said first diameter and 
greater than said second diameter. 
The later claim’s structural and functional limitations clearly place 
the recited subject matter into the “machine” or “manufacture” 
categories of § 101, rather than the “composition of matter” category. 
Moreover, the recited “machine” or “manufacture” is clearly “new” 
to the world, as wooden baseball bats with the precise structural and 
functional attributes claimed do not typically exist in nature absent 
human input or intervention. Accordingly, the later claim would 
recite patent-eligible subject matter under § 101. 
 
 707.  See Brief for Respondents at 40–43, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398); 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 37, 41 & 48, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398). 
 708.  See Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2116–19. 
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We have shown above how the proposed framework is entirely 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Myriad. The 
framework is similarly consistent with the Court’s decision in 
Chakrabarty, wherein the Court considered a claim directed to a 
genetically engineered bacterium capable of breaking down crude 
oil.709 The Court found the claimed bacterium patent eligible under 
§ 101, reasoning that the patentee had “produced a new bacterium 
with markedly different characteristics from any found in nature.”710 
Likewise, the genetically engineered bacterium would be found 
patent eligible under our proposed framework, because (1) the 
genetically-engineered bacterium falls into the “composition of 
matter” category of § 101, and (2) the genetically-engineered 
bacterium is “new” to the world, as it does not typically exist in 
nature without human input or intervention. 
However, the proposed framework would reach a different result 
than the Supreme Court’s ruling in Funk Bros. In that case, the 
patentee claimed an inoculant mixture for plants comprising multiple 
strains of bacteria that would not inhibit each other’s effects.711 
The Court found the claimed inoculant mixture patent ineligible, 
reasoning that (a) the individual species of bacteria in the claimed 
inoculant mixture were each products of nature, and (b) the patent 
did not claim any inventive concept beyond the underlying “natural 
principle” that certain strains of bacteria do not inhibit each other’s 
effects.712 The § 101 analysis and outcome would differ under our 
proposed framework. 
Under the first step of the proposed framework, the claim from 
Funk Bros. would be considered as a whole to determine whether it 
recites subject matter that falls within the § 101 statutory categories. 
Because the claimed inoculant mixture is a “composition of matter,” 
this initial requirement is satisfied. Step two of our framework would 
then ask whether the claimed inoculant mixture as a whole is “new” 
to the world. This differs from the Court’s analysis in Funk Bros., 
which dissected the claim and focused on the fact that the individual 
species of bacteria comprising the claimed inoculant mixture were 
 
 709.  Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980). 
 710.  Id. at 310 (emphasis added). 
 711.  Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 128–30 (1948). 
 712.  Id. at 131. 
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each products of nature.713 In contrast, under the proposed 
framework, the claimed inoculant mixture as a whole is a 
“composition of matter” that is “new” to the world, because there is 
no indication that the claimed mixture of multiple species of bacteria 
typically exists in nature without human input or intervention. As 
such, the claimed inoculant mixture of Funk Bros. would be patent 
eligible under the proposed framework. 
While the foregoing applications of the proposed framework 
concern “composition of matter” claims, the analysis is substantially 
the same for claims directed to the other categories of statutory 
subject matter. Consider, for example, the previously discussed 
hypothetical method of curing cancer by injecting lunar dust into a 
patient’s bloodstream.714 The hypothetical claim reads as follows: A 
method of curing cancer, comprising the steps of: (1) dissolving 
250mg to 500mg of lunar dust in a liquid solution; (2) injecting said 
liquid solution containing said lunar dust into the bloodstream of a 
cancer patient; and (3) curing the patient of cancer. 
The foregoing claim satisfies step one of the proposed 
framework, as it recites subject matter that literally falls into the 
“process” category of § 101. The claim further satisfies step two, as 
the claimed “process” of curing cancer is “new” to the world. 
Specifically, there is no indication that the claimed process of curing 
cancer with lunar dust typically occurs in nature without human input 
or intervention. Accordingly, under the proposed framework, the 
foregoing claim recites patent-eligible subject matter. 
It should be noted that the patent eligibility of the foregoing 
“process” of curing cancer is not affected by the mere fact that it 
utilizes a “composition of matter”—lunar dust—that typically exists 
in nature. Under the proposed framework, a “process” may be “new” 
to the world, even if it involves the use of products of nature which 
are not themselves patent eligible. Thus, a “process” of curing cancer 
with lunar dust is patent eligible, even though the lunar dust itself 
would not be patent eligible in a “composition of matter” claim. 
Of course, there are a multitude of processes that typically occur 
in nature without human input or intervention and thus cannot be 
considered “new” to the world. For example, a chemical process that 
 
 713.  Id. 
 714.  See supra Part V.F. 
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typically occurs in swamplands, a biological process that typically 
occurs in a natural organism, or a naturally occurring weather 
process each would not be patent eligible under the proposed 
framework. Moreover, a “process” which typically exits in nature 
without human input or intervention does not automatically become 
a “new” process when recreated in a lab. For example, a naturally 
occurring biological process does not become a “new” process when 
recreated in a petri dish. This is a corollary to the previously 
discussed principle that mere “isolation” from nature does not render 
a “composition of matter” patent eligible. 
Needless to say, the foregoing exemplary applications of the 
proposed framework do not endeavor to address every possible 
nuance or fact pattern that might arise regarding patent eligibility. 
The framework would be further refined through the development of 
a new body of patent-eligibility jurisprudence building upon Myriad. 
The important thing, in our view, is that the analysis should proceed 
by asking the correct questions: (1) whether the claim literally recites 
a “process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter”; and (2) 
whether the claimed subject matter is “new” to the world. 
Finally, it should always be remembered that a finding of patent 
eligibility under § 101 does not itself render a claim patentable. The 
other patentability requirements must additionally be satisfied, such 
as the requirements of novelty,715 non-obviousness,716 enablement,717 
written description,718 and definiteness.719 Indeed, even as the 
Myriad Court found certain claims to cDNA patent eligible under 
§ 101, it “express[ed] no opinion [as to] whether cDNA satisfies the 
other statutory requirements of patentability.”720 
B.  Closing the Circle: A “New” Facet to the Obviousness Inquiry 
Under the proposed framework, a “composition of matter” that 
typically exists in nature is not “new” to the world and thus is not 
patent eligible under § 101. Thus, the sap of a tree discovered in the 
 
 715.  35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
 716.  35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). 
 717.  35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012). 
 718.  Id. 
 719.  35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012). 
 720.  See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2119 n.9 
(2013) (“We express no opinion whether cDNA satisfies the other statutory requirements of 
patentability. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, and 112 . . . .”). 
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Amazon (let us call it an “Eden” tree) would not be patent eligible, as 
the sap typically exists in nature without human input or intervention 
and thus is not “new” to the world. However, if one were to discover 
that sap from the Eden tree is an effective treatment for acne when 
applied to human skin, this “new . . . process” of treating acne would 
be patent eligible under the proposed framework. Unlike the sap 
itself, the claimed “process” of treating acne does not typically exist 
in nature absent human input or intervention, as the process requires 
sap to be extracted from an Eden tree and applied to a person’s skin. 
This raises an interesting question of fundamental importance: 
Even though sap from the Eden tree would be patent ineligible as a 
“composition of matter,” could a patentee effectively capture all uses 
of this naturally occurring substance by simply claiming a “process” 
of harvesting sap from an Eden tree? An exemplary claim might 
read: “A method of harvesting Eden tree sap, comprising the steps of 
(a) locating an Eden tree, (b) extracting sap from the trunk of said 
Eden tree, and (c) storing the extracted sap in a sealed receptacle.” 
Such a claim would recite a “process” that is “new” to the world, as 
the claimed process of harvesting sap from the Eden tree does not 
typically occur in nature absent human input or intervention. Thus, 
under a straightforward application of the proposed framework, the 
foregoing claim recites patent-eligible subject matter under § 101. 
The scenario above illustrates a danger that patent eligibility 
might be gamed through artful claim drafting. At a gut-check level, 
many would likely agree that if sap from an Eden tree is 
unpatentable, a claim directed to a generic method of harvesting the 
sap should be unpatentable as well. Any contrary conclusion would 
allow a patentee to effectively capture all uses of the Eden tree sap, 
even though the sap itself is barred from patentability under § 101. 
The key question is whether the Patent Act offers an objective and 
logical means to prevent such apparently inconsistent results. 
As a preliminary observation, we note that the answer to the 
foregoing riddle cannot logically extend from the patent-eligibility 
requirement of § 101, as a “method of harvesting Eden tree sap” is 
clearly a “process” that is “new” to the world. The simplistic or 
trivial nature of a claimed “process” is wholly irrelevant to the 
patent-eligibility inquiry, as § 101 is solely concerned with the type 
of subject matter claimed. Indeed, if a patentee were to invent a 
particularized method of harvesting tree sap that is novel, non-
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obvious, definite, and fully enabled by the patent’s specification, 
then such a “process” applied to harvesting sap from an Eden tree 
certainly would not be barred from patent eligibility under § 101. 
Thus, because § 101 offers no statutory basis for distinguishing 
between different “process[es]” that are “new” to the world, the 
patent-eligibility inquiry cannot solve this quandary. 
Nor could the patentability of the claimed “method of harvesting 
Eden tree sap” be challenged under the novelty requirement of § 102. 
A patent claim is anticipated under § 102 only if “each and every 
[claimed] limitation is found either expressly or inherently in a single 
prior art reference.”721 Because the patentee in our hypothetical was 
the first person to ever harvest sap from an Eden tree—an express 
claim limitation—the invention is clearly novel under § 102. 
Likewise, under prevailing doctrine, the claimed “method of 
harvesting Eden tree sap” could arguably satisfy the non-obviousness 
requirement of § 103. Under § 103, a patent may not be obtained if 
“the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious . . . to a 
person having ordinary skill in the art.”722 Let us assume that the 
claimed means of harvesting tree sap (from any type of tree) was 
merely a routine and conventional process that had long been well-
known in the relevant field. Under that scenario, the claimed 
“method of harvesting Eden tree sap” would still arguably be non-
obvious under § 103, as the patentee was the first to discover the 
existence of the Eden tree and its sap. Without knowledge of the 
Eden tree’s existence, the patentee would argue, a person of ordinary 
skill in the art could not have found it obvious to harvest Eden tree 
sap. In other words, to establish the non-obviousness of the claimed 
process under § 103, the patentee would distinguish the prior art 
based solely upon his discovery of things that exist in nature—i.e., 
the Eden tree and its sap—which are not themselves patent eligible 
under § 101. 
The foregoing example illustrates the potential for seemingly 
inconsistent results—(a) an Eden tree is patent ineligible under 
§ 101, yet discovery of the Eden tree might be the sole basis for a 
claim’s patentability under § 103; and (b) Eden tree sap is patent 
ineligible as a “composition of matter” under § 101, yet a patent-
 
 721.  Whitserve, LLC v. Computer Packages, Inc., 694 F.3d 10, 21 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 
Celeritas Techs., Ltd. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 722.  35 U.S.C. § 103. 
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eligible “method of harvesting Eden tree sap” could effectively 
capture all uses of the patent-ineligible composition of matter. The 
fundamental underlying question, which has lurked just beneath the 
surface of more than a century of patent-eligibility jurisprudence, can 
be stated as follows: Where a claim as a whole recites patent-eligible 
subject matter, to what extent can claim elements that would be 
patent ineligible if claimed alone be used to distinguish the claim 
from the prior art? 
We believe that the Supreme Court’s failure to directly address 
and answer the foregoing question has been a core source of the 
confusion that has long plagued the patent-eligibility inquiry. 
Apparently sensing the issue—but failing to directly articulate it—
the Court created the “inventive concept” test in an effort to avoid 
inconsistencies such as those described above. Under that test, the 
patent-ineligible law of nature, physical phenomena, or abstract idea 
that the Court identifies as underlying the claim at issue “is treated 
as though it were a familiar part of the prior art,” effectively 
excising it from the claim.723 The claim is then found to be patent 
eligible under § 101 only if the claim’s “other elements” collectively 
recite an “inventive concept”—i.e., more than mere “routine, 
conventional activity previously engaged in by researchers in the 
field.”724 
But as we have described at length, the “inventive concept” test 
is deeply flawed.725 Unlike our proposed framework, the “inventive 
concept” test focuses on the Court’s judicial exceptions to patent 
eligibility for “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract 
ideas,”726 which we have demonstrated are overbroad, inconsistent 
with the statute, and unworkable in practice.727 Moreover, as the 
Supreme Court has itself admitted, “ignoring all laws of nature when 
evaluating a patent . . . would ‘make all inventions unpatentable 
because all inventions can be reduced to underlying principles of 
nature which, once known, make their implementation obvious.’”728 
 
 723.  Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 597 (1978); see also Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. 
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293–94 (2012). 
 724.  Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294. 
 725.  See supra Part V.D. 
 726.  Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293 (citation omitted). 
 727.  See supra Part V. 
 728.  Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1304 (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 189 n.12). 
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As will be described further below, we do agree that at least 
some patent-ineligible subject matter should be viewed as prior art. 
However, such findings should be relevant only to an obviousness 
analysis under § 103. There is no statutory basis for importing 
obviousness considerations into the § 101 analysis,729 and doing so 
invites subjective determinations outside of the detailed obviousness 
framework that is defined by a rich body of § 103 jurisprudence.730 
But if some patent-ineligible subject matter is to be treated as 
prior art for the purposes of an obviousness analysis under § 103, 
what is the statutory basis for doing so, and where should the line be 
drawn? “[T]oo broad an interpretation of this exclusionary principle 
could eviscerate patent law,”731 while too narrow an interpretation 
would leave room for gamesmanship and inconsistent results such as 
those described above. To answer this riddle, we turn once again to 
Chief Judge Rader’s mantra: “When all else fails, consult the 
statute!”732 
Section 103 of the Patent Act reads in its entirety as follows: 
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, 
notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically 
disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences 
between the claimed invention and the prior art are such 
that the claimed invention as a whole would have been 
obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed 
invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to 
which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not 
be negated by the manner in which the invention was 
made.733 
Section 103 does not expressly define what sources may be 
considered “prior art” in the obviousness inquiry. The antecedent 
phrase “notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically 
disclosed as set forth in section 102” has been interpreted as 
 
 729.  See supra notes 579–594 and accompanying text. 
 730.  See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007); United States v. 
Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (2001); Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57 
(1969); Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966); Great Atlantic & Pacific 
Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950); Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 
U.S. 248 (1850). 
 731.  Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293. 
 732.  CLS Bank, 717 F.3d at 1335 (Rader, C.J., Additional Reflections). 
 733.  35 U.S.C. § 103 (emphasis added). 
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indicating that the “prior art” includes at least the categories of prior 
art defined under § 102.734 Importantly, however, there is nothing in 
§ 103 that necessarily limits the “prior art” solely to § 102 prior art. 
To the contrary, the Federal Circuit has expressly recognized that 
“section 102 is not the only source of section 103 prior art.”735 For 
example, “prior art may be created by the admissions of the parties,” 
such as an admission in the patent’s specification or prosecution 
history that certain subject matter constitutes “prior art,” even if there 
is no basis for that subject matter to qualify as prior art under 
§ 102.736 As another example, “common sense” improvements and 
“common knowledge” may be considered in the obviousness 
analysis, even if not disclosed in any § 102 prior art reference.737 We 
posit that, in addition to the foregoing sources of prior art that may 
be considered in the obviousness inquiry, there is also a set of prior 
 
 734.  See Riverwood Int’l Corp. v. R.A. Jones & Co., Inc., 324 F.3d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 
2003) (“The term ‘prior art’ as used in section 103 refers at least to the statutory material named 
in 35 U.S.C. § 102.”) (emphasis added); In re Wertheim, 646 F.2d 527, 532 (CCPA 1981) (“[W]e 
have held that the term ‘prior art’ refers to at least the statutory prior art material named in 
§ 102.”) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also S. Rep. No. 
1979, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, at 2399 (“Section 
103 . . . refers to the difference between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art, 
meaning what was known before as described in section 102.”). 
 735.  Riverwood, 324 F.3d at 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also In re Fout, 675 F.2d 297, 300 
(CCPA 1982) (“This court has recognized that section 102 is not the only source of section 103 
prior art.”). 
 736.  Riverwood, 324 F.3d at 1354; see PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. ViaCell, Inc., 491 
F.3d 1342, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Admissions in the specification regarding the prior art are 
binding on the patentee for purposes of a later inquiry into obviousness.”); Constant v. Advanced 
Micro-Devices, 848 F.2d 1560, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“A statement in a patent that something is 
in the prior art is binding on the applicant and patentee for determinations of anticipation and 
obviousness.”); Sjolund v. Musland, 847 F.2d 1573, 1577–79 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (where patent 
specification admitted that certain subject matter was prior art, “the jury was not free to disregard 
[that subject matter]” and “must have accepted [it] as prior art, as a matter of law”); see also In re 
Fout, 675 F.2d at 300; In re Nomiya, 509 F.2d 566, 571 (CCPA 1975); In re Hellsund, 474 F.2d 
1307, 1386 (CCPA 1973); In re LoPresti, 333 F.2d 932, 934 (CCPA 1964); John Burke, The 
Prior Art By Admission Doctrine: Judicially Created Private Prior Art, 13 FED. CIR. B.J. 607 
(2004) (gathering and discussing cases); Lance Leonard Barry, Anything You Say Can Be Used 
Against You: Admissions of Prior Art, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 347 (2000) 
(gathering and discussing cases). 
 737.  See, e.g., KSR, 127 U.S. at 420–21 (“Common sense teaches . . . that familiar items may 
have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and in many cases a person of ordinary skill 
will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle.”); Perfect Web 
Techs., Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that “an analysis of 
obviousness . . . may include recourse to logic, judgment, and common sense available to the 
person of ordinary skill that do not necessarily require explication in any reference or expert 
opinion”); In re Bozek, 416 F.2d 1385, 1390 (CCPA 1969) (holding that an examiner my find 
obviousness based on “common knowledge and common sense of the person of ordinary skill in 
the art without any specific hint or suggestion in a particular reference”). 
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art defined by § 101. We propose the following rule: “Pursuant to 
§ 101, any ‘process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter’ that is not ‘new’ to the world is ‘prior art’ for the purposes of 
a § 103 obviousness analysis.” 
The logic of the proposed § 101 prior-art rule is straightforward, 
and it is firmly grounded in the statutory text. First, § 101 lists the 
categories of subject matter that are potentially patent eligible—i.e., 
any “process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”738 
Second, under our framework, anything that falls into these statutory 
categories is patent eligible, provided that it is “new” to the world.739 
But if a “process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter” 
is not “new” to the world, it is unpatentable under § 101. In such 
case, the subject matter’s prior existence in nature is the sole reason 
for its unpatentability under § 101. In other words, a “process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter” that is not “new” to 
the world is unpatentable under § 101, not because it falls outside the 
statutory categories, but rather because it is in effect anticipated by 
nature. In this regard, § 101 and § 102 can be viewed as two sides of 
the same coin—the former defining a set of prior art created by 
nature, and the latter defining a set of prior art created by man.740 
Indeed, the fundamental principle underlying the concept of 
prior art is that “Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents 
whose effects are to remove [subject matter] from the public domain, 
or to restrict free access to materials already available.”741 If a 
“process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter” is 
unpatentable under § 101 because it is not “new” to the world, then 
that subject matter is unquestionably within the public domain. For 
example, if a “composition of matter” is unpatentable under § 101 
because it exists in nature and thus is not “new” to the world, then 
that composition of matter is necessarily a material to which all 
members of the public are entitled free access. 
 
 738.  35 U.S.C. § 101. 
 739.  Id. 
 740.  See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (“Whoever invents or discovers and new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter . . . may obtain a patent therefor . . . .”) 
(emphasis added); 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless—(1) the 
claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or 
otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention; . . . .”) 
(emphases added). 
 741.  Graham, 383 U.S. at 6. 
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Moreover, a patent may not “remove from the public that which 
is in the public domain by virtue of its inclusion in, or obviousness 
from, the prior art.”742 In other words, “obvious variants of prior art 
references are themselves part of the public domain.”743 Accordingly, 
because a “process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter” 
that exists in nature is within the public domain, obvious variants and 
uses thereof should be viewed as within the public domain as well. 
Thus, if a natural “process” is unpatentable under § 101 because it is 
not “new” to the world, then obvious variants and uses of the natural 
process should be unpatentable as well. In such cases, the necessary 
conclusion is that the natural subject matter must be viewed as “prior 
art” for the purposes of an obviousness analysis under § 103. 
Finally, the fact that a patentee may have been first to uncover 
the existence of certain subject matter in nature is irrelevant to the 
§ 103 inquiry, because “actual knowledge of the [subject matter] is 
not required for [it] to be considered prior art.”744 “To determine 
patentability, a hypothetical person [having ordinary skill in the art] 
is presumed to know all the pertinent prior art, whether or not the 
applicant [was] actually aware of its existence” prior to the alleged 
invention.745 This “conclusive presumption of knowledge of such 
prior art is, in effect, a statutorily required fiction.”746 We see no 
reason this legal fiction should not apply equally to both prior art 
defined under § 101 and prior art defined under § 102. 
Accordingly, under the proposed § 101 prior-art rule, the 
obviousness analysis under § 103 would presume that a hypothetical 
person having ordinary skill in the art has full knowledge of the 
existence of every “process, machine, manufacture, and composition 
of matter” that is not “new” to the world—i.e., that typically exists or 
occurs in nature without human input or intervention. 
It is equally important to note what knowledge our proposed rule 
would not automatically attribute to the hypothetical person having 
ordinary skill in the art. While the person of ordinary skill would be 
presumed to have knowledge of the existence of every naturally 
 
 742.  In re Huai-Hung Kao, 639 F.3d 1057, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting In re Wiseman, 
596 F.2d 1019, 1023 (CCPA 1979)) (emphasis added). 
 743.  In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (emphasis added). 
 744.  In re Carlson, 983 F.2d 1032, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 745.  Id.; see also In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“The person of 
ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person who is presumed to know the relevant prior art.”). 
 746.  In re Howarth, 654 F.2d 103, 106 (Fed. Cir. 1981). 
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occurring “process, machine, manufacture, and composition of 
matter,” the presumption of knowledge would not extend to any 
attribute, quality, utility, or application of the natural subject matter. 
To be sure, the full § 103 analysis may ultimately conclude that a 
particular attribute, quality, utility, or application would have been 
obvious to a person of ordinary skill who has knowledge of the 
subject matter’s existence in nature. But that is an argument to be 
made, not an automatic presumption to be applied. 
Indeed, the foregoing is a key distinction between our proposed 
§ 101 prior-art rule and the Supreme Court’s “inventive concept” 
test. Beyond the existence of subject matter that falls within the 
§ 101 statutory categories but is not “new” to the world, the Court’s 
“inventive concept” test presumes that a person of ordinary skill in 
the art has full knowledge of any underlying principle, attribute, 
quality, or utility that can be characterized as a “law of nature.”747 
As we have discussed and the Supreme Court has admitted, faithful 
application of this rule would eviscerate patent law, “because all 
inventions can be reduced to underlying principles of nature which, 
once known, make their implementation obvious.”748 Moreover, 
unlike our proposed § 101 prior-art rule, the “inventive concept” test 
lacks any basis in the statutory text, and it conflicts with the plain 
language of § 101 that makes “discover[ies]” patent eligible so long 
as the claimed subject matter falls within the listed statutory 
categories and is “new” to the world.749 
We will now provide a series of exemplary applications of the 
proposed patent-eligibility framework in conjunction with the 
proposed § 101 prior-art rule. We return first to our hypothetical 
regarding the Eden tree. Let us consider, for example, a 
“composition of matter” claim directed solely to Eden tree sap. 
Applying the proposed framework, such a claim would clearly recite 
patent-ineligible subject matter under § 101, as Eden tree sap 
typically exists in nature without human input or intervention and 
thus is not “new” to the world. Such a “composition of matter” claim 
would therefore be rendered unpatentable by § 101, making 
consideration of the § 103 obviousness analysis unnecessary. 
 
 747.  See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293–94; Flook, 43 U.S. at 597. 
 748.  Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1304 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 189 n.12 (1981)). 
 749.  See supra Parts V.D–E. 
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The analysis changes if we instead consider a claim that recites: 
“A method of harvesting Eden tree sap, comprising the steps of 
(a) locating an Eden tree, (b) extracting sap from the trunk of said 
Eden tree, and (c) storing the extracted sap in a sealed receptacle.” 
The foregoing claim recites a “process” that is “new” to the world, as 
the claimed process of harvesting Eden tree sap does not typically 
occur in nature absent human input or intervention. As such, the 
claim recites patent-eligible subject matter under § 101. 
However, while the claimed “method of harvesting Eden tree 
sap” is patent eligible under § 101, the claim must still satisfy the 
remaining patentability requirements, including the non-obviousness 
requirement of § 103. Under § 103, a patent may not be obtained if 
“the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious . . . to a 
person having ordinary skill in the art.”750 Our hypothetical presumes 
that the recited means of harvesting tree sap was well-known in the 
art at the time of the alleged invention. Further, under the proposed 
§ 101 prior-art rule, because the Eden tree and its sap are both 
“composition[s] of matter” that are not “new” to the world, they 
constitute “prior art” for the purpose of the § 103 analysis. Under 
these circumstances, we believe that a fact finder would likely 
conclude that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have 
found it obvious that the known means of harvesting tree sap could 
be used to harvest sap from the Eden tree, the existence of which is 
presumed to be well-known. Accordingly, the claimed “method of 
harvesting Eden tree sap” would likely be found invalid as obvious 
under § 103. 
The analysis changes yet again if, after discovering that sap 
from the Eden tree is an effective treatment for acne, the patentee 
claims “[a] method of treating acne by applying Eden tree sap to a 
person’s skin.” In that scenario, the claimed “process” of treating 
acne would be “new” to the world, as it does not typically occur in 
nature absent human input or intervention. Accordingly, such a claim 
would be patent eligible under § 101. 
Turning to the § 103 analysis, the Eden tree sap would again be 
considered “prior art,” as it is a “composition of matter” that is not 
“new” to the world. However, while the Eden tree sap’s existence 
would be considered well-known, the prior art would not include the 
 
 750.  35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). 
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knowledge that Eden tree sap can be used to treat acne. The relevant 
question, therefore, would be whether a person having ordinary skill 
in the art would have found it obvious to use the known substance of 
Eden tree sap to treat acne. Given that the prior art includes no 
knowledge that Eden tree sap is effective at treating acne, we believe 
a fact finder would likely find the claim non-obvious under § 103. 
Accordingly, unlike the claims directed to Eden tree sap as a 
“composition of matter” or to a generic “process” of harvesting Eden 
tree sap, the claimed method of using Eden tree sap to treat acne 
would be both patent eligible (§ 101) and non-obvious (§ 103). 
As described above, if a “composition of matter” or “process” 
constitutes prior art under § 101 because it is not “new” to the world, 
then the hypothetical person having ordinary skill in the art is 
presumed to have knowledge of the subject matter’s existence in 
nature. It should be noted that knowledge of the subject matter’s 
existence in nature necessarily includes knowledge of all locations in 
nature where the subject matter can be found. 
For example, let us consider a hypothetical scenario in which a 
patentee was the first to discover that the DNA of an unborn fetus 
can be found circulating in the maternal bloodstream during 
pregnancy. Presume the patentee then claimed a “method of 
detecting fetal DNA in maternal blood” generally comprising the 
steps of (1) analyzing maternal blood using well-known laboratory 
tests, and (2) detecting the fetal DNA in the maternal blood. Because 
fetal DNA is a “composition of matter” that typically exists in nature 
and thus is not “new” to the world, the fetal DNA itself constitutes 
§ 101 prior art under our proposed rule. As such, a person having 
ordinary skill in the art would be presumed to have knowledge of the 
fetal DNA’s existence and location in nature—including, 
specifically, the fact that fetal DNA naturally exists in the maternal 
bloodstream. Under these circumstances, we believe a fact finder 
would likely conclude that a person having ordinary skill in the art 
would have found it obvious that known tests for analyzing blood 
could be used to detect fetal DNA in maternal blood, given the 
presumption that the presence of fetal DNA in maternal blood was 
already well-known. Accordingly, the claimed “method of detecting 
fetal DNA in maternal blood” would likely be found invalid as 
obvious under § 103. 
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While the foregoing examples both concerned “process” claims, 
the proposed § 101 prior-art rule applies to any type of claim. For 
example, let us again revisit the facts of Funk Bros., where the 
patentee claimed an inoculant mixture for plants comprising multiple 
strains of bacteria that did not inhibit each other’s effects.751 The 
Supreme Court found the claimed inoculant mixture patent ineligible 
under § 101, in part because the individual species of bacteria 
comprising the mixture were each products of nature.752 In contrast, 
as we described in Part VI.A, supra, our proposed framework would 
find the Funk Bros. claim patent eligible under § 101, as the claimed 
inoculant mixture as a whole is a “composition of matter” that is 
“new” to the world—i.e., the mixture of bacteria does not typically 
exist in nature absent human input or intervention. 
But the Funk Bros. inoculant mixture must still satisfy the non-
obviousness requirement of § 103. Under the proposed § 101 prior-
art rule, each of the individual species of bacteria comprising the 
claimed inoculant mixture would be considered “prior art” for the 
§ 103 analysis, as each bacteria strain is a “composition of matter” 
that typically exists in nature and thus is not “new” to the world. 
A person having ordinary skill in the art would thus be presumed to 
have knowledge of the existence of each bacteria strain. But that does 
not end the inquiry, as the claimed invention must be “considered as 
a whole” under § 103.753 The relevant question is whether a person 
of ordinary skill would have found it obvious to combine the known 
bacteria strains to create the claimed inoculant mixture. The Funk 
Bros. Court found that, prior to the invention, “it had been assumed 
that the different [bacteria] species were mutually inhibitive.”754 The 
inventor then “discovered that there are strains of each species of . . . 
bacteria which do not exert a mutually inhibitive effect on each 
other.”755 In our opinion, without this added knowledge discovered 
by the inventor (i.e., the qualities of mutual non-inhibition), a person 
having ordinary skill in the art would not have found it obvious to 
combine the known species of bacteria to form the claimed mixture. 
Accordingly, under our proposed patent-eligibility framework and 
 
 751.  Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 128–30. 
 752.  Id. at 131. 
 753.  35 U.S.C. § 103. 
 754.  Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). 
 755.  Id. 
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prior-art rule, the claimed inoculant mixture would have likely been 
found both patent eligible (§ 101) and non-obvious (§ 103). 
As a final example, we return once again to the facts of Myriad, 
including Myriad’s claims directed to synthetically created cDNA. 
As we discussed in Part VI.A, supra, our proposed framework would 
find that claims which recite cDNA (with one or more intervening 
introns removed) are patent eligible under § 101, as such claims 
recite “composition[s] of matter” (i.e., nucleotide sequences) that are 
“new” to the world (i.e., do not typically exist in the human genome). 
The Myriad Court reached the same conclusion under substantially 
similar reasoning.756 However, although the Myriad Court found that 
such cDNA claims were patent eligible under § 101, it “express[ed] 
no opinion [as to] whether cDNA satisfies the other statutory 
requirements of patentability,” such as obviousness under § 103.757 
The genome of a natural organism typically comprises one or 
more discrete chromosomes, wherein each chromosome is encoded 
with a sequence of millions of chemically joined nucleotide pairs.758 
Each chromosome is a “composition of matter” that typically exists 
in nature and thus is not “new” to the world. As such, under the 
proposed § 101 prior-art rule, every chromosome that exists in 
nature—including its entire nucleotide sequence—constitutes “prior 
art” for the purposes of a § 103 analysis. This means that a person of 
ordinary skill in the art would be presumed to have knowledge of the 
existence and location—i.e., the sequence—of all nucleotides in 
every chromosome of the natural organism’s genome. The 
corresponding implications for the obviousness inquiry will likely 
depend on the specific limitations recited in the claim at issue. 
For example, consider a hypothetical “composition of matter” 
claim directed to cDNA derived from the full nucleotide sequence of 
a chromosome. In other words, presume that the claim recites cDNA 
comprising all exons from the entire chromosome, with all of the 
introns removed. Under the proposed § 101 prior-art rule, the full 
nucleotide sequence of the chromosome used to create the cDNA 
would be considered “prior art” for the § 103 analysis. Further, as the 
Supreme Court noted in Myriad, the prior art also includes “well 
 
 756.  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2119 (2013). 
 757.  Id. at 2119 n.9 (“We express no opinion whether cDNA satisfies the other statutory 
requirements of patentability. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, and 112 . . . .”). 
 758.  Id. at 2111, 2114. 
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known laboratory methods” for deriving cDNA from natural 
DNA.759 Under these circumstances, we believe a fact finder would 
likely conclude that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have 
found it obvious that the known laboratory methods could be used to 
derive cDNA from the known nucleotide sequence of the 
chromosome. Thus, the hypothetical claim directed to cDNA derived 
from an entire natural chromosome would likely be invalid as 
obvious under § 103. 
The analysis changes, however, if we consider a “composition 
of matter” claim that recites cDNA derived from a specific subset of 
a chromosome’s nucleotide sequence. For example, Myriad 
discovered that a subset of the nucleotides located within 
chromosome 17 (the BRCA1 sequence) can be used to predict a 
patient’s cancer risk.760 Claim 2 of Myriad’s patent thus recited 
cDNA derived from the BRCA1 sequence.761 Under the proposed 
§ 101 prior-art rule, the entire nucleotide sequence of chromosome 
17 would be considered “prior art” for the § 103 analysis. What 
would not be prior art, however, is the knowledge that the BRCA1 
subset of chromosome 17 has a unique utility for predicting cancer 
risk. But a patent claim which recites a “composition of matter” is 
not limited to any specific utility. Thus, the relevant question for the 
§ 103 analysis is whether a person of ordinary skill would have 
found it obvious to use known laboratory methods to create cDNA 
from the BRCA1 subset of chromosome 17’s known nucleotide 
sequence, notwithstanding that the BRCA1 subset’s utility for 
predicting cancer risk was previously unknown. 
For such claims, the Federal Circuit has held that a “prima facie 
case of obviousness” may be established if there is “structural 
similarity” to the prior art and a “motivation to make the claimed 
composition[]”—i.e., a motivation aside from the newfound 
utility.762 The burden then shifts to the patentee to “rebut that prima 
facie case,” for example, by showing “that the prior art is so deficient 
that there is no motivation to make what might otherwise appear to 
be obvious.”763 The discovery of “unexpectedly improved properties 
 
 759.  Id. at 2112. 
 760.  Id. at 2110–11. 
 761.  Id. at 2113. 
 762.  In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 692 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc). 
 763.  Id. at 693. 
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or properties that the prior art does not have” is evidence of non-
obviousness, but “does not by itself defeat a prima facie case.”764 
Ultimately, analyzing Claim 2 of Myriad’s patent for obviousness 
will be a fact-intensive inquiry that is beyond the scope of this 
Article.765 But whatever the outcome, the important point is that the 
§ 103 analysis of the claimed subject matter—cDNA derived from 
the BRCA1 sequence—should proceed based upon the view that the 
natural nucleotide sequence of chromosome 17 is “prior art.” 
Finally, the analysis changes once again if—rather than a 
“composition of matter”—we instead consider a claimed “process” 
of using the BRCA1 sequence to test patients for an increased risk of 
cancer. Such a claim would recite patent-eligible subject matter 
under § 101, as the claimed “process” of using BRCA1 to assess a 
patient’s cancer risk is clearly “new” to the world—i.e., the process 
does not typically occur in nature without human input or 
intervention. 
Turning to the obviousness inquiry, the nucleotide sequence of 
chromosome 17—which includes the BRCA1 sequence—would 
again be considered “prior art” for the § 103 analysis, as it is a 
“composition of matter” that is not “new” to the world. However, 
while the sequence’s existence would be considered well-known, the 
prior art would not include knowledge that the BRCA1 sequence can 
be used to assess cancer risk. Moreover, unlike a “composition of 
matter” claim, the claimed “process” is tied to a specific utility—i.e., 
assessing cancer risk. As such, the relevant question for the § 103 
analysis is whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would have 
found it obvious to use the BRCA1 subset of chromosome 17’s 
known nucleotide sequence to test patients for increased cancer risk. 
Given that the prior art includes no knowledge that the BRCA1 
sequence can be used to assess cancer risk, we believe a fact finder 
would likely find the claimed process non-obvious under § 103. 
Accordingly, a claimed “process” of using the BRCA1 sequence to 
test patients for increased cancer risk would be both patent eligible 
(§ 101) and non-obvious (§ 103) under our proposed framework. 
 
 764. Id. at 692–93 (emphasis added). 
 765.  Id. at 693 (“Each situation must be considered on its own facts . . . .”); see generally 
Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Sandoz, Inc., 678 F.3d 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (analyzing obviousness 
of a pharmaceutical composition); Genetics Inst., LLC v. Novartis Vaccines & Diagnostics, Inc., 
655 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (analyzing obviousness of a human blood-clotting protein). 
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Indeed, this result should be unsurprising—the Myriad Court 
expressly noted that “this case does not involve [claims] on new 
applications of knowledge about the BRCA1” sequence, and “[m]any 
of [the] unchallenged claims are limited to such applications.”766 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
As we have endeavored to demonstrate in this Article, prior to 
Myriad, the Supreme Court’s patent-eligibility jurisprudence was 
deeply flawed. The Court’s judicially created exceptions to patent-
eligible subject matter lack any support in the statutory text, are 
based on misinterpretations of the Court’s own precedents, and rely 
upon subjective determinations that have proved thoroughly 
confounding for lower courts to apply. Further, the judicial 
exceptions have been prompted by concerns that Congress has 
already addressed in other explicit provisions of the patent laws, 
including but not limited to the requirements of non-obviousness,767 
full-scope enablement,768 written description,769 and claim 
definiteness.770 We submit that these other provisions should be 
allowed to do their work as Congress intended, while the patent-
eligibility inquiry should be limited to a role firmly grounded in the 
plain language of § 101. We have accordingly proposed a new 
framework for the patent-eligibility inquiry that takes its cues from 
Myriad and abandons the dominant frameworks of the Supreme 
Court’s pre-Myriad case law. 
Under our proposed framework, and consistent with the text of 
§ 101, a claim recites patent-eligible subject matter if and only if 
(1) the claim as a whole literally recites a “process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter,” and (2) the claimed subject 
matter as a whole is “new” to the world.771 For this analysis, the 
claimed subject matter is “new” to the world if and only if it does not 
typically exist or occur in nature absent human input or intervention. 
 
 766.  Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2120 (emphasis altered); see also id. at 2113 n.2 (“At issue are 
claims 1, 2, 5, 6, and 7 of U.S. Patent 5,747,282 . . . .”); U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 claim 20 (filed 
June 7, 1995) (unchallenged claim 20 reciting “[a] method for screening potential cancer 
therapeutics . . . .”). 
 767.  35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). 
 768.  35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012). 
 769.  Id. 
 770.  35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012). 
 771.  35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
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Finally, to close the circle and preserve that which is rightfully in the 
public domain, any “process, machine, manufacture, or composition 
of matter” that is not “new” to the world constitutes § 101 “prior art,” 
which may be cited in a typical § 103 obviousness analysis. 
The framework we have proposed maintains the long-standing 
prohibition against patenting products of nature—consistent with the 
statutory text—while providing a bright-line rule that will bring 
much-needed predictability and consistency to the § 101 inquiry. The 
framework reserves for other, better-suited provisions of the patent 
laws the more granular balancing of interests required to determine 
whether a particular claimed invention warrants patent protection. 
Finally, we emphasize that the proposed framework set forth in this 
Article would require changes to prevailing law—including the 
express overruling of a number of Supreme Court precedents—
which of course only the Supreme Court or Congress have the power 
to do. 
